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“Human beings are an amalgam of identities—race and economic 
status, etc., etc.  We [do not] live our lives as demographics or as 
political statements.  We simply live.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law is stuck on binary or categorical approaches.2  One is either 
this or that—heterosexual or homosexual; male or female; black or white; 
and the list can go on and on.3  This article posits that this approach should 
not be the way in which we categorize people’s personhood.4  To give the 
best example of why the law should rid itself of the binary approach we 
purposely focus on transsexuals.  They offer the best opportunity to 
experience how the law so often punishes them because they do not fit into 
one category.5  While the United States is slowly accepting gay and lesbian 
requests for justice, that particular happenstance does not solve the problem 
for transsexuals.6  Such a transformation for gays and lesbians can take place 
because it is obvious that if you are gay or a lesbian, then you are not a 
heterosexual, which allows the law to keep the binary approach.7  In order to 
fully understand intersections of identity and the binary approach to law, it is 
necessary to first look at how classifications are brought about in the social, 
psychological, and biological world.8  To bring life to these heady subjects, 
this Article shares with the reader actual stories of people who have to exist 
in a world enamored with categories.9  Lastly, this Article explores how the 
                                                            
1. Bob Minzesheimer, This Is Ayana Mathis:  And When She Heard ‘This Is 
Oprah Winfrey,’ Everything Changed for Debut Novelist, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2013, at D1. 
2. See Eric Engle, Aristotle, Law and Justice:  The Tragic Hero, 35 N. KY. L. 
REV. 1, 5–6, 9 n.71 (2008).  Aristotle was clearly a dialectician.  Id. at 2.  Inequalities are 
presumed unless you belong into the categories.  See id. at 5–6, 10–11.  The binary approach 
is Aristotle’s legacy, which permeates the law as well as other disciplines.  Id. at 9 n.71.  
Others have suggested a new approach, however, still accept the binary approach but just 
broaden it.  See Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories:  A 
Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 
919–20 (2002). 
3. See id. at 922. 
4. See infra Part XI. 
5. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 920–21. 
6. See Emily Greenhouse, Dropping the “T”:  Trans Rights in the Marriage 
Era, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/dropping-
the-t-trans-rights-in-the-marriage-era. 
7. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 921. 
8. See infra Parts II–IV. 
9. See infra Part V. 
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law approaches transsexual identity.10  It will be apparent that we should 
jettison the various identity categories and treat everyone as persons.11 
II. DEFINITIONS 
Since this Article, unlike most articles, will not focus on a single 
category of people, it is necessary to provide the reader with the vocabulary 
that will be used.  Transsexual or transgender includes many variations.12  
Various politically motivated groups use the word transsexuals as an 
organizing function so that the public will have a label to refer to a group of 
people advocating for their rights. 13   That group, however, may have a 
contingent of the following:  Male-to-Female (“MTF”).14  These folks are 
born with male genitalia but prefer to be considered female.15  Within that 
group are those who have gone through gender reassignment surgery 
(“GRS”).16  Of course, there is also Female-to-Male (“FTM”) for the women 
who identify as men.17  There are also people who are transvestites, who 
dress in the manner of the opposite gender from what they are.18  Included in 
this group are drag kings and drag queens.19  One of the main points to 
remember is that gender identity, birth sex, and sexual orientation are 
different.20  Because these variations exist on a sliding scale, there are those 
                                                            
10. See infra Part VI. 
11. See infra Part XI.  Making a person identify themselves has pitfalls in that 
it makes a person classify themselves.  Jody Lyneé Madeira, Comment, Law as a Reflection of 
Her/His-Story:  Current Institutional Perceptions of, and Possibilities for, Protecting 
Transsexuals’ Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 165 (2002).  
The authors are not suggesting that anyone has to identify himself or herself; only to say that 
they are a person.  See infra Part VI.  Thus, gender or sexual orientation is not the question 
asked.  See infra Part VI.  Also, some say that allowing transsexuals to decide would 
undermine the law’s consistency.  Madeira, supra note 11, at 171.  Such observations seem to 
be based on when a person could decide.  Id.  It is not necessary to pinpoint when the person 
who is self-identifying makes the decision.  See id. at 172.  Subjectively, the person should 
have the power to decide.  Contra id. at 171.  Yes, it is true judges would, at first, need 
training in this area.  See id. at 172–73. 
12. Laura E. Kuper et al., Exploring the Diversity of Gender and Sexual 
Orientation Identities in an Online Sample of Transgender Individuals, 49 J. SEX RES. 244, 
244 (2012). 
13. Id. 
14. Transgendered Definitions, CONN. OUTREACH SOC’Y, http://
www.ctoutreach.org/faq.pdf. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Transgendered Definitions, supra note 14. 
20. Madeira, supra note 11, at 171; see also JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., 
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN:  A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION 
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who would prefer to adopt a name that is more inclusive of everyone.21  For 
instance, QUILTBAG—an acronym that stands for “Queer/Questioning, 
Undecided, Intersex, Lesbian, Transgender/Transsexual, Bisexual, 
Allied/Asexual, Gay/Genderqueer”—has been suggested.22  “It is meant to 
be a more inclusive term than [Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender/Lesbian-
Gay-Bisexual-Transexual (“GLBT/LGBT”)] and to be more 
pronounceable—and memorable—than some of the other variations or 
extensions on the GLBT/LGBT abbreviation.”23  In one study, it was found 
that the younger generation prefers not to put their identity in any category.24  
They instead champion the idea of identity being fluid and contextual.25  This 
group also challenges “the assumption that their sexual orientation is a core 
feature of their sense of self.”26 
The authors, however, will be using the term transsexuals as the 
generic term, but with the caution that all of the above folks should be 
included.27  Indeed, the Article will show that in many instances—depending 
where you are on the scale of gender identity and sexual orientation—the law 
may be particularly tricky.28 
III. SOCIETY’S TREATMENT OF IDENTITY 
While race classification has received considerable discussion and 
legal attention for decades, sex and gender classification systems have only 
recently become the subject of litigation.29  As such, the traditional approach 
has been one of adopting a binary sex classification system instead of one 
that would deconstruct such a limited means of addressing human rights and 
privileges.30  Of particular concern are people who are transsexual, who are 
                                                                                                                                            
SURVEY 24 (2011), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDS_Report.pdf.  The authors 
stated that the survey respondents were sixty percent assigned male at birth, but twenty-nine 
percent now said male was their identity.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25.  Forty-two 
percent said they were female.  Id. 
21. See Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 248. 
22. QUILTBAG, QUEER DICTIONARY, (Mar. 16, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://
queerdictionary.tumblr.com/post/3899608042/quiltbag. 
23. Id. 
24. Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250; GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25.  
Twenty-nine percent of the respondents said they were something else other than just male or 
female.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25.  Also, the younger respondents identified as 
gender non-conforming.  Id. 
25. Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250. 
26. Id. 
27. See supra Part II. 
28. See infra Part III. 
29. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 919. 
30. Id. at 919–20. 
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forced to live in a rather twilight zone of factors that create a formidable 
chasm even with some gays, lesbians and bi-sexuals who “fear that inclusion 
of transgendered individuals may result in . . . rejection of legislation that 
would protect GLBs from sexual orientation discrimination.”31  Given the 
pervasive oppression and discrimination that has threaded its way through 
decades, the “manner in which a person’s sex[ual] [orientation] is defined 
has . . . significant legal consequences.”32  Therein lies the compelling need 
to re-examine the issues and infuse hope in addressing urgent human needs.33 
“Transsexuals pose a dilemma in the law both in their pre-operative 
and post-operative states. . . . Remedying this situation requires far-reaching 
changes in social perceptions and understanding[].” 34   The complexities 
challenge legal scholars and practitioners to move beyond looking at the 
issue through a traditional lens to one that provides a greater view of the 
human landscape in everyday expression.35  Our humanness compels us to do 
this if all of us are to reach our full potential as human beings.  Reaching full 
potential inherently means that social equality and justice are infused 
throughout the lifespan of every person.  In so doing, the legal system should 
consider the broader lens to inform.36 
“Critics of bipolar categories have called for their restructuring in the 
hope[] of creating more inclusive categories that reflect people’s true 
identities.” 37   Yet, the very use of categories continues to perpetuate a 
hierarchy of power that controls the allocation, or lack thereof, of rights and 
privileges.38  In contrast, Labman posits that “far-reaching changes in social 
perceptions and understandings” are needed, and further that “[t]he law has 
the ability to both mirror and construct social norms.”39  In essence, sex 
becomes a fluid concept which “dissolves and simply [a] relationship[] 
remain[s].”40 
                                                            
31. Id. at 920–21. 
32. Id. at 928. 
33. See id. 
34. Shauna Labman, Left in Legal Limbo:  Transsexual Identity and the Law, 
7 APPEAL:  REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 66, 66 (2001). 
35. See id. at 66–67. 
36. See id. at 67, 72. 
37. Rachel Haynes, Book Note, Bisexual Jurisprudence:  A Tripolar 
Approach to Law and Society, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 229 (1999) (reviewing RUTH 
COLKER, HYBRID:  BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
(1996)).  Others such as Ruth Colker champion the concept of hybrid, which is used to 
describe people who lie between bipolar legal categories.  Id. 
38. See id. at 231.  Colker’s belief was that without categories there would be 
anarchy.  Id. at 238. 
39. Labman, supra note 34, at 66. 
40. Id. at 72. 
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A. Reconceptualizing the Issues From a Humanistic Point of View 
Relationship.  It is the central life force that connects us as human 
beings. 41   Margaret S. Mahler, a world-renowned child psychoanalyst, 
introduced scholars of human behavior to the concept of a second birth.42  
That is, the emergence of a “psychological being possessing selfhood and 
separate identity.”43  Therein is a journey of navigating life, incorporating 
both a sense of oneness or attachment to others as well as sense of self or 
who we are as individuals.44  Beyond the legal arguments regarding the 
biology of sex and gender lie more substantial reasons for the need to look at 
the importance of relationships as the lynchpin of addressing the issues, 
rather than simply creating categories of race, sex, and gender.45  In order to 
examine this vast and complex realm of humanness, it is helpful to have a 
workable framework that helps one to make sense out of this complexity.46 
One effective approach is use of the biopsychosocial model.47  The 
biopsychosocial model was introduced in the 1950s by Roy Grinker, a 
neurologist and psychiatrist, who coined the term.48  However, this model is 
“associated indelibly with the name of George Engel, the internist, 
psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst” who “preached the indissoluble nature of 
mind-body links.”49  “Engel championed his ideas . . . [in part] to reverse the 
dehumanization of medicine and disempowerment of patients.”50  The model 
presented the philosophical view that “material lesions, life experiences, and 
current social situation[s] all matter in the presentation of illness.”51  The 
elegant, powerful, and versatile nature of this model is such that other 
professions—including social work—adopted the framework to address the 
                                                            
41. See LOUISE J. KAPLAN, ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS: FROM INFANT TO 
INDIVIDUAL 16–17 (1978). 
42. Id. at 15–16. 
43. Id. at 15.  Mahler’s work remains a cornerstone of child development 
theory.  See id. at 15, 19.  Kaplan was an understudy of Mahler.  See id. at 11. 
44. Kaplan, supra note 41, at 16–17. 
45. See Labman, supra note 34, at 66; Haynes, supra note 37, at 230. 
46. See Haynes, supra note 37, at 230. 
47. Edward Shorter, The History of the Biopsychosocial Approach in 
Medicine:  Before and After Engel in BIOPHYSICAL MEDICINE:  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING ILLNESS 1, 1 (Peter White ed., 2005). 
48. S. Nassir Ghaemi, The Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial Model, 195 
BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2009). 
49. Shorter, supra note 47, at 3; see also George L. Engel, The Need for a 
New Medical Model:  A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129, 132–33 (1977). 
50. Francesce Borrell-Carrió et al., The Biopsychosocial Model 25 Years 
Later:  Principles, Practice, and Scientific Inquiry, 2 ANNALS FAM. MED. 576, 576 (2004). 
51. Shorter, supra note 47, at 2. 
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complex issues of person-in-environment.52  Social work has a long-standing 
history in social reform and social justice, valuing the worth and dignity of 
every human being, the importance of human relationships, and 
empowerment.53 
B. Attachment:  The Essence of Humanness 
“Attachment theory is indispensable for understanding” the 
biopsychosocial interplay between person and environment.54  The theory 
was developed by psychiatrist John Bowlby through his work with the World 
Health Organization concerning health implications of homelessness in 
children. 55   He concluded that the crucial element in mental health is 
predicated on a “warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with a 
caregiver.”56  Human biology fosters this crucial need.57  Paul MacLean, a 
pioneer in the study of the human brain, contends that biology of attachment 
“goes back 180 million years [ago], originating with the earliest mammals” 
and even nesting birds.58  Indeed, we are biologically wired for connection.59  
For example, when an infant is in distress, the child emits a particular cry 
that brings caregiver protection, safety, and nurturing.60 
The biological need for attachment crosses all geography and 
cultures.61  Central to attachment is the need for a consistent and secure 
base.62  “The importance of having a secure base cannot be overstated.  As 
                                                            
52. See Tina Maschi & Robert Youdin, SOCIAL WORKER AS RESEARCHER:  
INTEGRATING RESEARCH WITH ADVOCACY 3 (2010). 
53. See id. at 11.  Social worker Jane Addams, most famously associated with 
Hull House in Chicago, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.  Id. at 6, 12, 25.  Hull House was 
an innovative settlement house that was developed in the slums of poor migrant people in the 
late 1880s.  Id. at 9, 25.  Leymah Gbowee—also a social worker, founder, and president of the 
Monrovia-based Gbowee Peace Foundation, Africa, Liberia—was selected Nobel Peace Prize 
winner in 2011 for her work on behalf of advancing women’s rights, conflict resolution, and 
working with ex-soldiers and victims of gender-based violence.  See Gender, War & 
Peacebuilding Study Guide, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 1, 10, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
files/NPECSG12.pdf. 
54. JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: A GUIDE TO SELF-UNDERSTANDING 
35–36 (1995). 
55. Id. at 36. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. at 36–37. 
58. Id. at 37; see also PAUL D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: 
ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS 8–9 (1990); M. Alan Kazlev, The Triune Brain, KHEPER, 
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intelligence/MacLean.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2003). 
59. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–37. 
60. Id. at 36. 
61. See id. at 38. 
62. Id. at 37. 
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Bowlby says, our survival as a species has depended on it.”63  A secure base 
is required in order for a human being to develop both individually and 
socially.64  Without this consistent secure base, infants and children have 
tremendous challenges in normal psychological social development.65  In 
fact, attachment is critical to self-regulation, or the ability to manage one’s 
physiology.66  Witness the child in distress who runs to mother or proximate 
caregiver.67  Recall human reaction to catastrophic events, such as natural 
disaster, terrorist attacks, and the like.68  The most compelling need in these 
instances is to connect with loved ones, friends, or people who represent 
safety. 69   Connection and proximity have a calming effect both 
psychologically and physically.70   Through attachment, comes interaction 
with the mother or primary caregiver and others in the social environment.71  
This interaction has often been referred to as mirroring.72  Heinz Kohut’s 
original studies illuminated this concept.73  If this interaction is positive over 
time, then a sense of self or self-cohesion develops.74  “Over time, these 
[positive interactions] lead to the child’s capacity to feel pride and take 
pleasure in his or her accomplishments—to feel a sense of competence and 
efficacy.” 75   When interaction is inconsistent, violent, rejecting, and 
destructive, the sense of self is compromised. 76   As a result, children 
“become arrested in their development of an internal sense of confidence and 
competence. . . . [H]e mistrusts and disrespects his own internal signals and 
states; he doubts his own self-worth and competence.”77 
                                                            
63. Id. 
64. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37–38. 
65. Id. at 36, 38. 
66. See id. at 36, 46. 
67. See id. at 46. 
68. See id. at 37, 47. 
69. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37.  In coping with any traumatic event, safety is 
critical.  Id. at 47.  Even inanimate objects can provide a measure of protection and safety.  Id.  
“This phenomenon of bonding to places [is referred to as] site attachment.”  Id. 
70. Id. at 36. 
71. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36. 
72. David B. Wexler, The Broken Mirror:  A Self Psychological Treatment 
Perspective for Relationship Violence, 8 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 129, 130 (1999). 
73. See Jamie McLean, Psychotherapy with a Narcissistic Patient Using 
Kohut’s Self Psychology Model, PSYCHIATRY (EDGMONT), Oct. 2007, at 40, 41, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2860525. 
 74. See Wexler, supra note 72, at 130, 137. 
75. Id. at 130. 
76. See id. 
77. Id.  Children then often mirror in adulthood the very traits they 
experienced from negative interactions in their growing years.  See id.  “While insisting [the] 
men [and women] take full responsibility for their . . . behavior,” Wexler and others have used 
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Our need for attachment continues throughout our lifetime. 78  
Interestingly, the “methods that enable one human being to enslave another 
are remarkably consistent.”79  A universal method used to control human 
beings is the destruction of attachments and isolation.80  “The destruction of 
attachments requires not only the isolation of the victim from others, but also 
the destruction of her internal images of connection to others.”81  Thus, our 
biology of attachment is in play throughout the life span.82  Attachment and 
social connection provide a nurturing stream of affirmation and belonging.83  
The fact that perpetrators of power universally use isolation as a weapon of 
control speaks to our continuing vulnerability as human beings.84  Fostering 
attachment and affirmation is the phenomenon of mirroring and witnessing.85  
These two interpersonal interactions are essential to the formation of self-
identity and to a sense of one’s place in the family, the community, the 
culture, and indeed, the larger social environment.86  Consider the following: 
C. Who Am I?  The Personal and Social-Cultural Self 
“Western societies, in which most of this theorizing and research has 
been carried out, can be characterized as cultural contexts with a strong 
emphasis on personal identities and individual achievements.” 87  
Contributing to identity development is “a substantial body of research 
reporting on phenomena that illustrate the powerful impact of people’s social 
                                                                                                                                            
self-psychological principles in working with clients who have battered their family members.  
Wexler, supra note 72, at 140.  Treatment programs such as Domestic Violence 2000 and 
Foundations for Violence-Free Living integrate these concepts.  Id.  That is not to say that all 
children experiencing deficient parenting will become abusive or neglectful.  See id. at 131.  
The journey to positive adulthood is that much more arduous.  See id. at 130. 
78. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44. 
79. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY:  THE AFTERMATH OF 
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 76 (1997).  “The accounts of 
hostages, political prisoners, and survivors of concentrations camps” as well as survivors of 
domestic violence “from every corner of the globe have an uncanny sameness.”  Id. at 76–77. 
80. Id. at 77. 
81. Id. at 80.  “Inevitably, in the absence of any other point of view, the victim 
will come to see the world through the eyes of the perpetrator.”  Id. at 81. 
82. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44. 
83. Id. at 44. 
84. See HERMAN, supra note 79, at 80–81. 
85. Aaron H. Devor, Witnessing and Mirroring:  A Fourteen Stage Model of 
Transsexual Identity Formation, 8 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, no. 1-2, 2004 at 41, 
46.	
86. See id. at 46–47. 
87. Naomi Ellemers et al., Self and Social Identity, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
161, 162 (2002) (citation omitted). 
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identities on their perceptions, emotions, and behavior.”88  Biology—with its 
compelling forces for our need of attachment—moves us into the 
psychological and social arenas, which are also essential elements of human 
development.89  Biology of attachment is but one powerful factor in human 
development.90  In addition to the universal need for attachment, the last 
thirty years of research indicate that human beings have “a strong biosocial 
preparedness for emotion expression and emotional communication in 
infancy.”91  Herein, the phenomena of witnessing and mirroring come into 
play.92 
1. Witnessing:  Observing and Affirmation 
“Witness:  [O]bserver . . . watcher . . . provid[ing] or furnish[ing] . . . 
confirm[ing], corroborat[ing] . . . behold[ing].”93  The concept of witnessing 
flows from both outside—e.g. an eyewitness providing testimony—to being 
watched.94  In both directions, powerful forces emerge that shape the self.95  
Survivors of domestic violence, oppression, political imprisonment, and 
torture “describe being forced to stand by helplessly while witnessing 
atrocities committed against people they love.”96  Witnessing can take on a 
different hue in the struggle for survival.97  The death camps of the Holocaust 
offer such a perspective.98  In the midst of terror, deprivation, and violence—
direct or indirect—the need to have others know of such human experiences 
is paramount. 99   Why?  “Terror dissolves the self into silence, but its 
aftermath . . . .  Horror arises and in its presence men and women are seized 
                                                            
88. Id. at 163. 
89. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 46, 50. 
90. See Devor, supra note 85, at 42. 
91. György Gergely & John S. Watson, The Social Biofeedback Theory of 
Parental Affect-Mirroring:  The Development of Emotional Self-Awareness and Self-Control 
in Infancy, 77 INT’L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1181, 1186 (1996).  Cross-cultural research 
demonstrates that there are universal facial expressions including “anger, fear, sadness, 
disgust, and surprise.”  Id. 
92. Id. at 1188. 
93. THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS 511 (1996). 
94. Devor, supra note 85, at 46. 
95. Id. 
96. HERMAN, supra note 79, at 83. 
97. See TERRENCE DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE 
DEATH CAMPS 32–33 (1976). 
98. See id. 
99. See id. at 33. 
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by an involuntary outburst of feeling which is very much like a scream . . . .  
And in this crude cry the will to bear witness is born . . . .”100 
Yet another view incorporates witnessing as essential to a sense of 
self.101  “The effectiveness of witnesses, in part, derives from the fact that 
they are not like oneself and can look at us from outside of our categories of 
self-definition.” 102   Devor argues that when another person provides 
“appraisals which conform to one’s own sense of self, it leaves one with a 
feeling of having been accurately seen by others who can be assumed to be 
impartial.”103  Devor believes that this is a critical issue for people who are 
transsexual.104  In all of these instances, the threading element is the presence 
of, or being present with, other human beings.105 
2. Mirroring:  Reflection of Self-Identity 
Mirror:  Reflection, reproduction, representation;106 the concept of 
mirroring is an inextricable facet of human development.107  The validation 
and affirmation of human expression in infancy enables the developing child 
to develop a sense of cohesion within the self and self-expression.108  In the 
process of attachment and calming, affirming the presence of others’ regard 
for, and sacredness of one’s humanness and that of others is manifested.109  
Mirroring may also be regarded as “seeing oneself in the eyes of others like 
oneself.”110  From a psychosocial perspective, infants are sensitive to face-to-
face affective communication and “are, to a large extent, dependent on their 
parent’s affect-regulative interactions as a means of emotional self-
                                                            
100. Id. at 33.  The compelling desire for those in a life and death struggle is to 
bear witness.  Id.  To tell the world.  DES PRES, supra note 97, at 33.  Des Pres accounts that  
[i]t took months and months of preparation, cutting down the suicides, insisting that 
survival even in such a place is not without value.  Their purpose—strong enough 
to lift the spirit from truly inhuman depths—was to destroy the camp and allow at 
least one man or woman to escape and bear the tale. 
Id. at 32–33. 
101. Devor, supra note 85, at 46. 
102. Id.  Devor makes the distinction between witnessing and mirroring.  Id.  
The former is critical in that the “[w]itness[] can be presumed to have some distance and 
therefore . . . objectivity.”  Id. at 46.  That is, validation is from someone not like oneself.  Id. 
103. Devor, supra note 85, at 46. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 46–47. 
106. THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS, supra note 93, at 253. 
107. See Devor, supra note 85, at 46; Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 
1186–88. 
108. See Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1186–88. 
109. Id. at 1188. 
110. Devor, supra note 85, at 46. 
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regulation.”111  Thus, requisite to human development over the life span is a 
continual need of attachment or sense of belonging, the influence of 
significant others in providing feedback and affirmation, and the presence of 
a safe supportive environment in which to grow in self-understanding and 
expression.112  “Each of us are social beings and as such we live in a sea of 
other humans with whom we interact during most of the waking hours of our 
lives.”113 
These concepts are powerfully illustrated in the lives of people who 
are transgender, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and intersex.114  There is, inherently, 
an immense role that society and the legal system plays in the struggle for 
their survival, struggle to be oneself, and have a valued place in the human 
sea.115 
3. Identity Formation 
“Although societal awareness of the existence of lesbian and gay 
people has increased dramatically over the past decade or so, most lesbians 
and gay men still grow up within a context of pervasive environmental and 
internalized homophobia and expectation to be heterosexual.”116  Likewise, 
while biological considerations are significant, “all people live within social 
environments which give meanings to the realities of their bodies and 
psyches,” 117  including people who are transgender and intersex. 118  
Interestingly, the study of identity remains primarily of interest to those most 
affected by discrimination and oppression and “little interest to members of 
the dominant group.”119  While there are different issues regarding ethnicity 
and racial identity with those of differing sexual orientation and gender 
expression, there is nonetheless agreement that one’s identity is critical to 
psychological functioning as an individual and a person-in-environment.120 
                                                            
111. Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188. 
112. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–38, 43; Devor, supra note 85, at 46; 
Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188–89. 
113. Devor, supra note 85, at 46. 
114. See id.; Susan R. McCarn & Ruth E. Fassinger, Revisioning Sexual 
Minority Identity Formation:  A New Model of Lesbian Identity and Its Implications for 
Counseling and Research, 24 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 508, 508 (1996). 
115. See Devor, supra note 85, at 46–47. 
116. McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 508. 
117. Devor, supra note 85, at 42. 
118. Id. at 42, 47. 
119. Jean S. Phinney, Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults:  Review of 
Research, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 499 (1990). 
120. Id. 
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It is not within the scope of this article to compare and contrast all of 
the various models of identity development.121  Each person is special and 
unique, as is one’s life journey and circumstance.  Thus, no one model can 
apply to all individuals in the same manner.  However, there is some 
consistency in using a stage model to explain a highly complex process.122  
Frequently referenced among models of identity development was the stage 
model developed by Vivienne C. Cass in 1979.123  The model has been 
revised and conceptually reworked by various researchers throughout the 
years.124   In reviewing the history of sexual minority identity formation, 
McCarn and Fassinger postulate that Coleman included another dimension 
that focused on the “force of social pressure at different stages of the coming 
out process.”125  Further, according to McCarn and Fassinger, the concept of 
identity development was again modified by Troiden, who “noted the critical 
importance of a supportive lesbian [or] gay environment in facilitating self-
definition and self-acceptance within the context of social stigma.”126  Devor 
proposes a fourteen-stage model of transsexual identity formation in order to 
more faithfully address needs and processes of transsexed people. 127  
However, there are limitations with all of these models and research studies 
attempting to understand the very complex and myriad process of coming-
out. 128   “More research is needed for inclusion of racially, ethnically, 
culturally, and economically diverse samples.”129 
                                                            
121. See id. at 501–03. 
 122. See, e.g., Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity Formation:  A 
Theoretical Model, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 219, 235 (1979). 
123. See id. at 219–20.  Cass intended the model to apply to both men and 
women.  Id. at 220.  The model includes such dimensions as one’s cognitions—thoughts and 
beliefs—and affective and behavioral features into a six-stage process.  Id. at 221.  Stage one 
features identity confusion and questioning.  Id. at 222.  This stage may be accompanied by 
anxiety and discomfort.  See Cass, supra note 122, at 223.  Other stages include identity 
comparison, which often evokes feelings of isolation and alienation.  Id. at 225.  Final stages 
include acceptance of oneself and eventually pride.  Id. at 231, 233. 
 124. Id. at 219–21; Eli Coleman, Developmental Stages of the Coming Out 
Process, in HOMOSEXUALITY & PSYCHOTHERAPY 1982, at 31, 31 (7 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, No. 3, 
1982). 
125. McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Coleman, supra 
note 124, at 31. 
126. McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Richard R. Troiden, 
The Formation of Homosexual Identities, 17 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 48–49 (1989). 
127. Devor, supra note 85, at 42. 
128. See Chad M. Mosher, The Social Implications of Sexual Identity 
Formation and the Coming-Out Process:  A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical 
Literature, 9 FAM. J. 164, 172 (2001). 
129. Id. 
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C. Intersectionality:  Human Beings, the Struggle for Self, Society, and 
the Legal System 
An emerging concept in the study of human behavior, particularly 
from a perspective of social justice, is that of intersectionality, which 
“underscores the complex nature of cultural and personal identities and 
human experiences that cannot be [divided] simply by one dimension of 
inequality or difference—either race or gender or sexual orientation or 
ability.”130  The sense of identity—who one is and one’s place with other 
human beings—is a central theme among scholars of race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation and gender, and gender expression.131  It is the driving force of 
human expression to be authentically oneself.132  If the struggle to become 
the authentic self takes place in a social environment that is fraught with 
messages and practices of oppression, destruction, and life threats, then the 
consequences to countless human beings is devastating.133  Such conditions 
are much like the forces prisoners of domestic violence and war 
experience. 134   To be sure, such forces are often invisible, yet just as 
damaging to self and life.135 
It is at this intersection of person-and-environment that courts must 
emerge as vigilantes and protectors of human life and expression.136  As 
Labman so aptly observed, “[t]he law has the ability to both mirror and 
construct social norms.”137  When society is inhumane and oppressive, the 
courts must move from a place of continuing to reflect on oppression to a 
place of constructing social norms such that all human beings may become 
their authentic selves.  The need for belonging, for attachment to meaningful 
human relationships without terror or fear of annihilation, the creating of safe 
and affirming environments, and regarding of the sanctity of our humanness 
should be the mission of the legal system. 
IV. SUMMARY 
“Contemporary adolescents are coming of age in a world that is 
considerably more multicultural than the world in which their parents and 
                                                            
130. YVETTE MURPHY ET AL., INCORPORATING INTERSECTIONALITY IN SOCIAL 
WORK PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EDUCATION 42 (2009). 
131. See Mosher, supra note 128, at 164; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499. 
132. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 128. 
133. See id. at 137–42; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499, 511. 
134. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 137–42; HERMAN, supra note 79, at 51–52. 
135. See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 127–28, 137–42. 
136. See Labman, supra note 34, at 66. 
137. Id. 
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grandparents grew up.” 138   The presence of the Internet and global 
communication has sped up globalization at an unprecedented pace.139  For 
the youth of today, developing a cultural identity is much more inclusive and 
complex.140  As a consequence, growing up is at a time of more pronounced 
openness and diversity.141  This is no less true for people who are exploring 
or experiencing an identity that is fluid and affirming of the authentic self.  
To categorize or to make distinctions is to impose a hierarchy of power and 
perpetuate oppression.  Whether binary or a range of categories—no matter 
how humane—the intension is in and of itself creating barriers to the flow of 
human development.  The world is moving and changing at a speed unlike 
any other in time.  There is a moral imperative for the courts to respond to 
the inevitable growing flexibility and fluidity of human expression and 
authenticity. 
V. PERSONAL STORIES:  SERAFIMA METZ AND KRYSTA CASCIO 
In order to avoid talking about people who deserve legal recognition 
in the abstract, their stories will be told.  Since self-identity is key to finding 
out how society and the law in particular treat any person, the first portion of 
this Part will examine how each person self-identified.142  These stories are a 
product of reaching out to the transsexual community and asking for 
volunteers to tell their stories. 143   Those transcripts and recordings will 
become part of a project at Shepard Broad Law Center to archive stories of 
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex (“LGBTI”) community 
entitled:  The Harris L. Kimball Memorial Digital Archive of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Florida Legal Oral History.144 
                                                            
138. Lene Arnett Jensen, Coming of Age in a Multicultural World:  
Globalization and Adolescent Cultural Identity Formation, 7 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 
189, 189 (2003), http://www.lenearnettjensen.com/files/2012/05/2003-ADS-Jensen-Coming-
of-Age-Multicultural-World.pdf. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 191. 
142. See infra Part V.A–B. 
143. See Interview with Krysta Cascio, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 8, 
2013) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library); 
Interview with Serafima Metz, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 1, 2013) (on file with Nova 
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library). 
144. See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1; Interview with 
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1. 
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A. Identity 
Serafima Metz said that even though she was born a male, that over 
the process of both mental and physical development, she now considers 
herself female.145  She found it problematic when it came to the law because 
she has observed that while she considers herself a female, the law might 
come to a different opinion.146  Serafima was quite willing to accept labels 
when it came to identity. 147   She observed that when labeled as 
transgendered, she embraced it.148 
Krysta Cascio had a different approach.149  First, she said she did not 
like labels. 150   However, when pressed, she now considers herself as a 
“pansexual, intersex, post-op trans-woman.”151   Interestingly, Krysta also 
said that she liked the definition of pansexual, which she understands as 
meaning gender blind.152  She noted that pansexual is different from being 
bi-sexual, which means you are equally attracted to men and women.153  But, 
bi-sexual leaves out, according to Krysta, all the trans-men, trans-women, 
and those who considered themselves two-spirited.154  Thus, according to 
Krysta, gender is not binary.155  Rather she sees it as a “huge scale of gray, 
and . . . you can fall in love with anyone on that scale of gray.”156  Krysta 
adds that she is blind to race, religion or disability.157  “[I]f I meet somebody 
and I connect with them and we click and then [that is] all that should matter.  
The rest is irrelevant.”158 
                                                            
145. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also GRANT ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 24.  The National Transgender Discrimination Survey has extensive 
information about transgendered people.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 20–32. 
146. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1. 
147. Id. 
148. Id.  Seventy-five percent of respondents identified themselves as 
transgendered.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24.  Interesting that forty-seven percent of that 
number identified as MTF, while only twenty-eight percent identified as FTM.  Id. 
149. See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 16. 
153. Id. 
154. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16.  “Gender identity and 
expression are complex and layered characteristics, with almost as many variations as there 
are individuals.”  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24. 
155. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16. 
156. Id.  Of those surveyed, fourteen percent identified themselves as gender 
non-conforming.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24. 
157. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16. 
158. Id. 
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B. Growing Up 
Serafima’s redefined identity began at an early age.159  According to 
her, when she was “very young [she did not] fit in with the rest of the males” 
when she was at school.160  The other boys teased her constantly.161  She 
considered herself different.162  She really had no role models and it was not 
until she was nineteen years old that she even met another transgendered 
person.163  At that time, she realized that “it was actually quite acceptable 
thing to do at . . . my own moral code.”164  She knew she had the genitalia of 
a boy, but her identity was nebulous.165  While she felt contrary to her body, 
she was happy with her life being a woman.166 
Krysta had some of the same experiences.167  When she was about 
four or five years old she said she recalls not falling into the gender 
binary.168  She remembers dressing up as Wonder Woman every day.169  She 
would come home and watch Linda Carter spin around and become Wonder 
Woman.170  So, Krysta would spin around hoping that she would become a 
woman.171 
Krysta’s growing up phase differed from Serafima’s.172  First, Krysta 
went to a Christian school that only had six students in class.173  Since the 
class was so small, the students really did not divide into gender specific 
roles.174  For instance, to play football, they all joined in.175  It was not until 
she started going through puberty that she realized something was not quite 
right.176  While she devoted her spare time to science fiction, reading comic 
                                                            
159. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 2.  Seventy-eight percent reported harassment, thirty-five percent 
physical assault, and twelve percent sexual violence when in grades kindergarten through 
twelfth.  GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 3.  Unfortunately, teachers were not very helpful 
and, in fact, thirty-one percent said that teachers and staff also harassed them.  Id. at 33. 
162. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2. 
163. Id. at 1. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1–2. 
166. Id. at 2. 
167. See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Compare Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1, with 
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2. 
173. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
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books, and becoming a gaming geek, she suddenly also developed breasts.177  
She thought she was a mutant.178  She hid the factor, never revealing it to 
anybody.179  She made sure she did not do anything that would show that she 
had breasts.180  This meant she stopped swimming and wore heavy jackets to 
school.181  Given that she lived in Miami, she was the target of ridicule 
because of her apparel.182  She described herself as an outcast.183   Even 
though she was an outcast, she had both girlfriends and boyfriends.184  She 
had no name for her orientation.185 
When Serafima was in high school, she began wearing women’s 
clothing now and then.186  Her take on it was that punk shows were popular 
at the time, so she was just following that style.187  In fact, she went to many 
punk shows and always wore dresses, and it made her feel good. 188  
Additionally, Serafima had a very supporting family.189  While she found it 
difficult to fully come out to them, she felt they were enlightened and liberal 
and “really put the effort to try and understand” what she was confiding in 
them.190  Regardless of their support, Serafima attempted suicide when she 
was eighteen.191  Her parents encouraged her to go to a treatment center 
because she was suffering from major depression.192  When she got out, she 
went back to the university she was attending, but again, she was so 
depressed, she tried to commit suicide again.193  As a result, she went to 
another treatment center, which was a three-month program for patients who 
                                                            
177. Id. 
178. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 1–2. 
181. Id. at 2. 
182. Id. 
183. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 2. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to 
Krysta Cascio (Apr. 12, 2013) (on file with Charlene Smith); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Report:  ‘Staggering’ Rate of Attempted Suicides by Transgenders Highlights Injustices, ABA 
J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/staggering_rate_
of_attempted_suicides_by_transgenders_highlights_injustices.  Forty-one percent of those 
who responded to a survey said they had attempted suicide in comparison to a 1.6% of the 
general population.  Weiss, supra note 191. 
192. Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to 
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191. 
193. Id. 
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had been diagnosed with mental illness.194  She was also there for substance 
abuse.195  After she got out, she lived with her parents for a short amount of 
time and eventually went to live in a house that was established for queer and 
trans people.196  It was the first time she had ever interacted with trans or 
queer people.197  As Serafima put it, “I began to feel comfortable questioning 
and exploring my gender identity.” 198   She started her transition with 
hormones, and as her body started changing, she began wearing women’s 
clothing all the time.199 
C. Relationships 
Serafima considers herself a lesbian and is in a committed 
relationship with another woman.200   She rejects the idea that she is bi-
sexual.201  She said she was always attracted to women and that has remained 
the same throughout her life.202 
Krysta noted that relationships are tough for trans folks. 203   If 
somebody was with a person before the transition, it’s rough. 204   For 
instance, Krysta knew a couple that had been together for fifteen years but, 
right after the surgery, the wife left.205  The hormonal treatment is also a 
factor.206  Because the person seeking to become the opposite gender has 
many emotional changes, the partner cannot handle the ups and downs.207  
Then, after the change is completed, finding a partner who is understanding 
is almost impossible.208  According to Krysta, when you are trying to find 
someone, you go stealth, and it becomes very awkward to tell the new 
person.209  Additionally, the newly trans person tends to fall for the wrong 
person.210 
                                                            
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to 
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191. 
198. Id. 
199. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3–4. 
200. Id. at 4. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 18. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 19. 
206. Id. 
207. See id. 
208. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 19. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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D. Legal and Societal Difficulties 
Before getting her name changed, Serafima applied to the university 
where she is currently a student.211  To get the university to change her first 
name was an uphill struggle.212  Her problem was that she would be on the 
teacher’s roster with a male name.213  She encountered a massive amount of 
bureaucracy to get her name on all the university’s collection of her data 
corrected.214  However, while the university changed her name, they still 
have her listed as a male.215  She was able to change her driver’s license by 
getting a letter from her doctor.216  However, that was a very difficult task.217  
Serafima found very little information on how to go about this process.218  
The people who work at the Department of Motor Vehicles were not 
helpful.219  Her experience with Social Security was even more stressful.220  
They eventually informed her that until her birth certificate was changed, 
they would not change the name on her Social Security card.221  Naturally, 
that has made getting jobs very difficult for Serafima.222  If it were not for 
True Group, 223  she would not have known the steps to take. 224   They 
provided all the forms she needed.225  The process was not cheap; it cost 
Serafima over four hundred dollars in court costs to complete as many 
documents as she had.226  She estimates that it takes about three to four 
months to complete the process, because many of the items required her to 
appear in court.227 
                                                            
211. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5. 
212. See id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id.  She notes that the university is huge, so that might explain some part 
of it.  Id. 
215. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5. 
216. Id. 
217. See id. 
218. Id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5–6. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 6. 
223. This Miami based group provides information on their website on how to 
go about changing your name/gender on legal documents. 
224. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6; Legal Name & 
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223. 
225. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6–7; Legal Name & 
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223. 
226. Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 7. 
227. Id. 
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Krysta’s experience regarding the law mirrors much of what 
Serafima explained.228  For instance, she said she spent a “whole day waiting 
at the wrong courthouse.”229  This happened because when she searched 
online, it gave the information that she could go to any courthouse within the 
county.230  She said that she mostly ran in circles because she did not have a 
clue as to what to do.231  Anybody she asked who had been through the 
experience had outdated information. 232   “[T]he name change alone was 
seven months of legal crap and fighting.”233  The whole process is different 
in every county.234  Krysta thoughtfully documented her experience, and then 
put up a website to help others.235 
Further, Krysta’s situation was different from other trans.236  Because 
she had Crohn’s disease, it was more complicated.237  For instance, because 
she needs Medicare assistance, Medicare gets information from Social 
Security, which gets its information from her birth certificate.238  She needed 
to change her gender on official documents—including her birth certificate—
because when she went to the pharmacy to get her medicine, if they did not 
see the correct gender, they would not give her the medicine she needed.239  
That differs from many trans folks because if they get their driver’s license 
changed, then a private insurer will accept that as being the proof they need 
for gender identification.240  Unfortunately, in Florida, you must have the 
surgery before you can change your birth certificate.241 
VI. THE LAW AND HOW TRANS RIGHTS ARE LARGELY IGNORED 
There are many rights and privileges afforded to U.S. citizens who 
fit into the legal dichotomy of either male or female.242  Individuals who 
identify with the biological sex he or she was born into, take for granted 
certain rights and protections.  Unfortunately, the law creates distinct 
                                                            
228. See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9; Interview with 
Serafima Metz, supra note 143 at 5–7. 
229. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. See id. 
233. Id. at 7. 
234. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7. 
235. Id. 
236. See id. at 3–5. 
237. See id. 
238. Id. at 8–9. 
239. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 9. 
242. See infra Part VII. 
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categories of male and female, rendering individuals who do not fit into this 
binary sex classification outside the scope of certain laws.243 
The narrow binary sex classification system fails to take into 
consideration the difference between sex and gender.244  The language and 
scope of the law makes the unfortunate and detrimental assumption that the 
biological sex a person is born with will match the gender they identify 
with. 245   There is a compelling need to reshape the law to incorporate 
individuals whose sex does not match their gender, because for trans people 
it is not as simple as penis equals male, and vagina equals female.246  The 
trans community faces a great battle in their fight to gain equality and 
reshape the law to address the human rights and privileges currently denied 
to them.247 
America is not always at the forefront of human rights, and is 
actually lagging behind other countries with respect to reaching equality for 
transgender people.  Laws and policies followed in other countries would 
eliminate many of the issues discussed in this article. 248   For example, 
Argentina recently passed a gender-identity law, which enables people to 
change their name and sex on official documents without judicial or medical 
approval. 249   The Netherlands has also taken an illustrative step toward 
equality by removing the surgery requirement to changing the gender marker 
on official documents.250  As this Article illustrates, America still has a long 
way to go in achieving equality and providing human rights to every person, 
irrespective of sexual orientation or gender identity. 
                                                            
243. See infra Part VII.  As Serafima Metz recognized, even though she 
personally identifies as a female, the law will not necessarily agree.  Interview with Serafima 
Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also supra Part V.A.  Krysta Cascio also disagrees with the 
binary sex classification of the law, rejecting the black and white view of gender, believing 
instead in a huge scale of gray.  Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16; see also  
supra Part V.A. 
244. See supra Part III. 
245. See infra Part VII. 
246. See infra Part VII.  Serafima and Krysta were both born male, but from a 
very young age knew that the biological sex they were born into did not fit with the gender 
they identified with.  Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1–2; Interview with 
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1–2. 
247. See Jessica Sideways, The Unique Issues that Transexuals Face, 
HUBPAGES, http://jessicasideways.hubpages.com/hub/The-Unique-Issues-that-Transexuals-
Face (last updated Feb. 9, 2014). 
248. See The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/netherlands-victory-
transgender-rights; Michael Warren, Argentina’s Gender ID Law Takes Effect, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 5, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/05/argentina-
gender-identity-law-takes-effect_n_1570830.html. 
249. Warren, supra note 248. 
250. The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248. 
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Within the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) community, the fight 
to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination in areas such as marriage, 
raising children, and employment is ongoing and slowly moving in a positive 
direction.251  However, gender identity and sexual orientation are different, 
and the binary approach to the law creates even bigger hurdles for trans 
people in reaching equality.252  The myriad of issues faced by trans people 
begins with their legal identity, and includes much of the discrimination 
experienced by the LGB community. 253   Thus, although LGBT is often 
grouped together, the trans community faces legal issues distinct from LGBs, 
relating to gender identity rather than sexual orientation.254 
This portion of the Article focuses on some of the major issues faced 
by transsexuals resulting from the law’s categorical approach of defining 
sex.255  These topics include:  States’ varying approaches for defining legal 
sex, processes of amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses, 
protections provided by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, access 
to healthcare, the right to marry, and the right to raise children.256 
VII. LEGAL IDENTITY 
The protections, rights, and benefits denied to the transgender 
community stem from the lack of recognition of their self-identified name 
and sex.257  Trans people face legal obstacles at all stages and facets of their 
life and “the ability to live fully in their post-transition name and sex can be 
vitally important to their safety, gender transition, and family security.”258  
As discussed in this Article, the legal identity of a transsexual affects the 
protections afforded to them under state and federal anti-discrimination 
statutes, the right to marry, and the right to raise children, to name just a 
few.259  Further, the basic need of a trans person’s recognition of the legal 
sex he or she identifies with is essential to his or her access to appropriate 
                                                            
251. See Sideways, supra note 247. 
252. See The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248. 
253. Sideways, supra note 247; see also The Netherlands:  Victory for 
Transgender Rights, supra note 248. 
254. See Sideways, supra note 247. 
255. See infra Parts VII–X. 
256. Id. 
257. Janson Wu & Kylar W. Broadus, Recognition of Name and Sex, in 
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW:  A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 16, 16 (Jennifer L. Levi & 
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012). 
258. Id. 
259. See infra Parts VII–X. 
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public accommodations, such as prisons, shelters, and restrooms.260  The first 
step in achieving equality is to legally recognize a transsexual’s gender 
identity by providing simple legal mechanisms under which a transsexual 
may change his or her name, amend his or her birth certificate, driver’s 
license, and any other official documents.261 
A. How the States Define Legal Sex 
An individual’s sex is defined by his or her physical attributes, 
including sexual and reproductive anatomy, hormones, and chromosomes, as 
well as his or her gender identity, which is the individual’s actual or 
perceived gender.262  Generally, a person’s biological sex and gender identity 
“line up, making the shorthand use of one’s birth genitalia to identify sex 
unproblematic.  Particularly for transsexual and intersexed persons, gender 
identity and the physical characteristics of sex in some way[s] conflict.”263  
When there is a conflict, the states vary on the approach taken in determining 
the legal sex of a transgendered person.264  Unfortunately, most jurisdictions 
take the essentialist approach and define sex as immutable and fixed at 
                                                            
260. See D. MORGAN BASSICHIS, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN 
HERE”:  A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK 
STATE MEN’S PRISONS 12 (Dean Spade ed., 2007). 
261. The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248; see 
also Warren, supra note 248.  This can be achieved by following the approach taken by 
countries like Argentina, which allow transgender people to change their names and amend 
official documents without having to go through painful and intensive surgery or obtaining 
judicial approval.  The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248. 
Serafima’s experience provides an example of the complicated and expensive process that 
transsexuals go through when attempting to amend official documents.  See supra Part V.  She 
was unable to change her driver’s license without a letter from her doctor, and Social Security 
would not change her Social Security card until her birth certificate was changed.  See supra 
Part V.D.  After about three to four months, and over four hundred dollars in court costs and 
multiple court appearances, she was able to amend her birth certificate and obtain congruent 
documents.  See supra Part V.D. 
262. See Taylor Flynn, The Ties That (Don’t) Bind:  Transgender Family Law 
and the Unmaking of Families, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 32, 34 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 
2006). 
263. Id. (alteration in original).  Intersexed individuals are born with “a 
reproductive or sexual anatomy that [does not] seem to fit the typical definitions of female or 
male.  For example, a person might be born appearing to be female on the outside, but having 
mostly male-typical anatomy on the inside.”  What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
264. Compare Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(finding sex to be immutable and fixed at birth), with M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (finding gender identity essential in determining legal sex of a 
transsexual). 
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birth. 265   A minority of jurisdictions have found gender identity to be 
determinative, or at least an essential factor, to defining legal sex.266  The 
gender identity approach to defining legal sex is urged because, if followed 
by all states, it would not only provide consistency to the law, but also would 
reflect the current medical and psychological understanding of sex, and most 
importantly, would respect an individual’s autonomy.267 
 
As a normative matter, this framework of autonomy-preserving 
guarantees—including the rights to privacy, freedom of 
expression, and bodily integrity—creates constitutional space for 
an as-of-yet-unarticulated right, the right to self-determination of 
sexual identity. . . . Such an approach would attempt not only to 
reclaim a rights-protecting view of the Constitution but also 
envisions a world free of our current investment in policing a 
boundary between—or among—the sexes.268 
1. The Biological Test to Defining Legal Sex 
Unfortunately, a majority of states, such as Ohio, Texas, and Florida, 
follow the approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth.269  These states 
use a rigid biological test to define legal sex, refusing to depart from the 
narrow black and white view of sex and gender.270  For instance, in Ohio, the 
court refused to issue an order finding a post-operative MTF transsexual to 
be female for legal purposes.271  The court found that a person’s sex is 
determined at birth and denied the transsexual’s request to amend her birth 
certificate.272  The holding rested solely on biological characteristics stating 
that “[t]here was no evidence that [the] applicant at birth had any physical 
characteristics other than those of a male and he was thus correctly 
designated Boy on his birth certificate.  There also was no laboratory 
documentation that the applicant had other than male chromosomes.”273 
                                                            
265. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104 
(Eng.); Flynn, supra note 262, at 33. 
266. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209. 
267. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–35. 
268. Id. at 34. 
269. See Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, 
in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 17 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). 
270. See In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 
Prob. Ct. 1987). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 832. 
273. Id. 
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Further, in Littleton v. Prange,274 the legal question addressed by the 
Court of Appeals of Texas was:  “[C]an a physician change the gender of a 
person with a scalpel, drugs, and counseling, or is a person’s gender 
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”275  The litigant was born male but 
identified as female from the time she was three or four years old.276  After 
receiving the appropriate treatments and undergoing complete sex 
reassignment surgery (“SRS”), she became a true MTF transsexual.277  In 
reaching its conclusion on her legal sex, the court focused solely on the 
biological and sexual reproductive organs of the transsexual litigant.278  The 
court held Christie to be a male, stating that even though “[s]ome physicians 
would consider Christie [to be] female; . . . [h]er female anatomy . . . is all 
man made.  The body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects 
other than what the physicians have supplied.”279 
2. Dual Test of Anatomy & Gender 
The legal system, as well as society, needs to recognize that the 
question of whether someone is a male or a female is not as simple as 
whether that person has a pair of XX or XY chromosomes and the genitalia 
he or she was born with.280  The Superior Court of New Jersey understands 
this critical realization and the essential role of gender identity in 
determining sex.281  Unlike the essentialist approach, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey recognized the complexities of sex and took into consideration 
factors other than mere biology.282  The court determined that a MTF post-
operative transsexual was considered to be legally female. 283   Despite 
recognition of jurisdictions following the essentialist approach to sex, this 
court found that: 
The evidence and authority which we have examined . . . show[s] 
that a person’s sex or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, 
that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or emotional 
sense of sexual identity and character.  Indeed, it has been 
                                                            
274. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
275. Id. at 224. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 225. 
278. See id. at 230–31. 
279. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. 
280. Id. at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting). 
281. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
282. See id.; Flynn, supra note 262, at 33. 
283. M.T., 355 A.2d at 211. 
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observed that the psychological sex of an individual, while not 
serviceable for all purposes, is practical, realistic, and humane.284 
Although the decision in M.T. v. J.T.285 was favorable and the court’s 
recognition of the importance of gender identify is noteworthy, the court 
engaged in a body-parts checklist approach.286  The reasoning of the court 
contained a detailed discussion of the expert testimony of a doctor pertaining 
to J.T.’s post-operative genitalia including its cosmetic appearance, whether 
it “could function as any female vagina,” and also whether she is capable of 
“traditional penile/vaginal intercourse.”287  This hypersexualization of a trans 
person’s post-operative sexual anatomy falls short of the approach that 
should govern defining legal sex—that of gender identity.288  While it is true 
that the New Jersey court found gender identity significant, the court’s 
conclusion reveals an unnecessary emphasis of sexual anatomy focused on 
finding that the “transsexual’s gender and genitalia are no longer discordant; 
they have been harmonized through medical treatment.”289 
B. Legal Name Changes 
Often the first step that a transsexual takes in obtaining legal 
recognition of his or her true self is a legal name change because “a name 
change sends an important message to the world, a message solidified and 
made official with a court’s approval.”290  All states have statutes addressing 
the process for changing a person’s name, with varying procedural 
requirements.291  Some states also allow common law changes, which take 
effect by simply using the new name.292  Almost all state statutes governing 
legal name change contain requirements designed to prevent an individual 
from changing his or her name for fraudulent purposes.293   Therefore, a 
transsexual who wishes to change his or her name to reflect his or her true 
identity should not be denied the right to do so.  Unfortunately, some state 
courts continue to make what should be a simple process more difficult and 
                                                            
284. Id. at 209; Douglas K. Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex 
Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 969–70 (1971). 
285. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
286. See id. at 206; Flynn, supra note 262, at 37. 
287. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206. 
288. Id. at 206–07. 
289. Id. at 211. 
290. ALLY WINDSOR HOWELL, TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND THE LAW 16–17 
(2013). 
291. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2013). 
292. HOWELL, supra note 290, at 17; see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Hansford, 580 
N.W.2d 171, 173 (Wis. 1998). 
293. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07(3)(j). 
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burdensome for transsexuals by requiring medical documents or doctors’ 
notes providing the reason for the name change.294 
C. Birth Certificate Amendments 
One way in which transsexuals attempt to obtain equal rights and 
protections of the law that conform to their self-identity, is through a birth 
certificate amendment. 295   Most jurisdictions in the United States have 
regulations, statutes, or policies governing birth certificate amendment 
procedures to change a person’s sex designation.296  While almost all of these 
jurisdictions have straightforward procedures for making an amendment to 
fix a mistake or change a person’s name, the policies governing a 
transsexual’s ability to amend the sex designation on his or her birth 
certificate are unpredictable, expensive, and unnecessarily intrusive.297  State 
policies vary on the ability to change the sex designation on a birth certificate 
and the procedural requirements for doing so.298  States that do permit such a 
change on a person’s birth certificate may issue an amended or a new birth 
certificate, requiring proof of either complete SRS or just necessary medical 
treatments, and the state may or may not require a court order for changing 
the birth certificate.299 
Some states confine the ability to change a person’s sex designation 
to circumstances where there was a mistake in the declaration on the birth 
certificate of either boy or girl, as determined at the time of birth.300  For 
example, the Ohio Probate Court held that an individual who was born male, 
who is now a post-operative female, could not amend her birth certificate.301  
The court interpreted Ohio’s birth certificate statute as “strictly a correction 
                                                            
294. Transgender Man Denied Name Change by Virginia Judge, 
LGBTQNATION (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2013/04/transgender-man-
denied-name-change-by-virginia-judge/.  For Krysta, just the process of changing her name 
took seven months.  Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7. 
295. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 2014). 
296. See Kristin Wenstrom, Comment, “What the Birth Certificate Shows”:  
An Argument to Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment Policies, 
17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 131, 131–33 (2008). 
297. Id. 
298. Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, 
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/changing-birth-certificate-sex-
designations-state-by-state-guidelines (last updated Feb. 3, 2015). 
299. Id. 
300. E.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828, 831–32 (Ohio 
Prob. Ct. 1987). 
301. Id. 
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type statute,” permitting a change only when an error was made in the 
designation of sex at the time of birth.302 
Tennessee actually goes as far as statutorily prohibiting a birth 
certificate amendment to reflect a transsexual’s self-identified sex, even post- 
SRS.303  Similarly, Idaho has a general statute permitting birth certificate 
amendments; but the Idaho Office of Vital Statistics shows that Idaho does 
not permit birth certificate amendments for post-operative transsexuals.304 
States, such as Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho, that do not permit an 
amendment to the sex designation on birth certificates, follow the approach 
that a “person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by 
the birth attendant” and restrict such amendments—absent a showing of error 
or inaccuracy—at the time of recording the gender.305  What these states fail 
to recognize is the importance of a transsexual’s internal sense of gender 
identity.  Transsexuals often feel “incongruencies of assigned birth sex, 
physical body, and gender identity.”306  In essence, the sex designation on 
their birth certificate, as recorded at the time of their birth, is inaccurate.307  
Preventing a person from obtaining congruent identity documents reflecting 
the appropriate sex, inhibits that person from living as his or her authentic 
self and from receiving equal rights and protections under the law.308 
Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and New York City 
allow sex designation amendments or changes to a person’s birth 
certificate.309  Almost all of these birth certificate amendment policies require 
proof that the applicant has undergone SRS,310 and many states require a 
                                                            
302. Id. at 831. 
303. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2014) (stating “[t]he sex of an 
individual [will] not be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change 
surgery”). 
304. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.02.08.201 (2013); Changing Birth Certificate 
Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298. 
305. In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832; Changing Birth 
Certificate Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298. 
306. Benjamin L. Jerner, Culturally Competent Representation, in 
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW:  A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 1, 3 (Jennifer L. Levi & 
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012). 
307. See id. 
308. Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 16–17; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 
132–33.  But see In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832. 
309. Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 19─20; see also Changing Birth 
Certificate Sex Designations:  State by State Guidelines, supra note 298 (demonstrating state 
statutes that allow birth certificate amendments with proof of sex reassignment surgery). 
310. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014) (requiring “a certified copy 
of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in 
this state has been changed by surgical procedure”); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3, 
.6 (2014). 
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] IDENTITY 147 
court order as a prerequisite to amending a birth certificate.311  Although the 
majority of states require complete SRS,312 other states do not specify the 
extent of surgery that is required.313  The particular surgical requirements 
outlined by states are critical because the treatment and surgery that 
transsexuals undergo “range from relatively minor cosmetic procedures, such 
as facial hair removal or breast augmentation for [MTF] patients, to complete 
genital reconstructive surgery . . . for patients of both sexes.”314  There are 
many reasons why a transsexual would decide not to undergo complete 
SRS.315  For instance, there may be health risks associated with surgery, the 
transsexual may not be able to afford surgery, and “others simply object to 
the idea that the only way to belong to a particular gender is to have anatomy 
that conforms to that gender.”316 
Furthermore, current understandings of transgender health indicate 
the personalized and unique process of gender transition.317   A statutory 
requirement of SRS—as a pre-requisite to amending the sex designation on 
one’s birth certificate—is incongruent with transgender health and is unduly 
intrusive.318  The more appropriate birth amendment policy that should be 
followed by states is one that only requires proof that the transsexual has 
completed the treatments necessary for his or her personal transition.319 
Virginia was the first state that allowed birth certificate amendments 
to a trans person’s proper gender without requiring sex-reassignment 
surgery. 320   Prior to 2002, Virginia’s requirements conformed with the 
majority of the states, requiring complete genital reconstructive surgery to 
amend birth certificates.321  However, Lambda Legal educated the Virginia 
Office of Vital Records on the various treatments that trans people undergo 
during their transition, and Virginia has changed its amendment requirement 
from complete SRS to necessary gender transition treatments.322 
                                                            
311. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115. 
312. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13(e) (2014); see also Changing Birth 
Certificate Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298. 
313. Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, 
supra note 298. 
314. Audrey C. Stirnitzke, Note, Transsexuality, Marriage, and the Myth of 
True Sex, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 288 (2011); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3, .6. 
315. Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 288. 
316. Id. 
317. Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 132–33. 
318. Id. 132–34. 
319. Id. at 133–34; see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014). 
320. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142.  
But see Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations:  State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 
298. 
321. See Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142. 
322. Id. 
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D. Driver’s License Amendments 
Each state also has its own policies and regulations for changing 
name and sex designation on driver’s licenses.323  In order to change one’s 
name on a driver’s license, all that is generally required is the court order 
documenting the name change.324   However, in order to change the sex 
designation on a driver’s license, the state may require proof from a 
physician or psychologist certifying the change of sex.325 
States should follow Virginia’s lead and become educated about 
transsexual health and the various procedures that transsexuals choose to 
undergo other than SRS.326  In moving towards equality, legislatures need to 
understand the critical need of transsexuals to live authentic lives in their 
self-identified gender and realize that extensive surgical requirements create 
a painful, expensive, life-changing, and potentially unnecessary barrier for a 
transsexual to obtain congruent documents reflecting their true identity.327  
Countries outside of the United States, such as Argentina and the 
Netherlands, have acknowledged this need, as evidenced by the recent 
legislation enabling transsexuals to change the sex on official documents 
without prior judicial or medical approval.328  A transsexual woman from 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, expressed her feelings after taking advantage of 
Argentina’s new gender-identity law, stating that “‘[it is] important to have 
the freedom to decide by myself and not have anyone deciding it instead of 
me. . . . [N]o one is authorized to say who I am, but me.’”329 
Transsexuals should have access to more efficient methods for 
amending their name and sex designation on official documents.330  It is time 
for the states to remove the barriers that are preventing the people in our 
                                                            
323. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender 
on a DMV Photo Document, N.Y. DEP’T. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/405/~/change-of-sex-or-gender-on-a-
dmv-photo-document (last updated Aug. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM). 
324. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506(b). 
325. Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document, supra note 323. 
326. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014); Wenstrom, supra note 296, 
at 142. 
327. See The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248; 
Warren, supra note 248. 
328. See The Netherlands:  Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248; 
Warren, supra note 248. 
329. Warren, supra note 248. 
330. Obtaining congruent documents is critically important for transsexuals in 
reaching equality and recognition of their true identity.  See supra Part V.A–D.  Inconsistent 
documents can make getting jobs difficult, and for Krysta, any inconsistency on her official 
documents meant that she would not receive medicine from the pharmacy to treat her Crohn’s 
disease.  See supra Part V.A–D. 
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country from being who they are, in order for our nation to move closer to 
achieving equality for all.331 
E. Public Accommodations 
Could you imagine if a stressful part of your day was dealing with 
public bathroom accommodations you are permitted to use?  A decision to 
use a public restroom, something that is a seemingly mindless decision to 
most, is often “one of the most difficult and stressful parts of a transgender 
person’s day.”332  Particularly for trans people who may be in the early stages 
of their transition, utilizing the restroom that corresponds to their gender 
identity has a potential to create “difficulty, anxiety, and even safety 
risks.”333  There are numerous examples of transgender individuals being 
arrested, fined, or charged for using the restroom of his or her self-identified 
gender.334 
Many cities and counties have public accommodation 
nondiscrimination ordinances, some of which include gender identity or 
expression.335  However, most of these ordinances do not address the use of 
public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers. 336   The ordinances that do 
address the use of public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers generally state 
that the nondiscrimination ordinance does not apply to discrimination on the 
basis of sex or gender in these facilities.337  Only a select few provide express 
protection for transitioned transsexuals against discrimination in the use of 
public restrooms.338 
Furthermore, institutions with sex segregation policies, in organizing 
their accommodation programs, create great difficulty for trans people.339  
For example, U.S. prisons that place people in a facility based on their birth 
                                                            
331. PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 15–16 (Sean Cahill et al. eds., 2000).  But see 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document, 
supra note 323. 
332. Jerner, supra note 306, at 9. 
333. Id. 
334. See, e.g., Transgender Woman Charged with Trespassing, Banned from 
Idaho Supermarket for Using Women’s Bathroom, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2013, 2:43 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/transgender-woman-banned-idaho-store-
women-restroom-article-1.1315827. 
335. E.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 49.70 (2014). 
336. See, e.g., id. 
337. E.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16 1/2, art. II, § 
34.1 (2014). 
338. E.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE ch. 12-1-1, 12-1-4(c) (2013). 
339. See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 752–53 
(2008). 
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sex can pose great danger for a trans person.340  A transgendered woman, 
who was born as a man but looks and identifies as a woman, is subject to 
high rates of extreme physical and sexual abuse from other inmates. 341  
Under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prisons are required 
to provide for inmate’s safety.342  “A prison official’s deliberate indifference 
to a substantial risk of serious harm . . . violates the Eighth Amendment.”343  
Often the abuse is so great that the transgendered inmate is placed in solitary 
confinement or is segregated for their protection.344 
Fortunately, the Prison Rape Elimination Act 345  (“PREA”) was 
enacted in 2003 in response to the high rate of sexual abuse in prisons, 
particularly against homosexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming 
individuals.346  The PREA mandates a screening process in federal prisons in 
determining whether to assign a trans person to a federal facility with male or 
female inmates.347  The U.S. Department of Justice issued final regulations to 
implement PREA in May 2012, and will hopefully prove to be effective in 
remedying the difficulties faced by the trans population in prison.348  The 
PREA is a positive step towards providing transgenders—as well as other at-
risk groups—necessary protection, and demonstrates an understanding that 
the decision of where to assign a transgender person cannot be based solely 
on birth sex.349  Chelsea Manning, an army soldier previously known as 
Bradley Manning, announced that she was a female living in the wrong body 
after she was convicted for leaking classified documents.350  Chelsea will be 
sent to an all male prison and made a statement that, “[g]iven the way that I 
feel and have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon 
                                                            
340. BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 17–18. 
341. Id. 
342. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
343. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. 
344. See id. at 830; BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 22–23. 
345. 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2012). 
346. LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 2012), http://www.transequality.org/Resources/PREA_
July2012.pdf. 
347. 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(a), (c) (2013). 
348. LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, supra note 346. 
349. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c); LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act, supra note 346. 
350. Adam Gabbatt, ‘I am Chelsea Manning,’ Says Jailed Soldier Formerly 
Known as Bradley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:35 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-gender-
reassignment. 
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as possible.”351  While in prison, she is prepared to take her plea for receiving 
gender reassignment treatment to court.352 
Similar sex segregation issues exist with the placement of trans 
individuals in homeless shelters.353  The majority of homeless shelters and 
other social service shelters house people according to his or her birth sex.354  
These policies often lead to harassment and assault against the transgender 
person by others housed in the facility.355  The potential harassment and 
violence results in trans people avoiding homeless shelters.356  Homeless 
shelters in a minority of jurisdictions, including San Francisco, Boston, 
Washington, D.C., and New York City, have policies permitting transgender 
people to be housed according to their self-identified gender.357  Homeless 
shelters are in place to assist those in need; consequently, sex segregation 
policies that have the effect of transgender individuals avoiding such 
facilities clearly should be changed.358 
Every person deserves equal access to appropriate public 
accommodations, such as restrooms, prisons, and homeless shelters, without 
fear of harassment or physical violence.  No person should be afraid to use 
the restroom of their self-identified gender, and sex segregation policies 
should be changed in prisons and homeless shelters in order to prevent the 
harassment or violence that results when a transgender person is placed with 
his or her birth sex rather than his or her self-identified gender.359 
VIII. STATE/LOCAL & FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 
Transsexuals experience severe discrimination and are in dire need 
of legislative protection in areas such as:  healthcare, employment, education, 
housing, public accommodations, law enforcement, and in many other 
areas.360  In order to reach equality and provide transsexuals with the same 
                                                            
351. Id. 
352. Denver Nicks, Chelsea Manning Prepared to Take Gender Reassignment 
Plea to Court, TIME (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nation.time.com/2013/11/01/chelsea-
manning-prepared-to-take-gender-reassignment-plea-to-court/. 
353. Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53. 
354. Id. at 753. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 736. 
358. See Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53. 
359. See Jerner, supra note 306, at 9; Spade, supra note 339, at 753; Gabbatt, 
supra note 350. 
360. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16. 
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rights and privileges as any other citizen, legislators and policymakers must 
remedy these injustices through trans-protective legislation.361 
Many states have laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex 
and sexual orientation; however, these laws do not provide protection for the 
trans community.362  Where society has failed and remains close-minded to 
those who are perceived as not normal, the law must step up and provide 
protection.363  Unfortunately, for trans people, where society has failed, so 
too has the law.364 
 
A. Anti-Discrimination Laws at the State Level 
 
Activists continue to fight for equal civil rights protections, and the 
greatest impact and progress has been at the local and state level.365  “By 
adding or amending definitions of sex, gender, or even sexual orientation, or 
by adding a new category, usually gender identity, legislation can make it 
clear to the courts that nondiscrimination laws should and do include gender 
nonconforming people.”366  In 1993, Minnesota became the first state to 
enact a statute prohibiting discrimination against trans people by defining 
sexual orientation to include “having or being perceived as having . . . a self-
image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness 
or femaleness.”367  Luckily, other states followed suit, and in the years that 
followed, states such as California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, 
Missouri, and Vermont began introducing non-discrimination laws for trans 
people.368 
States that have extended anti-discrimination protection to 
transsexuals have done so in a number of ways. 369   Some states have 
explicitly included gender identity as protected under anti-discrimination 
                                                            
361. Id. 
362. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(10), (11), (27) (consol. 2014); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a) (banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations, but gender identity is not protected); 2009 
Md. Laws 540, 552–53, 558–59 (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and 
public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation). 
363. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16. 
364. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999). 
365. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15. 
366. Currah, supra note 269, at 21. 
367. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2013); see also CURRAH & MINTER, supra 
note 331, at 15. 
368. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15. 
369. Id. at 15–16; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7) (2014); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2014). 
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] IDENTITY 153 
statutes,370 other states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and include gender identity or expression within the definition of sexual 
orientation,371 and a few states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, 
and include gender identity within the statutory definition of sex.372 
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination provides a good example 
of an ideal trans-inclusive anti-discrimination law.373  In New Jersey, “[a]ll 
persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of 
public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other 
real property without discrimination because of . . . gender identity or 
expression.” 374   Further, transgender youth are protected in school from 
harassment, intimidation or bullying based on gender identity.375 
States, such as Colorado, which have extended anti-discrimination 
protection to trans people through an expanded statutory definition of sexual 
orientation or sex is an improvement, but there is still room for 
misinterpretation.376  In order to prevent any ambiguity or misinterpretation, 
gender identity should be expressly placed alongside other protected 
categories.377  California has recognized this distinction, as evidenced by the 
recent amendment to its existing anti-discrimination law, which previously 
defined gender identity within the protected class of sexual orientation.378  
The law was amended in 2012, distinctly making gender identity and gender 
expression their own protected classes. 379   This decision was based on 
confusion that existed among employers and landlords about whether trans 
                                                            
370. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.c (The New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
expression in employment, housing, public accommodation, credit and business contracts). 
371. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7). 
372. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
373. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4. 
374. Id. (emphasis added). 
375. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14. 
376. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7). 
377. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.  But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-
34-402(1)(a)–(b). 
378. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5) (West 2012); see also Assemb. B. 887, 
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
379. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5); see also Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
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people were protected under the law.380  The amendment removed any such 
confusion and strengthened the state’s anti-discrimination law.381 
Currently, sixteen states and the District of Columbia have laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression.382  
The extent of protection within these laws vary, encompassing all or a few of 
categories including employment, public accommodations, housing, credit, 
and education.383  States should continue to strive to provide comprehensive 
protections for trans people in all aspects of life. 
B. Healthcare 
The trans community faces unfortunate health care discrimination by 
being denied equal access to health care services. 384   Transsexuals face 
discrimination and hostility from medical professionals and insurance 
providers.385   Most private insurance plans deny coverage for transition-
related treatment, and many state Medicaid and Medicare programs exclude 
such coverage as well.386 
States that participate in the Medicaid program receive grants from 
the federal government to assist state health care services in providing 
necessary medical services to qualified state residents.387  Although each 
state sets its own qualifying guidelines, “[t]he Medicaid agency may not 
arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required 
service . . . to an otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the 
                                                            
380. See Ari Rosenstein, California Passes AB 887:  The Gender 
Nondiscrimination Act, CPEHR BLOG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.smallbizhrblog.com/
california-passes-ab-887-the-gender-nondiscrimination-act.html; see also Cal. Assemb. B. 
887. 
381. Rosenstein, supra note 380; see also Cal. Assemb. B. 887. 
382. Non-Discrimination Laws That Include Gender Identity and Expression, 
TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST., http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/#jurisdictions (last 
updated Feb. 1, 2012); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO 
LAWS THAT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, NAT’L RES. CTR. ON 
LGBT AGING 2–3 (2010), http://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/
StateLawsThatProhibitDiscriminationAgainstTransPeople.pdf. 
383. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 382, at 3–4. 
384. TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, TRANSGENDER HEALTH AND THE 
LAW:  IDENTIFYING AND FIGHTING HEALTH CARE DISCRIMINATION (2004), available at 
http://www.thecentersd.org/pdf/health-advocacy/identifying-transgender.pdf. 
385. Id. 
386. Id.; KELLAN BAKER & ANDREW CRAY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHY 
GENDER-IDENTITY NONDISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE MAKES SENSE 1–2 (2013), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BakerNondiscrimination
Insurance-6.pdf. 
387. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012). 
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diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”388  Additionally, private insurance 
plans have even denied coverage to trans people for medical needs unrelated 
to gender transition.389  For example, an insurance company might argue that 
a medical concern—such as liver damage—resulted from transition related 
hormone treatment.390 
Many state Medicaid programs explicitly deny coverage for 
transition-related treatment; however, a few state courts have struck down 
such blanket exclusions.391  States that explicitly deny coverage for trans 
people justify these denials on the belief that such services are not medically 
necessary, or that such treatment is cosmetic.392  These justifications are 
unfounded because mental health professionals may deem gender transition 
treatment—which may include surgery, hormone therapy, or medication—to 
be medically necessary for a trans person. 393   Therefore, the states that 
participate in the Medicaid program that deny necessary medical services to 
qualified state residents violate federal law.394 
For example, in Iowa, procedures for treating gender identity 
disorder are specifically excluded from Medicaid coverage.395  In Smith v. 
Rasmussen,396 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this blanket denial 
of transition related treatment under its Medicaid program.397  The court 
found the blanket prohibition on funding for sex reassignment surgery to be 
reasonable and consistent with the Medicaid Act due to the “evolving nature 
of the diagnosis and treatment of gender identity disorder and the 
disagreement regarding the efficacy of sex reassignment surgery.”398 
Fortunately, there are states that have struck down total trans-related 
treatment exclusions from coverage. 399   In Doe v. Department of Public 
Welfare,400 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the “total exclusion of 
transsexual surgery from eligibility for [medical assistance payments was] . . 
                                                            
388. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2012). 
389. See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2; TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS 
PROJECT, supra note 384. 
390. TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 384. 
391. BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 1–2; see also, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (“[T]otal exclusion of transsexual surgery 
from eligibility for M.A. benefits . . . is void.”). 
392. BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2. 
393. Id. at 2, 5. 
394. See id. at 3. 
395. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b)(2) (2014). 
396. 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001). 
397. Id. at 761–62. 
398. Id. at 761; see also Medicaid Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 
Stat. 186, 343 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3201 (2012)). 
399. E.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977). 
400. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977). 
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. void.”401   In reaching this decision, the court discussed transsexualism 
generally and found that in certain cases, “[t]he only medical procedure 
known to be successful in treating . . . transsexualism is the radical sex 
conversion surgical procedure.”402  Therefore, a total exclusion of transsexual 
surgery from benefits under the medical assistance program is improper, and 
future determinations of the medical necessity of an applicant “must be 
considered individually, on a case-by-case basis.”403 
Removing exclusions for transition-related treatment is critical in 
providing the trans community with equal access to health care. 404  
“[C]ategorical exclusions are based on the false premise that the health care 
services that transgender people need are not medically necessary.”405  In 
reality, there are unfortunate consequences for trans people who are denied 
necessary health care and treatment.406  Lack of access to gender-transition 
medical care is linked with health consequences that include depression, 
anxiety, suicide, infections—such as HIV—and other health risks associated 
with seeking treatment on the black market.407 
A few other states have made progress and are taking steps in the 
direction of achieving the goal of equal access to healthcare.408  For example, 
in 2012, California became the first state to expressly “prohibit insurance 
discrimination against transgender people.”409  The California Department of 
Insurance issued guidelines and regulations that ensure equal health care 
insurance coverage to the trans community. 410   Similarly, Colorado, 411 
Oregon,412 and Vermont413  have all issued bulletins prohibiting insurance 
discrimination based on gender identity or expression.414 
                                                            
401. Id. at 820. 
402. Id. at 819. 
403. Id. at 820. 
404. See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2. 
405. Id. at 2. 
406. Id. at 2. 
407. Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice:  Race and Class 
Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People, 
SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y:  J. OF NSRC, Dec. 2007, at 7, 15.  Access to gender transition 
treatments is critical for transgender people.  Before Serafima began her transition treatments 
she experienced depression and attempted suicide on two occasions.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 191–93. 
408. BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3. 
409. Id. 
410. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5(a)–(e) (West 2014). 
411. DIV. OF INS., COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, BULL. NO. B-4.49, 
INSURANCE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION (2013). 
412. OR. INS. DIV., DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., BULL. INS 2012-1, 
APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 2 (2007 LEGISLATIVE SESSION) TO GENDER IDENTITY ISSUES IN 
THE TRANSACTION AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN OREGON (2012). 
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Although a few states have struck down blanket exclusions that 
discriminate against trans people, 415  or have issued regulations against 
insurance discrimination based on gender,416 the majority of the nation has a 
long way to go in providing transsexuals with equal access to the health care 
services they need.417 
Private and public health insurance programs should not arbitrarily 
deny coverage to transsexuals for medically necessary treatment.418  The 
remaining majority of the states should model the legislative decisions of 
states—such as California—by removing blanket exclusions of transition-
related treatment and enacting regulations prohibiting insurance 
discrimination against trans people.419 
C. Anti-Discrimination Laws and Protections at the Federal Level 
Although progress has been slower at the federal level, there have 
been some positive changes and protections in certain areas of the law that 
have been extended to reach the transgender community.420  For example, in 
2009 the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
was signed into federal law, expanding federal hate crime legislation to 
protect transgender people.421 
Further, Title IX of the Education Amendments—which protects 
people from sex discrimination in education programs—has been extended to 
protect transgender students through a settlement agreement.422  However, by 
far the most progress has been made in providing the trans community with 
much needed protection from employment discrimination.423 
                                                                                                                                            
413. DIV. OF INS., VT. DEP’T OF FIN. REGULATION, BULL. NO. 174, GUIDANCE 
REGARDING PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY INCLUDING 
MEDICALLY NECESSARY GENDER DYSPHORIA SURGERY AND RELATED HEALTH CARE (2013).  
414. BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3. 
415. E.g., J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1978) (striking 
down Medi-Cal’s blanket policy excluding coverage for transition-related treatment). 
416. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 (West 2014). 
417. See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3. 
418. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5. 
419. E.g., id. 
420. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
421. Id. § 249(a)(2). 
422. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012); see also Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 
1435995, at *6 n.6 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). 
423. See Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11. 
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1. Employment—Title VII 
Another major area of discrimination faced by the trans community 
is in employment. 424   Trans people face discrimination in various 
circumstances concerning employment.425  A trans person may not be hired, 
may be fired if going through transition while employed, or may be fired if 
his or her transgender status is discovered.426 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”427  Originally, Title VII was interpreted to protect employees from 
sex discrimination and did not protect employment discrimination against 
trans employees. 428   However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 429  the 
“Supreme Court [of the United States] concluded that gender stereotyping is 
sex discrimination under Title VII.”430  The Court held that, under Title VII, 
an employer may not discriminate against employees based on gender 
stereotypes, stating “we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group.”431 
The Price Waterhouse decision: 
[U]nlock[s] the shackles that tether personality, mannerisms, 
preferences, and tastes to a particular biological container.  After 
Price Waterhouse, because a body is branded female does not 
mean that she performs as the charm school graduate, “walk[s] . . . 
femininely, talk[s] . . . femininely, dress[es] . . . femininely,” . . . 
[and] a body, branded male need not be aggressive or macho.432 
Although Price Waterhouse did not involve a trans individual, this 
case illustrates the catch 22 experienced by trans people in the workplace.433  
A trans person who is just trying to be his or her self faces discrimination 
                                                            
424. Kylar W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination 
Protections for Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93, 93 (Paisley Currah et al. 
eds., 2006). 
425. Id. 
426. Id. 
427. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
428. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
429. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
430. Amy D. Ronner, Let’s Get the “Trans” and “Sex” Out of It and Free Us 
All, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 859, 866 (2013); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–
51. 
431. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
432. Ronner, supra note 430, at 874 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
235). 
433. Id. at 890; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 251. 
56
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] IDENTITY 159 
both pre-transition, for failing to conform to gender stereotypes, and post-
transition for being a fraud.434 
Fortunately, after Price Waterhouse, more cases continued to 
favorably interpret Title VII and provide protection for trans people in the 
workplace.435  In a recent ruling, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)—a federal agency authorized to enforce federal laws 
that prohibit workplace discrimination—held that transgender people are 
protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.436  Based on the 
rulings in federal court cases involving the interpretation of Title VII and 
transgender discrimination, the EEOC “conclude[d] that intentional 
discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is 
transgender is, by definition, discrimination based on . . . sex, and such 
discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”437 
Although these precedential rulings interpreting Title VII to provide 
protection for transgender people in the workplace are favorable, ultimately 
specific federal legislation embodying protection for transgender people is 
the most impactful.438  Luckily, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(“ENDA”), which was introduced in Congress in June of 2009, was finally 
passed by the Senate on November 7, 2013.439  This “major civil rights 
legislation . . . protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and for the first time ever, 
transgender Americans from discrimination in the workplace.”440 
ENDA extends federal employment discrimination protection 
currently provided under Title VII to sexual orientation and gender 
identity.441  The passage of this Act is a huge achievement and provides trans 
people equal rights and protection against discrimination in the workplace.442 
                                                            
434. See Ronner, supra note 430 at 890–92. 
435. E.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572–75 (6th Cir. 2004). 
436. Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20, 
2012). 
437. Id.; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that Title VII prohibits gender stereotyping); Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75 (holding that 
discrimination based on sex encompasses gender discrimination); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 
F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the term sex includes both the biological 
differences between males and females as well as gender). 
438. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–74; Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11; Lauren 
Fox, Senate Passes ENDA in Bipartisan Vote, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 7, 2013, 
3:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/07/senate-passes-enda-in-
bipartisan-vote. 
439. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as 
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013); see also Fox, supra note 438. 
440. Fox, supra note 438. 
441. S. 815 § 4(a)(1). 
442. See id.; Fox, supra note 438. 
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IX. MARRIAGE 
The recognition or authorization of a trans person’s marriage 
depends on three primary factors:  (1) how that state defines the legal sex of 
trans individuals; (2) what the sex of the trans person’s partner is; and (3) 
what the state’s law is on same-sex marriage.443  The marriage of a trans 
person is further affected by the individual’s status as either post-transition or 
pre-transition.444 
In the minority of states that have legalized same-sex marriage, a 
trans individual can marry—regardless of that state’s determination of his or 
her legal sex—because both same-sex and opposite-sex couples are afforded 
the right to marry. 445   Whether a trans person is pre-transition or post-
transition prior to entering into the marriage would have no effect, since the 
legal sex of the individual is not a determining factor in the legality of the 
marriage. 446   Further, a marriage would not be invalidated if a trans 
individual went through a transition and had a legal sex change after the 
marriage.447  In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-
sex marriage, effectively creating marriage equality for all couples, 
irrespective of sex.448  To date, same-sex marriage is legal in thirty-six states 
and the District of Columbia.449  While these states have recognized the 
importance of marriage equality for all-sex couples, the minority of the 
United States continues to prohibit same-sex marriage.450 
The trans community faces great obstacles in the ability to marry in 
states that prohibit same-sex marriage.451  A trans person living in a state that 
                                                            
443. Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder, Relationship Recognition and Protections, 
in TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW:  A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 36, 36 (Jennifer L. Levi & 
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012). 
444. Id. 
445. See id. at 37–38; Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/2013/05/28/us/same-sex-marriage-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 24, 
2015). 
446. Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 37–38. 
447. Id. 
448. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948, 961 (Mass. 
2003); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445. 
449. Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445.  Same-sex marriage is 
legal in:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.  Id. 
450. See id. 
451. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re 
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 
23097095, at *1, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003). 
58
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] IDENTITY 161 
prohibits same-sex marriage may face difficulty prior to entering into a 
marriage or, alternatively, his or her spouse or a third party may challenge 
the validity of an existing marriage.452  Additionally, Congress’ enactment of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) creates issues for same-sex couples 
who are legally married.453 
A. DOMA’s Effect at the State Level 
Due to Congress’ enactment of DOMA, each state, at its option, can 
choose to reject a legalized same-sex marriage from another state.454  DOMA 
states:  “No [s]tate . . . of the United States . . . shall be required to give effect 
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other [s]tate . . . 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other [s]tate . . . .”455  Essentially, section 2 
of DOMA grants the states an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
by allowing a state to not recognize the legal same-sex marriage granted to a 
couple in another state.456 
To illustrate the impact of section 2, attorneys for the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights (“NCLR”), an advocacy organization for the 
LGBT community, has noted that “within the space of a day’s travel across 
state lines, the same two individuals may be legally married in one state, 
demoted to domestic partners in another, and treated as complete legal 
strangers in a third.”457 
Section 2 of DOMA will not affect a post-transition marriage 
between two individuals if they were determined to be opposite-sex spouses 
at the time of the marriage.458  DOMA only relates to interstate recognition 
of marriages between same-sex couples.459  Thus, once again, the state’s 
determination of a trans person’s legal sex for the purpose of marriage comes 
into effect in determining whether the couple is a same-sex or opposite-sex 
                                                            
452. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121–22, 136; In re Application for 
a Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, *9. 
453. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), declared unconstitutional by United States v. 
Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
454. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
455. Id. 
456. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Defense of 
Marriage Act of 1996 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
457. Shannon Minter & Christopher Stoll, Legal Developments in Marriage 
Law for Same-Sex Couples, GEN. PRAC. SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV., Jan.Feb. 2010, at 30, 31–
32; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2. 
458. See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2; Monnin-Browder, supra note 
443, at 39–40. 
459. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
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couple.460  If determined to be a same-sex couple, section 2 of DOMA will 
affect them by giving other states the power not to recognize the individuals 
as a legally married same-sex couple.461   Essentially, states that prohibit 
same-sex marriage do not have to give full faith and credit to a legally 
married same-sex couple from another state.462 
B. DOMA’s Effect at the Federal Level 
Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage for federal purposes as:  “[A] 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.”463  This definition of marriage prevents legal same-sex marriages from 
being recognized at a federal level, irrespective of the validity of that 
marriage at the state level.464 
In United States v. Windsor,465 the Supreme Court was presented 
with the question of “[w]hether [s]ection 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons 
of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their [s]tate.”466  In 
this case, Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer had a legally recognized marriage in 
the state of New York.467  Upon Spyer’s death, Windsor as sole beneficiary 
of Spyer’s estate was required to pay $365,053 in federal estate tax because 
“their marriage was not respected by the federal government.”468 
The Supreme Court found Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional “as 
a deprivation of the [equal] liberty of . . . person[s] [that is] protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.”469  Under Section 3 of DOMA, the federal government 
was infringing on the authority of states to define and regulate marriage 
                                                            
460. Monnin-Browder supra note 443, at 36. 
461. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
462. Id. 
463. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7, declared 
unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013). 
464. See id. 
465. No. 12-307, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 26, 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2884 (2013). 
466. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 
slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013), 2013 WL 3991414; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 
3. 
467. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 2–3. 
468. Marriage at the Supreme Court in 2013, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/supreme-court (last visited Aug. 25, 2015); 
see also Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 3. 
469. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 25; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996 § 3. 
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within their laws.470  The federal government’s restrictions of benefits to 
same-sex couples was “directed to a class of persons that the laws of New 
York, and . . . [eleven] other [s]tates, have sought to protect.”471   This 
decision had the effect of providing married same-sex couples—living in 
states where same-sex marriage was legal—over 1100 federal benefits that 
were previously denied to them through DOMA.472 
In a similar victory, California’s Proposition 8, which amended the 
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, 473  was ruled 
unconstitutional by a district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.474  The Supreme Court ruled that the proponents of Proposition 8 did 
not have standing to appeal the decision and sent the case back to the appeals 
court with instructions to dismiss the appeal.475  Although the Supreme Court 
allowed the lower court ruling that invalidated Proposition 8 to stand, its 
ruling was narrow, having the effect of striking down California’s 
Proposition 8, but dodging the substantive issues of the constitutionality of 
same-sex marriage.476 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has yet to reach a substantive 
conclusion about the constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage.477  Instead of sending the case back to the court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court should have used this appeal as an opportunity to rule on the 
constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex marriage.  Same-sex marriage 
prohibitions directly conflict with the legal conclusions and principles set 
forth in Loving v. Virginia.478  The Supreme Court struck down the Virginia 
law that prohibited marriages between people of different racial classes.479  
The Court held the law unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, stating that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or 
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State.”480  This decision was monumental for the civil rights 
                                                            
470. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3; see also Windsor, No 12-307, slip 
op. at 18–19. 
471. Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 16. 
472. Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 23, 25; Marriage at the Supreme Court in 
2013, supra note 468; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
473. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
474. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding Proposition 
8 unconstitutional).  
475. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 26, 2013). 
476. See id. 
477. See id. 
478. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Julian Bond, Why Prop 8 Must Fall:  Civil Rights, 
USA TODAY (June 10, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
forum/2011-06-10-In-wake-of-Loving-decision-Prop-8-cannot-stand_n.htm. 
479. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12. 
480. Id. at 12. 
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movement, and the Lovings’ struggle to achieve marriage equality in 1967, is 
deeply connected to the fight for civil rights experienced by same-sex 
couples today.481  Just like the Supreme Court ruled in Loving, that “[t]he 
freedom to marry. . . . a person of another race resides with the individual,” 
so too should the Court conclude today, that the freedom to marry a person 
of the same-sex resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the 
State.482 
As Mildred Loving reflected on the impact of her case, she stated: 
 
I am proud that Richard’s and my name is on a court case 
that can help reinforce the love, the commitment, the fairness, and 
the family that so many people, black or white, young or old, gay 
or straight seek in life.  I support the freedom to marry for all. 
. . . . 
That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.483 
C. States That Ban Same-Sex Marriage 
In states that limit the right to marry to heterosexual couples, the 
states’ identification of a trans individual’s legal sex is the key-determining 
factor in a trans’ ability to marry. 484   That determination leads into the 
question of whether the state perceives the proposed marriage to be between 
same-sex or different-sex individuals. 485   As discussed above, in certain 
states a trans person can legally change his or her sex.486  Accordingly, what 
may have been perceived as a same-sex couple pre-transition, would be an 
opposite-sex couple post-transition and legal sex change.487  Nevertheless, 
there are states that do not recognize a trans individual’s changed sex for the 
purposes of marriage.488 
As discussed above, states vary in their determination of legal sex 
and the ability of trans people to change their legal sex to reflect their gender 
identity.489  States are further divided on their recognition of a trans person’s 
legal sex specifically for the purposes of marriage.490 
                                                            
481. Id.; Bond, supra note 478. 
482. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
483. Bond, supra note 478. 
484. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33. 
485. Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40. 
486. See supra Part V.A–D. 
487. See Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40. 
488. See, e.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-
0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003). 
489. See supra text accompanying notes 262–68. 
490. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–34. 
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There are two opposing standards utilized by courts in determining 
the validity of post-transition marriages:  (1) the state finds sex as immutable 
and fixed at birth, refusing to acknowledge sex-reassignment surgery, 
psychological factors of gender identity, or birth certificate amendments for 
the purpose of marriage;491 or (2) the state acknowledges a change to a birth 
certificate and recognizes that legal sex change for the purpose of 
marriage.492 
For the purpose of marriage, 
[d]ifferent jurisdictions . . . can and have come to different 
conclusions about how to determine legal sex:  most take the 
essentialist approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth, while 
a small minority recognizes the complexities of sex and looks to a 
person’s gender identity as the primary determinant of legal sex.493 
1. Biological Approach—Sex Is Immutable and Fixed at Birth 
The issue of legal sex for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a 
transsexual marriage was first analyzed in Corbett v. Corbett, 494  a 1970 
British case.495  The issue in this case was a determination of the true sex of 
April Ashley, a post-operative MTF transsexual, for the purpose of 
concluding whether the marriage she entered into with Arthur Corbett was 
valid.496  In assessing the legal sex of April, the court analyzed chromosomal 
factors, gonadal factors, genital factors, and psychological factors. 497  
However, the court failed to discuss the psychological factors for assessing 
April’s legal sex, and stated that the essential criteria must be biological.498  
The court further stated that the “biological sexual constitution of an 
individual is fixed at birth—at the latest—and cannot be changed . . . by 
medical or surgical means.” 499   Therefore, the court concluded that the 
marriage between April and Arthur was void, since April “is not a woman 
for the purposes of marriage.”500  The narrow biological test and principles 
set forth in Corbett have been followed by courts that have concluded that 
                                                            
491. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
492. E.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
493. Flynn, supra note 262, at 33. 
494. [1971] P. 83 (Eng.). 
495. Id. at 83. 
496. Id. at 84–85. 
497. Id. at 100. 
498. Id. at 106. 
499. Corbett, P. 83 at 104. 
500. Id. at 106. 
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sex is immutable, unchanged by psychological identity, SRS, or amended 
birth certificates.501 
Courts that have followed the conclusions of Corbett, disregarding 
the critical psychological and social factors in determining a person’s sex, 
have both denied marriage licenses and invalidated existing marriages.502  As 
previously mentioned, the majority of the states allow sex designation 
amendments to an individual’s birth certificate upon proof of the 
transsexual’s completed SRS. 503   Surprisingly, even an amended birth 
certificate, reflecting the transsexual’s true, self-identified sex, does not 
guarantee the security of a transsexual’s marriage, because courts have 
refused to recognize a transsexual’s post-transition sex for the purposes of 
marriage, notwithstanding the existence of an amended birth certificate.504 
In In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 505  an Ohio 
appellate court denied a marriage license to a post-operative FTM 
transsexual with a female. 506   Nash, the FTM transsexual, successfully 
amended his out-of-state birth certificate to reflect a change in sex from 
female to male after undergoing SRS.507  However, the Ohio court refused to 
give full faith and credit to his amended birth certificate, and denied the 
marriage license, stating that Ohio “has a clear public policy that authorizes 
and recognizes marriages only between members of the opposite sex.”508  
The court would not interpret male in the state’s marriage statute, to include 
a FTM post-operative transsexual.509 
Moreover, the complex issues and varied interpretations of legal sex 
for the purpose of marriage has had the effect of erasing marriages through 
court invalidation, and for all legal purposes, it is as if the marriage never 
existed.510  The invalidation of a marriage can have unfortunate consequences 
on the right to claim an inheritance when a spouse dies intestate.511  The 
Supreme Court of Kansas invalidated the marriage of J’Noel, a post-
transition MTF transsexual, to a male, after the husband had died intestate.512  
                                                            
501. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 227, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999); 
Corbett, P. 83 at 106. 
502. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; Corbett, P.83 at 106. 
503. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014). 
504. E.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, 4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003). 
505. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 31, 2003). 
506. Id. at *9. 
507. Id. at *1. 
508. Id. at *5. 
509. Id. at *6. 
510. Flynn, supra note 262, at 39–40. 
511. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 123 (Kan. 2002). 
512. Id. at 123, 137. 
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After his father died, the son challenged the validity of the marriage between 
his father and J’Noel because J’Noel was born a man.513 
Like in In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas refused to give full faith and credit to J’Noel’s 
amended Wisconsin birth certificate for the purpose of upholding the 
marriage to her husband.514  However, in J’Noel’s case, it actually had the 
effect of invalidating the marriage between J’Noel and her deceased 
husband.515 
The court concluded that J’Noel was not a woman within the 
meaning of Kansas’s marriage statute, and therefore affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling that their marriage was void.516  Consequently, the marriage 
between J’Noel and her deceased husband was erased; the son was named 
the sole heir, and inherited everything.517 
Like the MTF transsexual widow in In re Estate of Gardiner,518 an 
MTF transsexual widow in Texas also became a legal stranger to her 
deceased husband through court invalidation of her marriage.519  In Littleton 
v. Prange,520 the court granted a motion for summary judgment, holding that 
Christie, an MTF post-transition transsexual, was legally a male and 
therefore the marriage between Christie and another male was invalid.521  
Due to the court invalidating the marriage, Christie was unable to bring a 
claim under the wrongful death and survival statute because she was no 
longer considered the surviving spouse.522  The court held that Christie is a 
male even though she had successfully amended the name and sex on her 
birth certificate.523  “The trial court . . . granted the petition to amend the 
birth certificate” due to an affidavit presented by an “expert stating that 
Christie is a female.”524  As the dissent in the case correctly questioned: 
 
How then can the majority conclude that Christie is a male?  If 
Christie’s evidence that she was female was satisfactory enough 
for the trial court to issue an order to amend her original birth 
certificate to change both her name and her gender, why is it not 
                                                            
513. Id. at 123. 
514. Id.; In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, 
at *9. 
515. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136–37. 
516. Id. 
517. Id. at 123, 137. 
518. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).	
519. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
520. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
521. Id. at 225, 230–31. 
522. Id. 
523. Id. at 231. 
524. Id. 
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satisfactory enough to raise a genuine question of material fact on 
a motion for summary judgment?525 
2. Biological and Psychological Approach 
There is another line of cases that have moved away from the rigid 
biological test set forth in Corbett, applying an approach to defining legal sex 
for the purpose of marriage that incorporates the psychological, emotional, 
and social sense of an individual’s gender identity.526  These courts recognize 
the ability to change one’s sex and recognize that change of sex in upholding 
post-transition marriages.527 
In M.T., the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized the role that 
gender identity plays in determining sex.528  The court upheld the marriage of 
a post-operative MTF transsexual by ruling that she is legally female.529  In 
this case, the court rejects the notion that “sex is somehow irrevocably cast at 
the moment of birth” and found that the determination involves an analysis 
of several criteria. 530   Notably, the court found that “a person’s sex or 
sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, . . . one’s self image, the deep 
psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character.”531 
Critical in the court’s determination was finding that there had been 
a harmonization between the trans-person’s gender identity and physiology 
through SRS. 532   The court stated that she “has become physically and 
psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with 
her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy.  Consequently, 
plaintiff should be considered a member of the female sex for marital 
purposes.”533 
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the District 
of Minnesota recognized the many components in determining an 
individual’s sex and upheld a post-transition marriage. 534   Prior to 
                                                            
525. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting). 
526. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1976).  But see 
Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 106 (Eng.). 
527. E.g., M.T., 355 A.2d at 211. 
528. Id. at 209. 
529. See id. at 211. 
530. Id. at 209. 
531. Id. 
532. M.T., 355 A.2d at 211. 
533. Id.  Similarly, a trial court in California upheld a post-transition marriage, 
recognizing the transsexual as their post-operative sex.  Flynn, supra note 262, at 36.  The 
California court based its ruling on a California statute which permits an individual to receive 
a new birth certificate after having undergone SRS to reflect his or her new sex.  Id. 
534. See Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local #638 Health, 
Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1036 (D. Minn. 2012). 
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Minnesota’s legalization of same-sex marriage in August 2013, the sex of an 
individual—for purposes of marriage—was based on his or her sex at the 
time of marriage, not birth. 535   Minnesota also permits birth certificate 
amendments for people who have undergone SRS536 and acknowledges that 
“[t]here is no basis to conclude that Minnesota recognizes Plaintiff as female 
for some purposes—birth records and driver’s licenses, but not for others—
marriage certificates.”537 
The courts in New Jersey, California, and Minnesota recognize that 
sex can no longer be defined narrowly and “gender identity plays a central 
role in determining sex.” 538   While these decisions are favorable, and 
certainly an improvement from the rigid approach taken in Corbett, Nash, 
and Gardiner, the decisions were very focused on what the New Jersey court 
considered harmony between the transsexual’s gender and genitalia.539  The 
approach to defining sex for the purposes of marriage in states that prohibit 
same-sex marriage has certainly expanded, but is still too focused on sexual 
anatomy and biology as definitive of a person’s gender.540 
This issue has been addressed in jurisdictions outside of the United 
States, and the approach taken by an Australian court is particularly 
noteworthy.541  In In re Kevin, (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), 542 a 
FTM transsexual and his wife sought a declaration as to the validity of their 
marriage. 543   Prior to their marriage, Kevin, a FTM transsexual, had 
undergone hormone treatments, a total hysterectomy and mastectomy, but 
did not undergo a phalloplasty and still had a vagina.544  The key difference 
in this case from the New Jersey, California, and Minnesota cases, is that 
Kevin had not undergone complete sex-reassignment surgery, and therefore, 
in the words of the New Jersey court, there was not complete harmony 
between gender and genitals. 545   However, the Australian court was not 
                                                            
535. Id. at 1032. 
536. See MINN. STAT. § 144.218(4) (2013). 
537. Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 
538. Id. at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36. 
539. Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note 
262, at 35–36; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re 
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 
23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] p.83 at 104 (Eng.). 
540. See M.T., 355 A.2d at 209. 
541. See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 
1074 ¶ 1 (Austl.). 
542. [2001] FamCA 1074 (Austl.). 
543. Id. ¶ 1. 
544. See id. ¶ 30. 
545. Id. ¶¶ 30, 198; Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local 
#638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (D. Minn. 2012); 
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; see also Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36. 
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concerned with finding this harmony, and concluded that Kevin was legally 
male for the purposes of marriage.546  The court’s determination was based 
on expert testimony by psychiatrists who stated that Kevin’s “brain sex or 
mental sex is male.”547  The court expressly rejected the approach taken in 
Corbett, finding that sex cannot be determined based on any single factor 
“such as chromosomes or genital sex,” and stated that to determine a 
person’s sex for the purpose of marriage: 
[T]he relevant matters include . . . the person’s biological and 
physical characteristics at birth . . . the person’s life experiences, 
including the sex in which he or she is brought up and the person’s 
attitude to it; the person’s self-perception as a man or woman; the 
extent to which the person has functioned in society as a man or a 
woman; any hormonal, surgical or other medical sex reassignment 
treatments the person has undergone . . . and the person’s 
biological, psychological and physical characteristics at the time of 
the marriage, including—if they can be identified—any biological 
features of the person’s brain that are associated with a particular 
sex.548 
D. Issues That Arise During Divorce 
Even if a transsexual has successfully entered into a valid marriage 
recognized as a legal opposite sex marriage, issues may still arise when one 
of the spouses file for divorce.549  What should generally be a straightforward 
divorce proceeding can turn into a complex judicial determination of the 
transsexual’s legal sex and potential invalidation of the marriage.550  This is 
the battle that Michael Kantaras—an FTM transsexual—faced when he filed 
a petition for dissolution of marriage, and his wife counter petitioned 
alleging that their marriage was void because Michael is female and Florida 
prohibits same-sex marriage.551  The court agreed, holding that Michael is 
                                                            
546. In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶ 
330; see also M.T., 355 A.2d at 211. 
547. In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶ 
244; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35. 
548. In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶¶ 
328–330; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104 (Eng.). 
549. See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2004). 
550. E.g., id. at 156–57. 
551. Id. at 156. 
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] IDENTITY 171 
female and invalidated the marriage.552   Due to the invalidation of their 
marriage, Michael faced an ongoing battle of establishing parental rights.553 
More recently, an Arizona judge denied a divorce for Thomas 
Beatie—an FTM transsexual—based on the conclusion that he was a female 
at the time he married a woman, and due to Arizona’s prohibition on same-
sex marriage, the marriage was invalid. 554   Beatie is referred to as the 
Pregnant Man because he retained female reproductive organs and gave 
birth to three children during his marriage.555  He plans to appeal the divorce 
denial because “he wants the three children to whom he gave birth to know 
their parents’ marriage was legitimate” fearing that his children will “‘see 
that [the] court said that’s not your daddy.’”556 
It is clear that the sex of an individual is based on many components, 
which cannot be determined by biology alone.557  It seems inappropriate, and 
rather counter-intuitive, to narrowly define sex of a person as fixed at the 
time of his or her birth, when the individual personally and psychologically 
identifies differently, has undergone SRS or transition-related treatments, or 
even has had his or her certificate changed to reflect his or her new sex.558  
Moreover, states that prohibit same-sex marriage, but refuse to acknowledge 
the sex change of a transsexual, ultimately permit precisely what the same-
sex marriage ban was enacted to prevent.559 
 
When the ban on same-sex marriage meets the insistence that legal 
sex may not be changed, the result is as fitting as it is ironic:  [I]n 
these jurisdictions, transgender gay and lesbian couples can . . . 
marry.  Assume a transsexual woman lives in a state where birth 
anatomy—here, a penis—forever defines legal sex.  As a legal 
male, she is free to marry another woman, even though she, her 
partner, and society at large view them as lesbian.560 
                                                            
552. Id. at 161. 
553. See id. 
554. Associated Press, Arizona Judge Rejects Divorce for Transgender 
Pregnant Hawaii Man, Saying He Has No Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/judge-rejects-
divorce-transgender-pregnant-man-article-1.1302675. 
555. Id.; Jacques Billeaud, Transgender Man Plans to Keep Seeking Divorce, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 2013, at A8. 
556. Billeaud, supra note 555. 
557. See supra Part V. 
558. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
559. Flynn, supra note 262, at 34. 
560. Id.  For example, Serafima is a MTF transsexual who is in a relationship 
with another woman and considers herself a lesbian.  See supra Part V.  The jurisdiction that 
prohibits same-sex marriage and follows the strict biological approach to defining sex for the 
purposes of marriage would permit them to marry, because Serafima was born a male—even 
though in reality they are a same-sex couple.  See Flynn, supra note 262, at 34; supra Part V. 
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The complex issues of determining the validity of a post-transition 
marriage would be greatly simplified through same-sex marriage equality by 
removing any and all sex pre-qualifications for couples that want to marry.561  
However, the states that still prohibit same-sex marriage should follow the 
approach taken by the Family Court of Australia, which weighed more 
heavily psychological and personal perceptions of an individual’s gender 
identity in the determination of legal sex for the purposes of marriage.562 
X. THE RIGHT TO RAISE CHILDREN/PARENTAL RIGHTS 
As seen thus far, the struggles faced by the trans community concern 
some of the most intimate aspects of life—the right to marry, the right to be 
recognized for all legal purposes as the gender one identifies with, the right 
to equal health care, and matters concerning child custody and parental 
rights.563 
Legal ties between a parent and child can be established biologically, 
through adoption, or through marriage. 564   Unfortunately, none of these 
options for establishing and securing legal ties between a parent and child 
seem to hold true when a parent is transgender.565  The guiding standard 
governing child custody disputes is always the best interest of the child.566  
Variation exists among the states in the interpretation of the best interest of 
the child standard, and judges have broad discretion in weighing factors in 
child custody determinations.567 
Unfortunately, this standard has been unfairly applied against 
transgender parents.568  Gender identity should not be a factor in custody 
determinations or adoption placements, absent special circumstances 
indicating a likely negative impact on the child’s best interests. 569  
Unfortunately, many courts have denied child custody to a parent based on a 
finding that the parent’s gender identity, by itself, would not be in the best 
                                                            
561. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 40. 
562. See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] FamCA 
1074 ¶¶ 43–46 (Austl.); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445. 
563. HOWELL, supra note 290, at 2, 12–13, 57, 67–68. 
564. Flynn, supra note 262, at 41–42. 
565. Id. at 42. 
566. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2014). 
567. Kari J. Carter, Note, The Best Interest Test and Child Custody:  Why 
Transgender Should Not Be a Factor in Custody Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX:  J.L.–
MED. 209, 209–10 (2006). 
568. See, e.g., Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59–60 (Nev. 1986). 
569. See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2004); Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 294 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003). 
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interest of the child. 570   Some extreme cases have even gone as far as 
terminating a trans person’s parental rights.571 
In Daly v. Daly,572 the Supreme Court of Nevada terminated the 
parental rights of Suzanne—formerly known as Tim—the child’s biological 
father who underwent SRS.573  The court found that termination of parental 
rights were in the child’s best interest due to a “risk of serious physical, 
mental, or emotional injury to the child” if she were forced to maintain 
visitation with Suzanne.574  The court even went as far to state that “[i]t was 
strictly Tim Daly’s choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a 
female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.”575 
In addition to the extreme cases terminating parental rights of a trans 
parent, there have been numerous decisions restricting or denying child 
custody and visitation rights to a transgender parent.576  For example, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals in J.L.S. v. D.K.S.577 reversed the order of joint 
custody by the trial court because the father underwent sex-reassignment 
surgery. 578   The court determined “that immediate contact between the 
children and father would impair the boys’ emotional development.”579 
A circuit court in Florida correctly recognized that transgender status 
should not be a factor in custody determinations. 580   In Kantaras v. 
Kantaras581, Michael Kantaras, a FTM transsexual, was married to Linda 
Forsythe.582  Michael adopted Linda’s son from a previous marriage, and 
during their marriage Linda gave birth to a daughter through artificial 
insemination.583  After nine years of marriage to Linda, Michael filed for a 
                                                            
570. See, e.g., J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); 
Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982). 
571. E.g., Daly, 715 P.2d at 60. 
572. 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986). 
573. Id. at 57, 60. 
574. Id. at 57–58. 
575. Id. at 59. 
576. See J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Cisek v. 
Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982). 
577. 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
578. Id. at 774–75. 
579. Id. at 772.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington restricted the 
parental rights of a transgender father and granted residential placement with the mother, 
claiming to base this decision “on the children’s need for ‘environmental and parental 
stability.’”  In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).  The court 
did not follow the recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem, who concluded that “Robbie 
was the more nurturing and engaged parent, and . . . recommended that the court designate 
Robbie as the primary residential parent.”  Id. at 68. 
580. See Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 808 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003). 
581. No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003). 
582. Id. at 2, 4, 11. 
583. Id. at 15, 18–19. 
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divorce and sought custody of both children.584  In their custody battle, Linda 
argued that Michael had no parental rights over the children because he was 
a female.585  She claimed that the adoption of her son was void because it 
was done when Florida prohibited gay adoption, and that Michael was not 
the biological or legal father of her daughter.586 
Surprisingly, a Florida circuit court determined that the marriage was 
valid and concluded that it would be in the children’s best interest to remain 
in the parental custody of their transgender father.587  The approach taken by 
this court, in determining the custody of the children, is particularly 
noteworthy because Michael’s transgender status had no impact on the 
court’s application of the best interest of the child standard. 588   A 
psychologist, who testified about the qualities of a good parent, stated that 
there are no concerns about awarding custody to a trans parent as long as he 
is a good parent.589  The circuit court’s holding relied heavily on the finding 
that “[w]ith respect to the children, being a transsexual does not prevent him 
from being a good parent.”590 
However, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held the 
marriage between Michael and Linda as a same-sex marriage, and thus void 
ab initio.591  The court’s decision did not reverse the custody determination 
of the trial court and instead left that issue for review on remand.592  This 
decision unfortunately meant that Michael faced continued litigation in the 
fight to protect the parental rights over his children.593  Luckily, the well-
known television celebrity, Dr. Phil, heard about this ongoing case, invited 
Michael and Linda on his show, and successfully encouraged them to resolve 
the dispute in mediation.594  After two days of mediation, Michael’s battle 
was finally over when it was settled that he would retain all of his parental 
rights over his two children.595 
As demonstrated in In re Marriage of Simmons, 596  judicial 
invalidation of marriage can also have devastating effects on the parental 
                                                            
584. Id. at 2–3, 102, 615. 
585. See id. at 6. 
586. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 4–5, 8. 
587. Id. at 52, 799, 808. 
588. Id. at 52, 799. 
589. Id. at 294. 
590. Id. at 52. 
591. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
592. Id. 
593. See id. 
594. Case Summary & History, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://
www.nclrights.org/cases-and-policy/cases-and-advocacy/kantaras-v-kantaras/ (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2015). 
595. Id. 
596. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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rights of a trans person.597  The marriage of Sterling, a transsexual male, to 
his wife Jennifer, was declared invalid as a same-sex marriage and the court 
declared sole custody of the child to the wife.598  During their marriage, 
Jennifer underwent artificial insemination, and pursuant to the Parentage Act, 
the two of them and their physician signed a contract stating that Sterling is 
the natural father of the child born from this procedure.599  However, the 
court awarded custody to Jennifer, finding that Sterling was not biologically 
tied to the child and “lacked parental rights or standing to seek custody.”600 
In order for the artificial insemination agreement they signed to be 
valid, Sterling would have to be a husband and Jennifer, a wife.601  However, 
due to the invalidity of their marriage, they were not husband and wife at the 
time the agreement was signed, and the court further concluded that the 
Parentage Act does not “include[] transsexual males who have signed 
artificial insemination agreements as husbands in an invalid same-sex 
marriage.”602 
The fact that someone is transgender should not affect his or her 
parental rights and should not be a factor in the courts application of the best 
interest of the child standard.603  Although courts may deny the fact that a 
parent’s transgender status had a negative impact on their decision restricting 
or terminating parental rights,604 “reading between the lines it is easy for one 
to discern a bias against the transgender person and his or her gender 
identity.”605  Courts should follow the approach used by the Kantaras court 
in determining the best interest of the child in child custody disputes.606  The 
focus should be solely on parenting ability, excluding gender identity in that 
determination.607  Being a transsexual does not prevent someone from being 
a good parent; bias, animus, or a lack of understanding should not restrict or 
prevent a person from the right to raise children.608 
                                                            
597. See id. at 312. 
598. Id. at 307, 311, 315. 
599. Id. at 307. 
600. Id. 
601. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311. 
602. Id. 
603. See In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
(Kulik, J., dissenting). 
604. See id. at 67. 
605. HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68. 
606. See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2004). 
607. Contra In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 312–13. 
608. See HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, the American “legal system insists upon a 
male/female dichotomy.”609  Further, there are social expectations associated 
with what it means to be male and female, and those who fall outside of the 
cultural norm for femininity and masculinity are misunderstood, harassed, 
discriminated against, and even physically abused.610   For these reasons, 
there is a compelling need for legislative changes and specific legal 
protections for the trans community.611  The law should not categorize people 
based on his or her chromosomal make-up or attempt to fit an individual into 
a narrow category in which he or she may not belong.  As shown, the 
insistence on legally defining an individual as either male or female creates 
difficulties for transsexuals at all stages of his or her life.612  This binary 
classification system has the effect of diminishing the trans person’s 
autonomy by refusing to acknowledge and respect him or her for who he or 
she is.613  Everyone deserves to be respected and acknowledged for exactly 
who they are, an individual, not as a sex.  Instead of determining the rights 
and protections given to American citizens based on their classification of 
either male or female, the law should treat everyone equally—whether a 
person is male, female, transgender, intersex, homosexual, bisexual, 
pansexual, and so on—we are all individuals, entitled to the same rights, 
protections, and respect in society as well as in law. 
                                                            
609. Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 289. 
610. See GRANT ET. AL., supra note 20, at 3. 
611. See id. 
612. See id. at 3–8. 
613. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 935. 
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I. FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most basic tenets of federal judicial law is that a federal 
court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case.1  Subject 
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by the U.S. Constitution or 
federal statutes.2  These sources provide two primary bases of subject matter 
                                                 
1. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (holding that “when 
a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 
complaint in its entirety”). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between 
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens 
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects. 
Id.; see also infra notes 3–6. 
80
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 183 
jurisdiction:  Federal question jurisdiction 3  and diversity jurisdiction. 4  
First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”5  Alternatively, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction 
over certain cases, based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.6 
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, some diversity cases originate 
in the federal district court, but others are removed by defendants from state to 
federal court pursuant to § 1441.7  Regardless of their origin, in order to rely 
on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the parties must demonstrate that 
they meet the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction found in § 1332, 
including the minimum amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.8  
Section 1332 provides specific jurisdictional requirements based upon the 
identity of the parties and whether a case is filed as a class action.9 
Although the diversity jurisdiction requirements appear to be 
straightforward—at least as they are presented in the statute—their application 
has proved to be more complex over time.10  An abundance of case law has 
developed regarding how the requirements for diversity jurisdiction should be 
interpreted; this Guide focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
interprets them today.11  Specifically, Part II sets out the statutory foundations 
of diversity jurisdiction.12  Part III addresses Eleventh Circuit and Supreme 
Court of the United States precedents regarding § 1332’s 
amount-in-controversy requirement, while Part IV analyzes the statute’s 
                                                 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
4. Id. § 1332.  Title 28, Section 1367 of United States Code provides that the 
federal courts, in some circumstances, may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims 
that are part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the courts have primary 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. § 1367; see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“Once the court determines it has original jurisdiction over the 
civil action, it can turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims in the action.”). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  For example, federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334—bankruptcy proceedings, 28 
U.S.C. § 1335—interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1337—commerce and antitrust regulations, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338—patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1340—internal revenue and customs 
duties, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343—civil rights and elective franchise.  Id. §§ 1334, 1335, 1337, 
1338, 1340, 1343. 
6. Id. § 1332. 
7. Id.; §§ 1332, 1441(a)–(h). 
8. Id. § 1332(a). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)–(d)(4). 
10. See id. § 1332(a)–(d)(4); infra Parts II–VI. 
11. See infra Parts II–VI. 
12. See infra Parts II. 
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requirements for diversity of citizenship. 13   Section 1332’s specific 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction in the context of class actions are set 
forth in Part V.14  Finally, Part VI presents some specific legal rules that come 
up in appellate litigation of diversity issues.15 
II. STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND 
GENERAL RULES OF APPLICATION 
The starting point for federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction is § 1332.16  
In subsection (a), that statute provides the basic requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $75,000, 17  exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between— 
(1) citizens of different [s]tates; 
(2) citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, 
except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction 
under this subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the 
same [s]tate; 
(3) citizens of different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state are additional parties; and 
(4) a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and 
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.18 
Subsection (d) sets out specific diversity jurisdiction requirements for 
class action lawsuits, which are different from those in other diversity cases.19 
More generally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”), provides the following requirement for pleading jurisdiction in 
                                                 
13. See infra Parts III–IV. 
14. See infra Parts V. 
15. See infra Parts VI. 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
17. Id.  The amount in the amount-in-controversy requirement has increased 
numerous times since the nineteenth century, and has been set at more than $75,000 since 1996.  
See id. § 1332(a). 
18. Id. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). 
19. See id. § 1332(d). 
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cases filed originally in federal court:  “A pleading that states a claim for 
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support.”20  Applying this rule, when a plaintiff 
files suit in federal court based on diversity, he or she must allege facts that 
demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.21  If a 
plaintiff’s inadequate jurisdictional allegations remain uncured, the district 
court is required to dismiss the case without addressing its merits. 22  
Dismissal is required because “once a federal court determines that it is 
without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”23 
Sometimes a diversity case is in federal court because a defendant has 
petitioned for its removal from state court.24  The statutory basis for removal 
of a civil action from a state court to a federal court is found in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any 
civil action brought in a [s]tate court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States 
for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending.25 
The burden is on the defendant to adequately plead diversity in a 
removal case.26  A defendant seeking to remove an action from state to 
federal court must file a notice of removal in the district court that “contain[s] 
a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of 
all process, pleadings, and orders” served upon the defendant in the state court 
action.27  If the defendant fails to demonstrate that the § 1332 diversity 
requirements have been met in a removed case, the district court will remand 
the case back to the state court.28 
                                                 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013). 
22. Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268–69; see also Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 
1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001). 
23. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). 
24. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (“A civil case filed in state 
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought 
originally in federal court.”). 
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 
27. Id. 
28. See id. § 1332; Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410. 
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Even if the parties do not dispute a court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
based upon diversity, federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject 
matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”29  The parties 
may not agree to waive subject matter jurisdiction. 30   As a result, the 
following legal issues may come up either by way of arguments raised by one 
or more of the parties, or because the federal court identifies a potential 
problem with diversity jurisdiction.31 
III. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY 
In civil actions—aside from class actions—there are two basic 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction:  (1) the amount in controversy must 
be more than $75,000; and (2) the parties must be completely diverse.32  This 
first section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit applies the 
amount-in-controversy requirement.33 
A. Burden of Demonstrating that Amount in Controversy Has Been Met 
 As stated above, the diversity statute requires that “the matter in 
controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs.”34  The party responsible for bringing the case to the federal courts 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the diversity requirements have been 
met.35  In a case originating in the federal district court, the plaintiff must 
allege in good faith a sum adequate to meet the statutory requirements.36 
                                                 
29. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410. 
30. Id.; see also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s 
competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise 
conferred upon the court by the parties.  Otherwise a party could work a wrongful 
extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied 
them.  
Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1000 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (holding that “subject-matter 
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited 
or waived”). 
31. See infra Parts III–IV. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). 
33. See infra Part III.A–F. 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
35. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411–12 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
36. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L.L.C., 329 F.3d 805, 807 
(11th Cir. 2003); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 
84
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 187 
In contrast, in cases removed from state court to federal court, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving diversity. 37   The defendant must 
“show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting jurisdiction.”38  
Applying this standard in removal cases, the federal court will show deference 
to the plaintiff’s damages allegations when pleaded specifically.39  However, 
when the plaintiff has not alleged a specific amount of damages, the court will 
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard.40 
B. “Legal Certainty” Requirement for Dismissal Based on Failure to 
Meet Amount in Controversy Requirement 
Federal courts “will not dismiss a case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the diversity statute ‘unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ 
that plaintiff’s claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional amount.’”41  
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this standard “give[s] great weight to 
plaintiff’s assessment of the value of plaintiff’s case.”42  It is an objective 
standard.43 
In contrast, the court will not allow defendants seeking to remove 
cases from state to federal court to benefit from the legal certainty test.44  
Thus, where the plaintiff seeks less than the amount required for diversity 
jurisdiction, “only the sum actually demanded is in controversy.”45  In order 
to avoid remand in removal cases involving alleged damages below the 
statutory amount-in-controversy minimum, the defendant “must prove to a 
legal certainty” that the plaintiff’s counsel has either falsely or incompetently 
assessed the case.46  The Eleventh Circuit has stated that one way that a 
                                                                                                                   
(1938) (stating that “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in 
good faith”). 
37. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 
38. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. 
39. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 (stating that “plaintiff’s claim, when it is 
specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth”). 
40. See Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 947–48 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
41. Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 
1998) (quoting Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094) (emphasis added); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. 
Co., 303 U.S. at 289 (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”). 
42. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094. 
43. Id. at 1096. 
44. See id. at 1094–95 (noting that the plaintiff “is the master of his own 
claim.”). 
45. See id. at 1095 (emphasis added). 
46. Id. 
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removing defendant could remain in federal court in this circumstance was if 
“he showed that, if plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the 
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible awards.”47 
C. Timing of Amount in Controversy Determination for Removal Cases 
Jurisdictional facts—including those regarding the amount in 
controversy—must be determined as of the date of removal.48  However, the 
court is not limited to jurisdictional allegations in the removal petition; it may 
also consider post-removal evidence of the amount in controversy, such as that 
presented in affidavits, if that evidence is relevant to the time of removal.49 
 
D. Calculating Amount in Controversy 
1. Law Regarding Aggregating Claims to Meet Amount in Controversy 
Requirements 
The law regarding aggregation of claims to meet amount in 
controversy requirements is complex and not always consistent. 50   This 
subsection sets out some of the rules regarding aggregation of claims.51 
a. Aggregation of Multiple Claims by Plaintiff(s) Against a Single 
Defendant 
As a general rule, a plaintiff may aggregate multiple claims against a 
single defendant in order to meet the amount in controversy requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction.52  In contrast, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that multiple plaintiffs’ claims can be aggregated, for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, only when “plaintiffs [have] unite[d] to enforce a single 
title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.”53  Thus, 
                                                 
47. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096. 
48. Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). 
49. Id.; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2001) (stating that “a district court may properly consider post-removal evidence in determining 
whether the jurisdictional amount was satisfied at the time of removal”). 
50. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3704 (4th ed. 2011). 
51. See infra Part III.D(1)(a–c). 
52. Pearson v. Nat’l Soc’y of Pub. Accountants, 200 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 
1953). 
53. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper 
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973). 
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 189 
when multiple plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, the court will not 
aggregate those claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy.54 
b. Aggregating Claims Against Multiple Defendants 
When a plaintiff brings separate and distinct claims against multiple 
defendants, the general rule is that claims cannot be aggregated to meet the 
amount in controversy requirement. 55   The outcome is different when a 
plaintiff brings claims against two or more defendants who are jointly liable to 
the plaintiff; in that situation, the claims may be aggregated.56  Applying this 
rule, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not aggregate claims against 
two insurance companies when one company had primary liability and the 
other one had excess coverage of the same insured risk.57 
c. Aggregation in the Context of Class Actions 
There are additional specific aggregation rules in the context of class 
actions.58  For a complete discussion of those rules, see Part V.59 
2. Methods of Determining Amount in Controversy in Removal Cases 
The Eleventh Circuit has set out a specific approach to determining 
amount in controversy in removal cases.60  When the state court complaint 
seeks more than $75,000 in damages, “a removing defendant may rely on the 
plaintiff’s valuation of the case to establish the amount in controversy unless it 
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount 
claimed.”61  However, if the complaint does not contain a claim for a specific 
amount of damages, the federal court should consider whether “it is facially 
                                                 
54. E.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Dyess Furniture Co., 292 F.2d 232, 233 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (“The law has been . . . long settled . . . that when two or more plaintiffs, having 
separate and distinct demands, unite in a single suit for convenience of litigation, their claims 
cannot be aggregated to make up the jurisdictional amount.”). 
55. Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961); see 
also Cornell v. Mabe, 206 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1953). 
56. Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13; Cornell, 206 F.2d at 516–17 (“However, when the 
action is to recover a single tract of land and the several defendants claim under a common 
source of title, the matter in controversy is the entire tract of land and not its several parts.”). 
57. Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13. 
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
59. See infra Part V. 
60. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 
61. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
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apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the 
jurisdictional requirement.”62 
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy is facially apparent 
from the complaint, “the district court is not bound by the plaintiff’s 
representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff is in 
the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought.”63  Indeed, the 
court may decide that the defendant’s evidence regarding the amount in 
controversy is more reliable than that of the plaintiff.64  The district court 
“may use [its] judicial experience and common sense in determining whether 
the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.”65 
“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the 
complaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require 
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was 
removed.”66  In order to sufficiently allege jurisdiction in the petition for 
removal, the defendant must do more than make “[a] conclusory allegation . . . 
that the . . . amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts 
supporting such an assertion.”67 
3. Determining Amount in Controversy in Cases Involving Only 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
In cases where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive 
relief, the proper measure of amount in controversy is the value of the object 
of the litigation.68  The Eleventh Circuit has determined that this value should 
                                                 
62. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). 
63. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061. 
64. Id. at 1061. 
65. Id. at 1062. 
 Thus, when a district court can determine, relying on its judicial 
experience and common sense, that a claim satisfies the amount in controversy 
requirements, it need not give credence to a plaintiff’s representation that the value of 
the claim is indeterminate.  Otherwise, a defendant could wrongly be denied the 
removal to which it is entitled. 
Id at 1064. 
66. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. 
67. Id. at 1319–20; see also Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 
(11th Cir. 2002) (“The defendants in this case have failed to carry their burden; all they did was 
to fill the notice of removal with the type of unsupported assumptions we have held to be 
inadequate.”). 
68. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see 
also Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 
218 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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be determined from the plaintiff’s perspective.69  If the value of the requested 
relief is too speculative or immeasurable, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the 
plaintiff fails to meet the amount in controversy requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.70 
4. Determining Amount in Controversy for Specific Performance Cases 
In diversity cases in which the plaintiff seeks specific performance of 
a contract, federal courts generally base their calculation of the amount in 
controversy on the value of the property at issue, not the amount that might be 
awarded in damages for breach of contract.71 
5. Challenges to Arbitration Awards and the Amount in Controversy 
Requirement 
The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide subject matter 
jurisdiction for a case to be in federal courts.72  Instead, a party seeking to 
challenge an arbitration award must demonstrate an independent basis for 
jurisdiction, such as diversity.73  In Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc.,74 the Eleventh Circuit held that “a federal court has subject 
matter jurisdiction where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award is also 
seeking a new arbitration hearing at which he will demand a sum which 
exceeds the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”75 
                                                 
69. Ericcson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218–20; see also Davis v. 
Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1999).  Note:  Not all circuits 
follow the plaintiff’s-viewpoint rule, although the majority have.  Ericsson GE Mobile 
Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218 n.8. 
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d 
at 222 (“Because [the plaintiff] cannot reduce the speculative benefit resulting from a rebid to a 
monetary standard, . . . there is no pecuniary amount in controversy.”); see also Morrison v. 
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “a plaintiff who bases 
diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctive relief must show that the benefit to be obtained 
from the injunction is sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the . . . amount in 
controversy requirement”) (quotation omitted). 
71. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Bullard, 995 F.2d 1046, 1047 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam).  “When the value of property sought to be obtained by specific performance 
exceeds the sum which might have been awarded in damages, the amount in controversy is 
established by the value of the property.”  Id. 
72. Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 431 F.3d 1320, 
1325 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
73. See Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1325. 
74. 431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). 
75. Id. at 1325. 
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E. Effect of Subsequent Events 
Subsequent events do not change a federal court’s analysis of the 
amount in controversy, as the court’s jurisdiction is determined as of the date 
that the case enters the district court.76  As the Supreme Court of the United 
States noted in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,77 the fact that 
the plaintiff does not ultimately recover the full amount alleged in the 
complaint does not void the federal court’s jurisdiction in a diversity case.78  
In explaining the good-faith requirement, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he 
inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court 
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.”79 
Applying this rule, a plaintiff’s stipulation or amendment of the 
pleadings after a case is removed to federal court that reduces the amount in 
controversy below the statutory minimum does not divest the federal court of 
diversity jurisdiction.80  Moreover, 
the fact that it appears from the face of the complaint that the 
defendant has a valid defense, if asserted, to all or a portion of the 
claim, or the circumstance that the rulings of the district court after 
removal reduce the amount recoverable below the jurisdictional 
requirement, will not justify remand.81 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, in determining the amount in 
controversy, it will not consider whether some damages may be precluded by 
the statute of limitations.82 
                                                 
76. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 293 
(1938). 
77. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
78. Id. at 289. 
79. Id.; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 
777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that, once the amount in controversy requirement 
is met “and the federal court is seized of jurisdiction, the court’s power is not conditional on a 
later award of at least that amount”). 
80. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292. 
81. Id. 
82. McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 The district court also found it significant that Maytag’s calculation of the 
amount in controversy did not account for the effect of any applicable statutes of 
limitations.  When determining the amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes, however, courts cannot look past the complaint to the merits of a defense 
that has not yet been established. 
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1332 n.9. 
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F. Relevance of State Law to Determination of Amount in Controversy 
Although the question of whether the plaintiff has met the amount in 
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is a federal question, courts 
will often consider whether state law is relevant to that determination.83  
Specifically, the court will utilize state law “insofar as it defines the nature and 
extent of the right plaintiff seeks to enforce.”84 
In Broughton v. Florida International Underwriters, Inc., 85  the 
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a plaintiff could rely upon claims for 
statutory penalties and attorney’s fees, brought pursuant to a Georgia statute, 
to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for diversity 
jurisdiction.86  Although the court was willing to consider these types of 
claims, it ultimately determined that the defendant was not liable under the 
state statute and, therefore, the plaintiff did not meet the minimum 
amount-in-controversy requirement. 87   In Ericsson GE Mobile 
Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc.,88 the 
court also considered the availability of state-law remedies—this time under 
Alabama law—in determining whether the amount in controversy 
requirement was met.89 
IV. DETERMINING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP 
The following Part addresses in more detail the Eleventh Circuit’s 
analysis of § 1332’s requirement that parties seeking the federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction demonstrate diversity of citizenship.90  In fact, most of 
the court’s analysis regarding jurisdiction under this statute has focused 
primarily on this specific requirement, as explained further.91 
                                                 
83. See Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 
(11th Cir. 1998); Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352–53 (1961).   
[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction is a federal question to be decided under federal standards, although the 
federal courts must, of course, look to state law to determine the nature and extent of 
the right to be enforced in a diversity case. 
Horton, 367 U.S. at 352–53. 
84. Broughton, 139 F.3d at 863 (quoting Duderwicz v. Sweetwater Sav. Ass’n, 
595 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
85. 139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998). 
86. Id. at 863–64. 
87. Id. at 864. 
88. 120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997). 
89. Id. at 220–21 (holding that under Alabama law, if the plaintiff was 
successful it would only be entitled to rebid the contract and that the value of that benefit was 
too speculative to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.). 
90. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
91. See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. Rules Related to Pleading Diversity of Citizenship Exists 
1. The Rule for Cases Filed Originally in District Court 
a. Requirements Under FRCP 8 
When a party seeks to bring an original civil action in the federal 
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), FRCP 8 applies.92  Under FRCP 8, the 
plaintiff’s complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the court’s 
jurisdiction.93   Applying FRCP 8 in the context of § 1332, in order to 
adequately allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must provide specific 
allegations regarding the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.94  
Although the rule is straightforward, numerous legal issues can complicate the 
federal court’s analysis of the parties’ citizenship, as illustrated below.95 
b. Timing:  Diversity Jurisdiction Is Determined as of Date that the 
Action Was Filed 
In determining whether the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit looks to the facts as they existed at the time 
the action was filed.96 
i. Post-filing Changes in Citizenship Do Not Matter for 
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction 
It is well established that the only citizenship that matters for purposes 
of determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists is the original parties’ 
citizenship at the time the lawsuit is filed; any changes in a party’s citizenship 
that occur after filing are irrelevant.97  Thus, the district court will not “lose 
jurisdiction over a diversity [claim that] was well founded at the outset even 
[if] one of the parties . . . later change[s] [its] domicile.”98   Moreover, 
post-filing changes in the citizenship of a party cannot cure jurisdictional 
defects in a diversity action, where “[t]he purported cure arose not from a 
                                                 
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
95. See infra Part IV.A.1.b. 
96. See Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) 
(per curiam); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989). 
97. Freeport-McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 428; Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Kan., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) (“Jurisdiction once acquired on that ground 
is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties.”). 
98. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970), 
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change in parties to the action, but from a change in the citizenship of a 
continuing party.”99 
ii. The Substitution of Parties Under FRCP 25(c) Does Not 
Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction 
Diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse 
party to the action—accomplished by substituting the nondiverse party as a 
plaintiff under FRCP 25(c)—when the plaintiffs and defendant were diverse at 
the time that the action arose and at the time that federal proceedings were 
commenced; the substituted party “was not an indispensable party at the time 
the complaint was filed”; and the substituted party “had no interest whatsoever 
in the outcome of the litigation until sometime after [the] suit was 
commenced.”100 
iii. Permissive Intervention of a Party Under FRCP 24 Does Not 
Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction 
FRCP 24 provides for intervention of right and permissive 
intervention by other parties.101  The intervention of a party, by leave of court, 
does not destroy the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction when the intervening 
party’s “presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the 
original parties.”102 
Recent Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that an intervenor’s 
citizenship does have an effect on a court’s diversity jurisdiction analysis in 
some circumstances, however.103  In Flintlock Construction Services, L.L.C. 
v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C 104  a case brought pursuant to diversity 
jurisdiction, the intervenor was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff and 
sought to bring claims against both the plaintiff and the defendants.105  In 
order to maintain diversity jurisdiction, the court dismissed the intervenor’s 
                                                 
99. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2004). 
100. Freeport McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 426–29 (noting that “[a] contrary rule 
could well have the effect of deterring normal business transactions during the pendency of 
what might be lengthy litigation”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (1894) (holding that the substitution of nondiverse defendants for diverse 
defendants did not destroy federal jurisdiction). 
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).  FRCP 24(a) provides for intervention of right, 
while FRCP 24(b) applies to permissive interventions.  Id. 
102. Wichita R.R. & Light Co., 260 U.S. at 54. 
103. See Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 
F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013). 
104. 710 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2013). 
105. Id. at 1222-23. 
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claims against the plaintiff but allowed the claims against the defendant to 
proceed.106 
iv. Plaintiff Cannot Later Amend Complaint to Add Nondiverse 
Defendant 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity jurisdiction 
is not destroyed by a federal court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over 
nonfederal claims involving impleader, cross-claims, or counter-claims, a 
court will not have diversity jurisdiction where a plaintiff later amends the 
complaint to add a nondiverse party.107 
v. In Evaluating Diversity, the Court Should Realign Parties 
According to Their Real Interests 
The plaintiff’s alignment of the parties is not determinative for 
diversity purposes.108  Thus, a federal district court, in determining whether 
there is complete diversity, has a duty to realign parties according to their real 
interests.109  For example, in shareholder derivative suits brought in federal 
court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the court will align the corporation as a 
defendant whenever the corporate management has adopted a position that is 
antagonistic to that of the plaintiff shareholder.110 
c. Curing Defects in Diversity Jurisdiction 
Under certain circumstances, it is possible to cure defects in diversity 
jurisdiction.111  The following subsection provides some analysis of when 
curing is possible and how it may be accomplished.112 
i. Courts May Use FRCP 21 to Drop Nondiverse Dispensable 
Parties 
“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, 
add or drop a party.”113  Thus, although generally diversity jurisdiction is 
                                                 
106. Id. at 1225. 
107. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1978). 
108. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941). 
109. Id.; see also City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “federal courts are required to realign the parties in an action 
to reflect their interests in the litigation”). 
110. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 96–98 (1957). 
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; infra Part IV.A.1.C. 
112. See infra Part IV.A.1.C. 
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determined at the time of filing, a jurisdictional defect relating to diversity of 
citizenship can be cured by the dismissal of a nondiverse dispensable party 
who destroyed diversity.114  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
warned that federal courts should exercise this power sparingly. 115   In 
determining whether to dismiss a nondiverse party, the court “should carefully 
consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of the 
parties in the litigation.”116 
Dismissal of nondiverse parties is not possible in all circumstances.117  
If the nondiverse party is indispensable, the court must dismiss the entire case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.118 
ii. Under Some Circumstances, Parties Can Cure Defective Allegations 
of Jurisdiction 
Parties may amend defective allegations of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1653.119  Title 28, Section 1653 of the United States Code provides 
that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in 
the trial or appellate courts.”120  The statute applies only to allegations of 
jurisdiction, however, and not to the underlying jurisdictional facts. 121  
Moreover, a defendant’s admissions as to his domicile—as well as record 
evidence regarding domicile—are sufficient to cure a plaintiff’s pleading 
defect when the complaint only pleaded the defendant’s residency.122 
Parties may also cure deficiencies in diversity jurisdiction allegations 
by submitting evidence of citizenship during case proceedings. 123   The 
                                                                                                                   
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to 
allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been 
rendered.”). 
114. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004); 
see also Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 827, 837–38; Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. 
Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011). 
115. Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 837–38. 
116. Id. at 838. 
117. See id. at 837–38. 
118. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1343. 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2012). 
120. Id.; see also Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.12 (11th Cir. 
2013) (allowing parties to submit supplemental materials to demonstrate diversity of citizenship 
in case removed from state court). 
121. Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 831 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1653 
“addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists, and not defects in 
the jurisdictional facts themselves”). 
122. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342–43. 
123. See id. 
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Supreme Court of the United States has held that a federal court may consider 
record evidence in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 124  
Applying that rule, the appellate court “need not vacate a decision on the 
merits if the evidence submitted during the course of the proceedings cures 
any jurisdictional pleading deficiency by convincing [the court] of the parties’ 
citizenship.”125 
iii. Limitations on a Party’s Attempts to Cure Jurisdictional 
Allegations 
Although it is possible for the plaintiff to cure the jurisdictional 
allegations in the complaint, a federal court will not accept the parties’ 
stipulation that diversity jurisdiction exists.126  Furthermore, although a party 
may cure insufficient allegations of diversity jurisdiction by amending 
pleadings, a party may not cure them solely through self-serving statements in 
an unsworn brief.127 
2. Case Removed from State Court to Federal District Court 
As explained above, a defendant may also remove a case from state 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as long as he demonstrates that the federal 
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.128  As the Eleventh Circuit 
explained in Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,129 “[a] civil case filed in state 
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have 
been brought originally in federal court.”130  Similar to the diversity rules for 
cases filed originally in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit has developed a 
series of legal rules for analysis of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction in 
removal cases, as discussed further.131 
                                                 
124. See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 382 (1904) 
(stating “[t]he whole record . . . may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment 
of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of 
citizenship”). 
125. Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013). 
126. See id. at 1269–70 (stating “it is fundamental that parties may not stipulate 
to federal jurisdiction”). 
127. See id. at 1269 (noting that “we have never held that an unsworn statement 
in a brief, alone, can demonstrate a party’s citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity 
jurisdiction”). 
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 
154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
129. 154 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). 
130. Id. at 1287. 
131. See infra Part V.B. 
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a. Burden to Adequately Plead Diversity Is on the Defendant in a 
Removal Case 
Although the pleading requirements are somewhat similar in removal 
cases to those originating in federal court, the pleading requirements for 
removed cases are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), rather than FRCP 8(a)(1).132  
As explained further, the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of 
pleading diversity in a case removed from state court.133  As part of that 
requirement, the defendant’s notice of removal must include “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for removal.”134 
b. Specific Statutory Rules for Removal of Diversity Cases 
Title 28, Section 1441 of the United States Code contains additional 
special rules for diversity cases in the context of removal cases, as described 
below.135 
i. Fictitious Names (“Jane Does”) Are Disregarded for 
Purposes of Determining Jurisdiction in Removal Cases 
Title 28, Section 1441(b)(1) of the United States Code instructs that, 
“[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the 
jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . the citizenship of defendants sued under 
fictitious names shall be disregarded.”136 
ii. Exception When Defendant Is Citizen of State in Which 
Action Was Brought 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “[a] civil action otherwise removable 
solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . may not be 
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”137 
                                                 
132. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 
(11th Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A. 
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 
135. See infra Part IV.A.2.c. 
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); see also Walker v. CSX Transp., Inc., 650 F.3d 
1392, 1395 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011). 
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 
90 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 
When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts 
would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or 
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c. Time For Determining Whether Diversity Exists for Purposes of 
Removal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), “[i]n a case not originally 
removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the 
post-commencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements—for 
example, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party—may remove the 
case to federal court within [thirty] days of receiving such information.”138 
The timing of a determination of diversity for purposes of removal is 
approached somewhat differently than it is in cases originating in federal 
court.139  In cases removed from state to federal court, the district court must 
look at the case at the time of removal, rather than the time of filing of the 
original complaint, to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.140  
Generally, the right of removal is decided by the pleadings, viewed at the time 
when removal is filed.141 
d. Curing Faulty Citizenship Allegations in Removal Petitions 
Faulty allegations of citizenship in a removal petition may be properly 
cured by filing an amended petition for removal in the federal district court.142  
Moreover, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly 
removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional 
requirements are met at the time final judgment is entered.”143  The Supreme 
Court has contrasted situations in which a jurisdictional defect remained 
uncured and situations in which there was no jurisdictional defect at the time 
that the district court entered judgment.144 
                                                                                                                   
defendants may remove the action to federal court . . . provided that no defendant “is 
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 
Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted). 
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68–69. 
139. Compare Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 
2002), with Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883). 
140. Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir. 
2007) (per curium); see also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Leonard, 279 F.3d at 972 (noting that “the critical time is the date of removal”); Poore v. 
Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by 
Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 2007). 
141. Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 253 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 
2001) (per curiam).  But see Gibson, 108 U.S. at 563 (holding that diversity of citizenship, 
when the basis of jurisdiction, must exist at the time of the filing of the original action, as well as 
at the time of the petition for removal). 
142. See D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 147 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
143. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 64. 
144. Compare id. at 76–77, with Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 
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Despite a federal trial court’s threshold denial of a motion to 
remand, if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect 
remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. . . .  In this case, 
however, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the 
District Court.  To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment, and 
return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional 
requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court 
system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted 
administration of justice.145 
e. Effect of Subsequent Acts on Diversity Jurisdiction 
“[I]f a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity 
action at the time of removal, subsequent acts do not divest the court of its 
jurisdiction over the action.”146 
B. Types of Parties 
Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh 
Circuit have further developed the requirements for how a federal court 
determines a party’s citizenship in the context of diversity jurisdiction.147  
The rules vary, depending on the type of parties.148  Those rules are analyzed 
further below.149 
                                                                                                                   
U.S. 377, 382 (1904). 
145. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 76–77 (citations omitted). 
146. Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining 
that changes to pleadings made after removal in diversity cases do not deprive the court of 
supplemental jurisdiction); Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 
1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 
2007).  But see Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that, 
after removal, plaintiff destroyed diversity by joining non-diverse defendant, but defect could 
be cured by dismissing non-diverse defendant). 
147. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010); Molinos Valle Del 
Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2011); McCormick v. Aderholt, 
293 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 
(11th Cir. 1994). 
148. Compare McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257–58, with Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 
80. 
149. See infra Parts IV.B.1–12. 
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1. Individuals 
a. General Rules 
The plaintiff is required to allege natural parties’ citizenship, not 
residence.150  As the court has observed, “[t]o be a citizen of a [s]tate within 
the meaning of [§] 1332, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United 
States, and a domiciliary of that [s]tate.  For diversity purposes, citizenship 
means domicile; mere residence in the [s]tate is not sufficient.” 151  
Furthermore, the federal court applies federal law, not state law, to determine 
a party’s citizenship under § 1332.152  For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 
“[t]he word ‘States’ . . . includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”153 
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a person’s “[c]itizenship is 
equivalent to domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”154  The court 
has defined a party’s domicile as “the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent 
home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of 
returning whenever he is absent therefrom.’”155  There is a presumption that a 
person is a domiciliary of the State of his birth, unless and until he acquires a 
new domicile, regardless of whether his parents were citizens of that State.156  
In order to demonstrate a change in domicile, a party must show both:  “(1) 
physical presence at the new location, [and] (2) an intention to remain there 
indefinitely.”157 
b. United States Citizens Living Abroad 
“[United States] citizens domiciled abroad are neither ‘citizens of a 
State’ under § 1332(a) nor ‘citizens or subjects of a foreign state’ and therefore 
are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court.”158  In determining 
                                                 
150. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342 n.12; Taylor, 30 F.3d 
at 1367 (“Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to 
establish diversity for a natural person.”). 
151. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
152. Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e). 
154. McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). 
155. Id. at 1257–58 (quoting Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399). 
156. See Gregg v. La. Power & Light Co., 626 F.2d 1315, 1317 (5th Cir. 1980). 
157. McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258. 
158. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
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that a United States citizen domiciled abroad destroyed diversity jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court of the United States applied the following reasoning: 
In order to be a citizen of a [s]tate within the meaning of the 
diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the 
United States and be domiciled within the [s]tate.  The problem in 
this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no 
domicile in any [s]tate.  He is therefore stateless for purposes of § 
1332(a)(3).  Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt when a citizen of a [s]tate sues aliens only, also 
could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen.159 
Although Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain160 applied this rule 
in the context of a defendant, it also applies to a United States citizen living 
abroad who is a plaintiff to a lawsuit:  “A United States citizen with no 
domicile in any state of this country is stateless and cannot satisfy the 
complete diversity requirement when she, or her estate, files an action against 
a United States citizen.”161 
There is one important exception to this rule.162  “[A] citizen of a 
state does not lose her domicile when her employer sends her abroad,” or, in 
other words, when the citizen is living abroad “‘in the exercise of some 
particular profession.’”163 
c. Dual Citizenship 
There is also a special rule for individuals who have dual 
citizenship.164  The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “an individual who is a 
dual citizen of the United States and another nation is only a citizen of the 
United States for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”165 
                                                 
159. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 827–28 (1989) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (case in which one defendant was a United States 
citizen living overseas); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3). 
160. 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
161. King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007); see also 
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828–29; Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“[A] United States citizen who is a permanent resident of a foreign country may not invoke 
federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 
162. See King, 505 F.3d 1171–72. 
163. Id. at 117–72 (quoting Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 423 (1853)). 
164. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
165. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). 
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d. Permanent Resident Aliens 
The district court does not have diversity jurisdiction of “an action 
between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are 
domiciled in the same [s]tate.”166 
e. Other Aliens 
For a full discussion of how other aliens are treated for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.167 
2. Corporations 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), “a corporation shall be deemed to 
be a citizen of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated 
and of the [s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of 
business.”168  Thus, “the complaint must allege either the corporation’s state 
of incorporation or principal place of business.”169  As demonstrated below, 
the interpretation of this statute has been more complicated in practice, and as 
a result, a number of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases provide 
further guidance for its application.170 
a. Domestic Corporations–Principal Place of Business 
i. The “Nerve Center” Test 
“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the place where 
the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation’s activities.” 171   The Supreme Court has observed that “in 
practice, [the principal place of business] should . . . be the place where the 
corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the 
actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ 
and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”172  
                                                 
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
167. See infra Part IV.B.12. 
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
169. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
170. See infra Part B.2.a. 
171. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010) (noting that some lower 
federal courts have referred to that place as the corporation’s “nerve center”). 
172. Id. at 93. 
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By taking this approach in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,173 the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected an approach to the “principal place of business” 
determination that measured the amount of business conducted within a state 
and compared that amount to the amount of business conducted in other 
states.174 
The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue in a 
published case since the Supreme Court decided Hertz Corp.175  However, 
prior to Hertz Corp., the Eleventh Circuit applied a “total activities” test to 
determine a corporation’s principal place of business.176  In MacGinnitie v. 
Hobbs Group, LLC,177 the court described the “total activities” test as follows:   
[The “total activities”] test combines the “place of activities” test 
and the “nerve center” test used by other circuits.  Under the “place 
of activities” test, the location of the majority of the corporation’s 
sales or production activities is its principal place of business.  
Under the “nerve center” test, the location of the corporate offices is 
generally the principal place of business. 
. . . . 
The total activities test requires a somewhat subjective 
analysis to choose between the results of the nerve center and place 
of activities tests, if they differ. . . . Where a company’s activities 
are not concentrated in one place, a district court is entitled “to give 
these ‘nerve-center’-related facts greater significance” in 
determining principal place of business.178 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz Corp., the Eleventh 
Circuit’s application of the “total activities” test to determine a corporation’s 
“principal place of business,” as the Court did in MacGinnitie and earlier 
cases, appears to no longer be good law.179 
                                                 
173. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
174. See id. at 93–95. 
175. See id.; cf. Holston Inv., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071 
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that, in Hertz, the Supreme Court “announced a simple 
rule wherein a corporation’s principal place of business is determined based on where the 
corporation’s ‘nerve center’ is located”). 
176. MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). 
177. 420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). 
178. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted). 
179. Compare Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 80, 93–95, with MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d 
at 1239. 
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ii. Application 
Applying the standard set out in Hertz Corp., the Supreme Court 
determined that the mere filing of a Securities and Exchange Commission 
form “listing a corporation’s ‘principal executive offices’ would, without 
more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center,’” and thus 
its “principal place of business” for diversity jurisdiction purposes.180 
The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to apply alter ego theory in the 
context of diversity jurisdiction; thus, for diversity purposes, the Florida 
incorporation of a subsidiary could not be ignored on the ground that the 
subsidiary was the alter ego of its non-Florida citizen parent corporation and 
that the parent’s California citizenship should be imputed to the subsidiary.181 
b. Domestic Corporation with Principal Place of Business Outside of 
United States 
There is a special rule for a domestic corporation whose principal 
place of business is outside of the United States.182  In Cabalceta v. Standard 
Fruit Co., 183  the Eleventh Circuit held that if “a domestic corporation’s 
world-wide principal place of business is not in one of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico, . . . then the foreign principal place of 
business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes.” 184  
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) was amended effective January 2012.185  
That provision now states:  “[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen 
of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the 
[s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”186  It is 
unclear whether Eleventh Circuit’s holding from Cabalceta is still good law 
after that amendment.187 
                                                 
180. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97. 
181. Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 1985). 
182. E.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
183. 883 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1989). 
184. Id. at 1561. 
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
186. Id. (emphasis added).  That statutory provision states a different rule for 
cases in which the defendant is a liability insurer.  See id. 
187. See id.; Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1561. 
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c. Foreign Corporations 
For jurisdictional purposes, federal courts treat the corporation of a 
foreign state as a citizen of that state.188  However, if a foreign corporation 
has its principal place of business in the United States, it is a citizen of the state 
in which its principal place of business is located.189  However, a corporation 
“owned by a foreign state is . . . deemed a foreign state for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction.”190  In that case, diversity jurisdiction will not exist unless the 
foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(4).191 
For additional discussion of alienage jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.192 
d. Corporations Chartered Pursuant to Federal Law 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1348, “[a]ll national banking associations 
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed 
citizens of the [s]tates in which they are respectively located.”193  However, 
the statute does not further define how the court should determine a national 
bank’s location.194  The Supreme Court has subsequently provided further 
guidance, holding in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt195 that “a national bank, for § 
1348 purposes, is a citizen of the [s]tate in which its main office, as set forth in 
its articles of association, is located.”196 
Prior to Wachovia Bank, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that a federal 
savings bank, as a corporation chartered pursuant to federal law, “would not 
be a citizen of any state for diversity purposes and diversity jurisdiction would 
not exist unless the corporation’s activities were sufficiently localized in one 
                                                 
188. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 
U.S. 88, 91 (2002). 
189. Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir. 
1984) (“[A] foreign corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it has its principal 
place of business.”); see also Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(determining that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), a Panamanian corporation was a citizen of 
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because its principal place of business was located 
in Florida). 
190. See Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 
1993). 
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542. 
192. See infra Part IV.B.12. 
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1348. 
194. See id. 
195. 546 U.S. 303 (2006), rev’d, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (2013). 
196. Id. at 307. 
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state.”197  However, after Wachovia Bank, the Court’s analysis in Loyola 
Federal Savings Bank v. Fickling198 should no longer be good law.199 
e. Dissolved or Inactive Corporations 
Circuit courts that have considered the issue are divided regarding 
whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has a principal place of 
business. 200   In Holston Investments, Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 201  the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for this issue:  “[A] dissolved 
corporation has no principal place of business.” 202   Thus, a dissolved 
corporation is only a citizen of its state of incorporation.203 
3. Unincorporated Associations 
Unincorporated associations are treated differently than corporations 
when it comes to citizenships analysis.204 
 
[U]nincorporated associations do not themselves have any 
citizenship, but instead must prove the citizenship of each of their 
members to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  Furthermore, no matter the particular features of an 
unincorporated entity, it has long been “[t]he tradition of the 
common law . . . to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups 
and to assimilate all others to partnerships,” which must plead the 
citizenship of each member.205 
 
Thus, an unincorporated association has no legal existence separate 
from its individual members, even if state law permits the unincorporated 
association to “sue or be sued in the association[’s] name.”206 
                                                 
197. Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603, 606 (11th Cir. 1995). 
198. 58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995). 
199. See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 317–19; Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank, 58 F.3d 
at 606. 
200. See Holston Invs., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing the various approaches to this issue used by other 
circuits). 
201. 677 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
202. Id. at 1071. 
203. See id. 
204. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1081, 
1086 (11th Cir. 2010). 
205. Id. at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 
288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)). 
206. Id. at 1091 (quoting Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 
1962)). 
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a. Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) 
With this standard in mind, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “a 
limited liability company . . . ‘is a citizen of any state of which a member of 
the company is a citizen.’ . . .  ‘To sufficiently allege the citizenships of these 
unincorporated business entities, a party must list the citizenships of all the 
members of the limited liability company.’”207  Applying this rule, it is not 
enough for the complaint to allege that an “[LLC was] created under the laws 
of the [s]tate of Georgia, with its principal place of business . . . in Scottsdale, 
Georgia.”208 
b. Partnerships:  General and Limited 
Similar to the approach taken for LLCs, for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction, a partnership’s citizenship “depends on the citizenship of each of 
its partners.”209  Accordingly, “a limited partnership is a citizen of each state 
in which any of its [general or limited] partners . . . are citizens.” 210  
Furthermore, when one of the partners is also a partnership, the district court 
should inquire into the citizenship of the second partnership’s partners as 
well.211 
c. Syndicates 
Syndicates—such as the underwriters associated with Lloyd’s of 
London—are required to plead every member’s citizenship, just like other 
unincorporated associations.212 
                                                 
207. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast 
SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); see also Flintlock 
Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013). 
208. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, LLC, 663 F.3d at 1305; see also 
Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 1224; Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021, 
1022. 
209. Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431, 433 
n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). 
210. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021; see also Carden v. Arkoma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990). 
211. Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co., 588 F.2d at 433 n.1. 
212. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1088–89 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
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d. Unincorporated Joint Stock Companies 
Federal courts treat unincorporated joint stock companies as 
partnerships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and apply the same rules for 
determining citizenship.213 
e. Unincorporated National Labor Unions 
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that federal courts 
should not treat unincorporated national labor unions as corporations for 
diversity purposes but instead should look to the citizenship of the union’s 
members.214 
f. Unincorporated Business Trusts 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the citizenship of an 
unincorporated business trust is to be determined on the basis of the 
citizenship of its shareholders.215  However, the court has also stated that a 
business trust is neither a corporation nor an association, and therefore, where 
the trustees hold, manage, and dispose of trust assets for the benefit of trust 
beneficiaries, the court should consider the citizenship of trustees rather than 
trust beneficiaries.216 
g. The Exception:  Sociedad en Comandita 
As an exception to the general rule that the citizenship of an 
unincorporated association is determined by the citizenship of its individual 
members, the Supreme Court has held that a sociedad en comandita—an 
entity created under the civil law of Puerto Rico—could be treated as a citizen 
of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.217  In coming to this 
                                                 
213. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889). 
214. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 
U.S. 145, 147, 149–53 (1965). 
215. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 
1337–39 (11th Cir. 2002); Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R. 
Starnes Co. of Fla., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[T]he Trust Funds, 
which appear to be voluntary unincorporated associations, are not citizens of any particular 
state; rather, the citizenship of trust fund members is determinative of the existence of diversity 
of citizenship.”); Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(determining that, because trust funds were voluntary unincorporated associations, the 
citizenship of their members was determinative of the existence of diversity of citizenship). 
216. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 462, 463 nn. 10, 11, 
465–66 (1980). 
217. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933). 
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determination, the Court reasoned that the sociedad’s juridical personality “is 
so complete in contemplation of the law of Puerto Rico that we see no 
adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a different status for 
purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that 
law.”218 
4. Receivers 
In an action by or against a receiver, the district court should consider 
the citizenship of the receiver for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 219  
However, the case law distinguishes between situations in which a receiver is 
a proper party to litigation—and thus his citizenship should be 
considered—versus those in which he is not a proper party, and his citizenship 
should be ignored in diversity determinations.220  In the former, the receiver 
is a proper party because another party seeks to take property out of his 
possession or seeks relief against his acts.221  However, the receiver is not a 
proper party to litigation affecting parties’ rights in property not in his 
possession, or to litigation asserting rights to said property in his possession 
without disturbing his possession thereof.222 
5. Liability Insurance Companies 
a. Statutory Basis 
Section 1332 provides special rules for determining a liability 
insurance company’s citizenship for diversity purposes: 
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of 
liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to 
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such 
insurer shall be deemed a citizen of– 
(A) every [s]tate and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen; 
(B) every [s]tate and foreign state by which the insurer has been 
incorporated; and 
                                                 
218. Id. 
219. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1934). 
220. See U.S. Mortg. & Trust Co. v. Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co., 269 F. 497, 500─01 
(5th Cir. 1921). 
221. Id. at 501. 
222. Id. 
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(C) the [s]tate or foreign state where the insurer has its principal 
place of business.223 
b. Case Law Interpreting These Provisions 
The “direct action” provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) is limited to 
actions against insurers and thus is not applicable to a workers’ compensation 
action brought in federal court by an insurer.224  Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) 
“will defeat diversity jurisdiction only if the claim which the third party has 
against the insuredfor intentional tort, negligence, fraud, etc.is the same 
one asserted against the insurance company as within the zone of primary 
liability for which the company issued the policy.”225  As the Eleventh Circuit 
has observed, “courts have uniformly defined the term ‘direct action’ to refer 
to ‘those cases in which a party suffering injuries or damage for which another 
is legally responsible is entitled to bring suit against the other’s liability 
insurer without joining the insured or first obtaining a judgment against 
him.’”226 
In contrast: 
[W]here the suit, brought either by the insured or by an injured third 
party, is based not on the primary liability covered by the liability 
insurance policy but on the insurer’s failure to settle within policy 
limits or in good faith, the [§] 1332(c) direct action proviso does not 
preclude diversity jurisdiction.227 
In Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,228 the court explained 
that, “unless the cause of action against the insurance company is of such a 
nature that the liability sought to be imposed could be imposed against the 
insured, the action is not a direct action.”229 
                                                 
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
224. Id.; Northbrook Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 7 (1989); see also 
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 1332(c) 
does not apply to a “declaratory judgment action in which a liability insurer is the plaintiff”). 
225. John Cooper Produce, Inc. v. Paxton Nat’l Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 433, 435 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
226. Kong v. Allied Prof’l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157, 1159 (11th Cir. 1985)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
227. Fortson, 751 F.2d at 1159; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). 
228. 751 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1985). 
229. Id. at 1159. 
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6. Institutions of Higher Learning 
The Eleventh Circuit held that a complaint insufficiently alleged the 
citizenship of Tuskegee University when it stated that Tuskegee University 
was “‘an Alabama institution of higher learning, located in Macon County, 
Alabama.’”230  The court has also applied an Eleventh Amendment immunity 
analysis to determine that a state university was not a state citizen for the 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction.231 
7. Unincorporated Indian Tribes 
There is also a special rule for determining the citizenship of 
unincorporated Indian tribes. 232   As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, 
“unincorporated Indian tribes cannot sue or be sued in diversity under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because they are not citizens of any state.”233 
8. Estates 
“Where an estate is a party, . . . the citizenship that counts for diversity 
purposes is that of the decedent.”234  Thus, the legal representative of the 
estate is also deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent.235 
Note:  Prior to May 18, 1989, “federal diversity jurisdiction in estate 
cases was determined by looking [into] the domicile of the representative of 
the estate,” rather than the decedent’s domicile. 236   On that date, the 
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requiring courts to “look to the domicile of 
the decedent to determine diversity jurisdiction” went into effect.237  Thus, as 
to this issue, case law predating the 1989 amendment is no longer good law.238 
                                                 
230. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
231. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
232. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607 
F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010). 
233. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012). 
234. Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); see also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 
1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Where an estate is a party, the citizenship that counts for diversity 
purposes is that of the decedent, and she is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which she was 
domiciled at the time of her death.”). 
236. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 668 n.3 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
237. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
238. See Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 668 n.3. 
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9. Infants and Incompetents 
Section 1332 provides that “the legal representative of an infant or 
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same [s]tate as the 
infant or incompetent.”239 
10. States 
Special diversity jurisdiction rules also apply when a state is a party to 
the case.240  A state is not a citizen of a state for the purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction.241 
A public entity or political subdivision of a state, unless simply an 
‘arm or alter ego of the State,’ however, is a citizen of the state for 
diversity purposes.  Therefore, if a party is deemed to be ‘an arm or 
alter ego of the State,’ then diversity jurisdiction must fail.242 
When analyzing whether diversity jurisdiction exists over cases 
involving state entities as parties, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis to determine the citizenship of the 
state entities.243 
11. State Agencies and State-Created Public Entities 
a. Test for Determining Whether a State Agency Is a Citizen of a State 
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the following analysis to determine 
whether state agencies are “sufficiently separate and independent from the 
state so as to confer citizen status upon them” for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction:   
 
(1) whether the agency can be sued in its own name; (2) whether the 
agency can implead and be impleaded in any competent court; (3) 
whether the agency can contract in its own name; (4) whether the 
agency can acquire, hold title to, and dispose of property in its own 
name; and (5) whether the agency can be considered a body 
                                                 
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
240. See Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973). 
241. Id.; Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir. 
1999); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983). 
242. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412 (quoting Moor, 411 U.S. at 717). 
243. Id.; Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318. 
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corporate having the rights, powers and immunities incident to 
corporations.244 
 
As demonstrated below, the Eleventh Circuit takes a case-by-case approach to 
this analysis.245 
b. Specific Examples 
i. State Universities 
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity analysis to determine that a state university was not a 
state citizen for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.246 
ii. A State Entity’s Board of Trustees 
The Supreme Court held—in a case in which the Board of Trustees of 
the Ohio State University was a party—that the complaint must allege the 
citizenship of each individual trustee because the board was not a corporation, 
even though under state law the Board had the power to sue and be sued, enter 
into contracts, and supervise lands and other property of the university under 
its collective name.247 
Taking a different approach, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the 
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of 
Florida was a citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because 
the title of the land in dispute was vested with the Trustees and “because the 
Trustees ha[d] acted . . . as a separate and distinct entity from the state.”248 
iii. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 
In Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. 
Davis, 249  the Eleventh Circuit determined that diversity jurisdiction was 
proper because Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 
“[was vested] with the power to sue and be sued and possessed other generally 
recognized corporate powers.”250 
                                                 
244. Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318. 
245. See infra Part IV.B.11.b. 
246. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412; see supra Part IV.B.6, 10. 
247. See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 213–18 
(1904). 
248. Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1316, 1318. 
249. 616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980). 
250. Id. at 833. 
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iv. State Bar 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the Florida Bar, having been 
explicitly created by and existing under the Supreme Court of Florida as an 
“official arm of th[at] court,” could not be sued in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.251 
v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans 
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Board of Commissioners of 
the Port of New Orleanscreated by state law, granting the Board all of the 
rights, powers, and immunities incident to a corporation and specifically 
granting to it various business powers, including authority to employ legal 
services and engage counselis a separate entity from the State of Louisiana 
for diversity purposes.252 
vi. Alabama State Docks Department 
The Alabama State Docks Department is merely the alter ego of the 
State of Alabama and thus is not a citizen of Alabama for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.253 
vii. Political Subdivisions, such as Municipalities or Counties 
“It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship, 
political subdivisions are citizens of their respective [s]tates.”254  Thus, “a 
municipality which is independent in character and function from the state 
should be considered a citizen for § 1332 diversity.”255  Moreover, a county 
may be a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction if, under state law, it has 
a sufficiently independent corporate character.256 
                                                 
251. See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195, 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1969). 
252. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 424 F.2d 764, 76567 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
253. Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 415 
F.2d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1969). 
254. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972), cert. granted, 445 
U.S. 926 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).  Other cases in which the Supreme Court 
determined that political subdivisions were citizens of a state for purposes of diversity include:  
Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 180 (1933); Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472, 
485–86 (1900); Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533–34 (1893); Lincoln Cnty. v. 
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer Cnty., 74 U.S. 118, 122 (1869). 
255. Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976). 
256. Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719–21 (1973). 
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 viii. Private Probation Companies as Officers of the Court 
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that private probation 
companies, as officers of the court, are governmental entities for purposes of 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). 257   Instead, private 
probation companies are private entities, in the same way that attorneys would 
not qualify as government entities.258 
12. Specific Diversity Rules for Aliens 
a. Statutory Basis for Alienage Jurisdiction 
Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code also sets forth 
specific diversity requirements for cases involving foreign citizens.259  First, 
the statute provides that federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction of a 
civil action that meets the amount in controversy requirement and is between  
 
citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except 
that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this 
subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same 
[s]tate.”260 
 
Second, it allows diversity cases to be brought between “citizens of 
different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 
additional parties.”261  Finally, the statute allows diversity cases to be brought 
between “a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and 
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.”262 
b. Case Law Analyzing Alienage Jurisdiction 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that aliens who are in the United States 
on non-immigrant work visas are not permanent residents for purposes of 28 
                                                 
257. McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)). 
258. McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242. 
259. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(4) (2012). 
260. Id. § 1332(a)(2). 
261. Id. § 1332(a)(3). 
262. Id. § 1332(a)(4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
115
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
218 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).263  The court has determined that the permanent resident 
alien provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) refers only to an alien’s official 
immigration status.264  Thus, an alien who resided in Florida for four years 
but had not yet attained official permanent resident status was not a citizen of 
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.265  The fact that an alien resides 
in the United States is not relevant for diversity jurisdiction; what matters for 
purposes of diversity is the alien’s citizenship, not residency. 266   In 
comparison, “an individual who is a dual citizen of the United States and 
another nation is only a citizen of the United States for the purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”267 
The Supreme Court has held that “the United Kingdom’s retention 
and exercise of authority over the [British Virgin Islands (“BVI”)] renders 
BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, ‘citizens or subjects’ of the United 
Kingdom under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”268 
c. Foreign States 
Where a foreign state is a party to a case, diversity jurisdiction may 
exist if the foreign state is the plaintiff but will not exist if the foreign state is 
the defendant.269  Suits may only be brought against foreign states pursuant to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.270 
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a foreign state is defined as 
including “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.” 271   Furthermore, the statute defines 
“instrumentality of a foreign state” as: 
                                                 
263. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 n.10 
(11th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
264. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1340 n.10. 
265. Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1348–50 
(11th Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
266. Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1981). 
267. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(2). 
268. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 
U.S. 88, 100 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5 (1989); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 
& n.11 (11th Cir. 1993). 
270. Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1543; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1330 (1976)). 
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 219 
[A]ny entity— 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in [§] 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws 
of any third country.272 
A corporation owned by a foreign state is deemed a foreign state for 
purposes of federal jurisdiction; thus, diversity jurisdiction will not exist 
unless the foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).273  In order for a foreign state to bring a diversity action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), at least one of the defendants must be a citizen 
of a state, and diversity jurisdiction does not exist if all defendants are only 
citizens of foreign states.274 
C. Complete Diversity Rule 
Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code “require[s] complete 
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”275 
D. Exceptions to Complete Diversity Rule 
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity, there are 
several exceptions to this rule, as discussed further.276 
1. Court May Ignore Citizenship of a Plaintiff that Has Independent 
Basis of Original Federal Jurisdiction Against Defendant 
Although the general rule is that diversity jurisdiction requires 
complete diversity, there is an exception to this requirement when a 
                                                 
272. Id. § 1603(b). 
273. Id. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542–43. 
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v. 
M/V Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987, 990–91 (11th Cir. 1985). 
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Wis. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 
(1996). 
 276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; infra Part IV.D.1–8. 
117
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
220 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
non-diverse plaintiff “has an independent basis of original . . . jurisdiction 
against the defendant.”277 
2. Court May Properly Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction When 
Non-Diverse Defendant Is Sued Under Federal Law 
Similarly, the district court still may properly exercise diversity 
jurisdiction “when the plaintiff joins a non-diverse defendant sued under 
federal law with a diverse defendant sued in diversity.”278 
3. Supplemental/Ancillary Claims Asserted Between Non-Diverse 
Defendants 
While it is true that a nondiverse defendant must be formally 
dismissed from the case to permit a subsequent removal, this in 
effect requires only that the plaintiff dismiss all his claims asserted 
against the nondiverse defendant and does not prevent the federal 
court from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim 
against a defendant or a cross-claim between defendants. . . .  Once 
a court has jurisdiction over a main claim, it also has jurisdiction 
over any claim ancillary to the main claim, regardless of the amount 
in controversy, citizenship of the parties or existence of a federal 
question in the ancillary claim.279 
The Supreme Court cases addressing this issue were decided prior to 
Congress’s passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
in 1990.280  That statute specifically provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which 
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 
the United States Constitution.  Such supplemental jurisdiction 
                                                 
277. Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 
1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
278. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508, 1511–12 (11th 
Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
381 (1959). 
279. Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 
1988); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375–77 (1978) (holding 
that a diverse defendant could implead a non-diverse third-party defendant, but the plaintiff 
could not assert a claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant). 
 280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377. 
118
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 221 
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of 
additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded solely on [§] 1332 of this title, the district 
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) 
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the [FRCP], or over claims by persons proposed 
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to 
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent 
with the jurisdictional requirements of [§] 1332.281 
The supplemental jurisdiction statute appears to have codified the 
Supreme Court’s holdings with respect to these issues, and therefore these 
cases should still be good law.282 
4. Nominal Parties 
“[A] federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest 
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.”283  
Applying this rule, courts will disregard nominal, nondiverse parties in 
determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.284 
5. Statutory Interpleader Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
Claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, applying statutory 
interpleader, require only minimal diversity; the plaintiff does not have to be 
diverse from the defendants, but at least two defendants must be diverse from 
each other.285 
                                                 
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(b). 
282. Id. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377. 
283. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980); see also Bacon v. 
Rives, 106 U.S. 99, 104 (1882) (holding that the joinder of formal parties, destitute of interest, 
cannot oust the federal court of jurisdiction). 
284. See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Mfr.’s Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182, 190 (1924) 
(determining depository of a trust was a nominal party when it had no interest in the outcome); 
Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 437 (1903) (holding that corporate directors 
were nominal parties when the relief prayed for by plaintiffs against both a company and its 
directors was to be recovered from the company only); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 469 
(1879) (holding that the railroad was a nominal party for removal purposes after it resolved its 
dispute with the defendant and had no common interest with the trustee plaintiffs). 
285. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 
523, 530 (1967); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1957). 
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6. Class Actions 
The statute sets forth requirements of minimal diversity, rather than 
total diversity, for class actions brought pursuant to the federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction.286 
For further discussion of diversity jurisdiction and class actions, see 
Part V.287 
7. Total Diversity Rule and Alienage Jurisdiction 
a. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) 
In cases in which jurisdiction is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(2), the presence of aliens as both plaintiff and defendant destroys full 
diversity under alien jurisdiction.288 
b. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) 
There is an exception to the previous rule.289  Under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(3), the district court may have diversity jurisdiction over a case in 
which there are aliens on both sides of the actions, as long as there are also 
citizens of a state on both sides.290 
8. Removal Cases, When Non-Diverse Party Fraudulently Joined 
Although the district court generally will not have diversity 
jurisdiction over removal cases where the parties are not completely diverse, 
district courts still have diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff has 
                                                 
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 287. See infra Part V. 
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 
633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2011) (vacating judgment in favor of alien corporation against 
alien citizens because aliens’ presence destroyed full diversity under alienage jurisdiction); 
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the 
presence of at least one alien on both sides of an action destroys diversity”); Ed & Fred, Inc. v. 
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the rule 
of complete diversity was applicable to an action brought by an alien against a citizen of a state 
and another alien). 
 289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). 
290. Id.; Iraola & Cia, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 860 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“It is a standard rule that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over cases 
where there are foreign entities on both sides of the action, without the presence of citizens of a 
state on both sides.”). 
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fraudulently joined non-diverse defendants in order to prevent removal.291  
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three circumstances when non-diverse 
parties have been fraudulently joined in state court. 292   First, fraudulent 
joinder exists “when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause 
of action against the resident—non-diverse—defendant.” 293   Second, a 
plaintiff may fraudulently plead jurisdictional facts in an attempt to avoid 
removal.294  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has identified a third example of 
fraudulent joinder:  “[W]here a diverse defendant is joined with a non-diverse 
defendant as to whom there is no joint, several, or alternative liability and 
where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the 
claim against the non-diverse defendant.”295 
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “‘[t]he determination of whether 
a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined must be based upon the 
plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits 
and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.’”296  The district court 
should approach a fraudulent joinder claim in the same way that it would a 
motion for summary judgment under FRCP 56(b), resolving disputed 
questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff.297 
With respect to the first type of fraudulent joinder, there is a fairly 
high hurdle for a removal attempt.298  In Coker v. Amoco Oil Co.,299 the 
Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]f there is even a possibility that a state court 
would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the 
resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and 
remand the case to the state court.”300  Thus, “[t]he plaintiff need not have a 
winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a 
                                                 
291. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
292. Id. 
293. Id.; see also Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
294. Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440. 
295. Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996). 
296. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001), 
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon 
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005)). 
297. Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). 
298. See Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440–41. 
 299. 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983). 
300. Id. at 1440–41. 
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possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be 
legitimate.”301 
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the third type of fraudulent 
joinder in the context of class action cases.302  This Guide addresses that 
analysis in greater detail in Part V.303 
E. Exceptions Where Court Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction Even if 
Diversity Is Established 
1. Probate Exception 
Under limited circumstances, courts will abstain from hearing a case 
involving wills and estates, even if there is diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 
the judicially-created probate exception. 304   However, this exception is 
narrowly construed.305 
2. Domestic Relations Exception 
a. General Rule 
The domestic relations exception divests the federal courts of power 
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees but does not ordinarily 
include tort claims. 306   Thus, even if the district court has diversity 
jurisdiction, the court will abstain from hearing a claim in cases involving the 
                                                 
301. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis omitted). 
302. See Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287–90; Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 
F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 303. See infra Part V. 
304. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 
666, 672 (11th Cir. 1991). 
305. See Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (“[F]ederal courts of equity have jurisdiction 
to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a 
decedent’s estate to establish their claims so long as the federal court does not interfere with the 
probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in 
the custody of the state court.”); Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 672–73; Mich. Tech. Fund v. Century 
Nat’l Bank, 680 F.2d 736, 737–38, 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that district court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over action against decedent’s estate seeking a declaration that decedent’s 
will conveyed certain assets to plaintiff, in spite of fact that there were pending probate 
proceedings and the federal court was required to interpret the will); DeWitt v. Duce, 599 F.2d 
676, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that a suit alleging independent tort claim for 
intentional interference with inheritance was properly before district court based on diversity 
jurisdiction). 
306. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). 
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parties’ domestic affairs.307  Speaking specifically to this issue, in Ingram v. 
Hayes,308 the Eleventh Circuit stated that “federal courts generally dismiss 
cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation[] rights, 
establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or 
divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.”309 
b. Limitations to the Domestic Relations Exception 
“The [domestic relations] exception . . . is to be read narrowly and 
does not—at least, ordinarily—include third parties in its scope.”310  The 
Eleventh Circuit has stated that courts should not abstain from cases related to 
domestic-relations law “when the following factors are absent:  (1) strong 
state interest in domestic relations; (2) competency of state courts in settling 
family disputes; (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in 
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state; and (4) the problem of 
congested federal court dockets.”311  Instead, “federal courts should dismiss 
the action only if hearing the claim would mandate inquiry into the marital or 
parent-child relationship.”312 
c. Examples 
In Rash v. Rash,313 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the domestic 
relations exception did not apply in a case disputing assets, specifically 
alimony, rights to pension, and real property, and which involved the question 
of which competing state decrees should be enforced.314  Similarly, in Kirby 
v. Mellenger, 315  the court held “that the district court [had] abused its 
discretion [in] dismissing [the] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” in a 
diversity case in which a former wife sued her former husband to obtain a 
                                                 
307. See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 308. 866 F.2d 368 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).  
309. Id. at 369–70 (determining that the district court properly dismissed child 
support arrearage claim because claim would require district court to decide the propriety of the 
Alabama state court’s order). 
310. Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), reh’g 
granted, 719 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1998); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 n.7 (observing that 
the third-party defendant in that case “would appear to stand in the same position with respect to 
[the plaintiff] as any other opponent in a tort suit brought in federal court pursuant to diversity 
jurisdiction”). 
311. Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441; see also Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370. 
312. Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370. 
313. 173 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1999). 
314. See id. at 1380. 
315. 830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
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share of his military retirement benefits not awarded under a Texas divorce 
decree.316 
The Eleventh Circuit’s precedent also demonstrates that a federal 
court may have jurisdiction over some issues but not others in this context.317  
Thus, in Jagiella v. Jagiella,318 the Circuit Court determined that the district 
court properly exercised jurisdiction over the former wife’s suit seeking 
alimony and child support arrears and properly refused to exercise jurisdiction 
the of former husband’s counterclaims for modification of the divorce decree 
by reducing his child support payments and increasing his visitation rights and 
for alienage of his children’s affection.319 
3. Violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1359:  Parties Improperly or Collusively 
Joined to Invoke Jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1359, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction 
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been 
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such 
court.”320 
V. SPECIAL RULES FOR CLASS ACTIONS AND MASS ACTIONS 
Plaintiffs may bring a class action in federal court pursuant to FRCP 
23.321  If the class action relies on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, it 
must meet the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.322  Specifically, 
§ 1332(d) provides specific rules for determining when a federal court may 
                                                 
316. See id. at 178–79. 
317. See Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1981). 
318. 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981). 
319. See id. at 564–65. 
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012); see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 
U.S. 823, 826–29 (1969) (holding that § 1359 prevents federal courts from exercising diversity 
jurisdiction in cases in which parties have been collusively joined, regardless of whether 
diversity was based on parties being citizens of different states or alienage jurisdiction); 
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the application of § 1359 in the context of transfers or assignments of claims and 
holding there is no presumption of collusion in determining whether diversity jurisdiction was 
manufactured in violation of the statute); Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1381 
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001), 
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon 
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005) (holding that fraudulent joinder of defendants could not be 
used to defeat diversity jurisdiction). 
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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exercise diversity jurisdiction in class actions.323  Many of the rules regarding 
diversity jurisdiction are different for class actions than for other diversity 
cases; and thus, it is important to look closely at the provisions in § 1332(d).324  
Furthermore, in many circumstances, case law decided prior to passage of 
CAFA,325 which revised the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class 
actions, may no longer be good law.326  CAFA sets out specific requirements 
for federal diversity jurisdiction in two types of cases:  Class actions and 
certain mass actions that qualify as class actions. 327   The following 
subsections analyze the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class action 
and mass action lawsuits post-CAFA.328 
A. Class Actions versus Mass Actions 
As stated above, CAFA applies to class actions and certain mass 
actions.329  A class action is defined as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of 
the [FRCP] or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.”330  The 
statute defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief 
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground 
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”331  For 
the most part, CAFA applies the same diversity jurisdiction rules to mass 
actions as class actions, going so far as to define a mass action as a class action 
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,332 except for specific circumstances 
analyzed in the following subsections.333  The Eleventh Circuit has observed 
that, “CAFA’s mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of 
interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.”334 
                                                 
323. See id. 
 324. Id. 
325. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)). 
 326. Id. 
327. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. 
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
 328. See infra Parts A–C.  
329. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2 § 4, 119 Stat. at 9. 
330. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
331. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
332. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“a mass action shall be deemed to be a class 
action removable under [§ 1332(d)(2)-(10)] if it otherwise meets the provisions of those 
paragraphs”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1199–1201 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 333. See infra Parts B–C. 
334. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1198. 
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B. Amount-in-Controversy Requirements 
As explained further below, CAFA sets out different 
amount-in-controversy requirements depending on whether the lawsuit is a 
class action or a mass action.335 
1. Amount-in-Controversy Requirements for Class Actions 
Class actions have a different amount-in-controversy requirement 
than other cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.336  Under CAFA, a 
class action brought pursuant to the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction must 
exceed the value of five million dollars excluding costs and interests.337  The 
statute explicitly states that each individual member’s claims will be 
aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.338  The statute does not 
require any individual class action plaintiff to assert a claim exceeding 
seventy-five thousand dollars. 339   Although CAFA’s legislative history 
suggests Congress’s intent that courts resolve doubts about the amount in 
controversy in favor of finding jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected 
that approach.340  Instead, the court has held that doubts regarding amount in 
controversy should be resolved in favor of remanding the class action to the 
state court.341 
Applying the same rule that applies in other diversity cases that are 
removed to federal court, when the plaintiffs in a class action have not pleaded 
a specific amount of damages, the removed defendant is required to prove that 
the amount in controversy meets the statutory minimum by a preponderance 
of the evidence.342  In those circumstances, the district court looks to the face 
                                                 
335. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (6) (setting out 
amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) 
(setting out specific requirements for mass actions that qualify as class actions under the 
statute). 
336. Compare the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with those set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
337. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
338. Id. § 1332(d)(6).  Prior to CAFA, class action plaintiffs were only allowed 
to aggregate their claims in limited circumstances.  See, e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
410 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2005). 
339. Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam). 
340. See generally Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1327–30 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (discussing the legislative history of CAFA). 
341. Id. at 1329–30. 
342. Id. at 1330 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th 
Cir. 2001)); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 550 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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of the complaint, and, “[i]f the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent 
from the complaint, the court [looks] to the notice of removal and may require 
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was 
removed.”343  A defendant’s conclusory allegation in the notice of removal, 
stating that the jurisdictional amount has been met, is insufficient to satisfy 
CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement.344  In applying this rule, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant’s bare assertions that the amount in 
controversy in one case was similar to that in other cases that the federal court 
had jurisdiction over, without specific factual details, affidavits, or other 
evidence to support those assertions, was insufficient to establish the court’s 
diversity jurisdiction in CAFA cases.345  In contrast, the federal court may 
consider a defendant’s own affidavits, declarations, and other evidence in 
inferring that the jurisdictional minimum has been met.346 
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied the same standard for 
determining the amount in controversy when class action plaintiffs seek 
injunctive or declarative relief as the court does for other types of diversity 
cases.347  Thus, in South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,348 
the court determined that “the value of declaratory relief is ‘the monetary 
value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the [relief he is seeking] 
were granted.’”349  In the case of a class action, the federal court should 
therefore “aggregate the claims of individual class members and consider the 
monetary [benefit] that would flow to the entire class if declaratory relief were 
granted.”350 
Furthermore, in class actions in which a class has not yet been 
certified, a named plaintiff cannot stipulate that the class will not seek 
damages in excess of five million dollars in an attempt to avoid removal to 
federal court.351  In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,352 the Supreme 
                                                 
343. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319); see also 
S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (“What counts 
is the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”).  Like other removal cases, the 
calculation of the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases is based upon the time of 
removal.  See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751. 
344. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (citing Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320). 
345. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1210–11, 1220–21 
(11th Cir. 2007); Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752–54 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Lowery). 
346. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 755. 
347. See S. Fla. Wellness, Inc., 745 F.3d at 1315–16; supra Part 111.D.3. 
348. 745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014). 
349. Id. at 1316 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 
(11th Cir. 2000)). 
350. Id. 
351. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 19, 
2013). 
352. No. 11-1450, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013). 
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Court explained that such a stipulation was ineffective “because a plaintiff 
who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed 
class before the class is certified.”353  The Supreme Court observed that this 
rule is different from non-class action diversity cases, where the plaintiff has 
the ability to legally bind himself through his stipulations.354 
2. Amount in Controversy Requirements for Mass Actions 
Title 28, Section 1332 or the United States Code sets out different 
amount-in-controversy requirements for mass actions than for class actions.355  
In addition to requiring total aggregated claims of more than five million 
dollars, the statute specifies that the federal court only has diversity 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in mass actions whose individual claims satisfy the 
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).356 
C. Diversity Requirements under CAFA 
1. Basic Requirements for Diversity 
Under CAFA, complete diversity of citizenship is not required.357  
Instead, the statute only requires minimal diversity for both class actions and 
mass actions.358  CAFA’s diversity requirements can be met in the following 
three specific circumstances: 
                                                 
353. Id. at 4. 
354. Id. at 7. 
355. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012) (setting out amount in 
controversy requirements for class actions), with § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that the federal 
court only has diversity jurisdiction over mass action plaintiffs who meet the amount in 
controversy requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). 
356. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(11)(B)(i).  The Eleventh Circuit considered this 
requirement in Lowery, but did not ultimately determine how the $75,000 amount in 
controversy requirement fit within the five million dollar amount in controversy requirement 
because the court determined that the defendant did not demonstrate that the removed action 
met the five million dollar minimum.  See id. § 1332(d)(2); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 
F.3d 1184, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). 
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
358. See id.; Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip 
op. at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).  Prior to CAFA’s effective date, the Supreme Court interpreted § 
1332(a) to require that each named plaintiff in a class action be diverse from each defendant, but 
that standard was replaced by CAFA’s minimal diversity standard.  Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1193 
n.24 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921)). 
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(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate 
different from any defendant; 
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen 
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a 
[s]tate; or 
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate and 
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign 
state.359 
A class action also requires a minimum of one hundred plaintiffs, 
including named and unnamed class members.360  In contrast, a mass action 
requires a minimum of one hundred named plaintiffs.361  In Mississippi ex rel. 
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,362 the Supreme Court of the United States 
specifically rejected the argument that the numerosity requirement for mass 
action diversity jurisdiction could be met when a state filed suit as a sole 
plaintiff based upon injuries suffered by the state’s citizens.363  Moreover, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant may not attempt to combine two 
separate cases under the mass action provision by arguing that the cases 
involved common questions of law and fact, when the plaintiffs of those suits 
did not seek to consolidate their claims and each case, when considered 
separately, did not meet the numerosity requirements for federal diversity 
jurisdiction over mass actions.364 
2. Federal Court’s Discretionary Authority to Decline to Exercise 
Diversity Jurisdiction Over Some Class Actions 
There are certain circumstances when the district court may decline to 
exercise diversity jurisdiction in class action cases even when minimal 
diversity exists.365  This discretionary authority exists in cases where more 
than one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the proposed class members—as 
well as the primary defendants—are citizens of the state in which the action 
has been filed. 366   The statute directs the district court to consider the 
                                                 
359. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012)). 
360. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); see also id. § 1332 (d)(1)(D). 
361. See AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. at 5 (interpreting the 
requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). 
362. No. 12-1036, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
363. See id. at 1. 
364. See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2013). 
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 
366. Id. 
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following factors in determining whether to decline to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction in these circumstances: 
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or 
interstate interest; 
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the 
[s]tate in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of 
other [s]tates; 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks 
to avoid [f]ederal jurisdiction; 
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus 
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; 
(E) whether the number of citizens of the [s]tate in which the action 
was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate 
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other 
[s]tate, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed 
class is dispersed among a substantial number of [s]tates; and 
(F) whether, during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims 
on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.367 
3. Federal Court Must Decline to Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction over 
Class Actions in Certain Circumstances 
Title 28 § 1332 of the United States Code also sets out certain 
circumstances when the district court must decline to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction in class action cases, even when the minimal diversity 
requirements in § 1332(d)(2) have been met.368  Specifically, the district court 
will not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the following class actions: 
(A)(i) . . . a class action in which— 
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff 
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the [s]tate in which the action 
was originally filed; 
(II) at least [one] defendant is a defendant— 
                                                 
367. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F). 
368. See id. § 1332(d)(4). 
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(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the 
plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the [s]tate in which the action was originally 
filed; and 
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any 
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the [s]tate in 
which the action was originally filed; and 
(ii) during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or 
similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of 
the same or other persons.369 
The Eleventh Circuit refers to this provision as the “local 
controversy” exception.370 
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that CAFA’s legislative history 
indicated “Congress intended the local controversy exception to be a narrow 
one, with all doubts resolved ‘in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the 
case.’”371  The party seeking to keep the class action out of federal court has 
the burden of demonstrating that CAFA’s local controversy exception 
applies.372  With respect to the first prong, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that 
plaintiffs’ designation of particular classes may make it difficult for the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class were 
citizens of a particular state, but that difficulty did not excuse them from the 
local controversy exception’s requirements.373 
The court has also provided some guidance regarding the second 
prong, known as the “significant defendant” prong.374  In Evans v. Walter 
Industries, Inc., 375  the Eleventh Circuit determined that the non-diverse 
defendant was not a significant defendant because:  (1) the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that the defendant was significantly liable for the damages 
alleged by the plaintiffs, in comparison to seventeen other co-defendants; 
                                                 
369. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
370. Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006). 
371. Id. at 1163 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005)). 
372. Id. at 1164 (stating that “when a party seeks to avail itself of an express 
statutory exception to federal jurisdiction granted under CAFA, . . . we hold that the party 
seeking remand bears the burden of proof with regard to that exception”). 
373. Id. at 1166. 
374. See id. at 1166–68. 
375. 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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(2) the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendant played a significant 
role in the underlying actions that caused the plaintiffs’ damages; and (3) the 
facts showed that the defendant’s actions were primarily limited to a small part 
of the time period and geographical location at issue in the case.376 
The district court should also not exercise diversity jurisdiction over 
class actions when at least two-thirds of the proposed class members, as well 
as the defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action has been filed.377 
4. Statutory Limitations on a Federal Court’s Exercise of Diversity 
Jurisdiction in Mass Action Removal Cases 
Although district courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over 
certain mass actions removed from state court, the statute provides additional 
limitations for jurisdiction in that context.378  Specifically, § 1332(d)(11)(B) 
specifically bars the federal courts’ exercise of diversity jurisdiction in mass 
action removal cases under the following circumstances: 
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in 
the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in 
injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State; 
(II) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; 
(III) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the 
general public—and not on behalf of individual claimants or 
members of a purported class—pursuant to a [s]tate statute 
specifically authorizing such action379; or 
(IV) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for 
pretrial proceedings.380 
Aside from these requirements, the same rules that apply to class 
actions originating in federal court also apply to removal cases.381 
                                                 
376. Id. at 1167–68 (stating that “plaintiffs’ evidence offers no insight into 
whether U.S. Pipe played a significant role in the alleged contamination, as opposed to a lesser 
role, or even a minimal role.  The evidence does not indicate that a significant number or 
percentage of putative class members may have claims against U.S. Pipe, or indeed that any 
plaintiff has such a claim.”). 
377. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2012). 
378. See id. § 1332(d)(11). 
379. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B).  The Supreme Court has referred to this provision as 
the “general public exception.”  See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 
No.12-1036, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV). 
381. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A). 
132
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 235 
5. The Defendant Has the Burden of Demonstrating that Diversity 
Jurisdiction Exists in Removal Cases. 
Although CAFA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended 
the plaintiff to bear the burden of demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction 
exists in removal cases, the statute is silent as to that issue.382  As a result, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that “CAFA does not change the traditional rule that 
the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of 
establishing federal jurisdiction.”383 
6. Timing of Citizenship Determination in Class Actions 
The statute directs the federal court to base citizenship determinations 
as of the date on which the complaint is filed.384  If the original complaint did 
not meet federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements, the district court 
should base citizenship determinations as of the date on which an amended 
complaint is filed, if the amended complaint then adequately pleads federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.385 
7. Other Special Diversity Rules in Class Action and Mass Action Cases 
a. Only Named Parties Considered for Diversity Purposes 
It is a long-standing rule that the federal court ordinarily considers, for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the citizenship of the named parties.386 
b. Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations 
Unincorporated associations are treated differently in class actions 
than they are in other diversity cases.387  “For purposes of [a class action], an 
                                                 
382. See id. § 1332(d); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005). 
383. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7). 
385. Id. 
386. See Day v. Persels & Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, 624 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1980). 
[T]he rule that absent class members are not parties for the purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction “is . . . justified by the goals of class action litigation” because “[e]ase of 
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to consider the 
citizenship of all class members” and “considering all class members for these 
purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions. 
Day, 729 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002)). 
387. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10). 
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unincorporated association [is] deemed to be a citizen of the [s]tate where it 
has its principal place of business and the [s]tate under whose laws it is 
organized.”388 
VI. APPELLATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION ISSUES 
A. Standard of Review 
Because jurisdictional questions are questions of law, appellate courts 
review de novo whether the federal court has diversity jurisdiction in a civil 
action.389  The court also applies a de novo standard to the review of the 
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1).390  However, the Eleventh Circuit reviews 
a district court’s jurisdictional factual findings regarding the parties’ 
citizenship for clear error.391 
B. Adequacy of Diversity Allegations 
When the pleadings were inadequate for the court to assess whether 
diversity jurisdiction existed, the Eleventh Circuit has “issued a jurisdictional 
question asking the parties whether the allegations of citizenship were 
deficient and, if so, whether amendment of the complaint was necessary.”392  
After determining that the plaintiff’s “allegations of citizenship were fatally 
deficient,” the court remanded the case to the district court for jurisdictional 
findings.393 
                                                 
388. Id. 
389. See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
390. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (amended 2007); Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. 
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010). 
391. See Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1085. 
392. Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1267–68; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, when the court could not ascertain whether the 
amount in controversy in a removal case was sufficient for diversity jurisdiction, it required the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue). 
393. See Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268. 
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C. Requirement that Appellate Court Sua Sponte Consider Whether 
Diversity Jurisdiction Exists 
If it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is in question, the 
appellate court is required to sua sponte inquire into both its own jurisdiction 
and that of the district court whose opinion is under review.394 
D. Objections Based on Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Be 
Raised at Any Time 
A party can raise an objection to the federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction at any time.395  Applying this rule, the Supreme Court has held 
that, even after a party loses at trial, he or she may still move for dismissal 
under FRCP 12(b)(1).396 
 
                                                 
394. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999); 
see also Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that 
“federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of 
their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the 
parties either overlook or elect not to press”); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). 
395. Henderson, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5. 
396. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3) (amended 2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 7, 2010, three men brandishing guns entered a pizzeria in 
South Florida and demanded cash from an employee.1  About a month later, 
                                            
*  Stephanie Carlton is a J.D. candidate for May 2016 at Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad College of Law. Stephanie would like to extend a thank you to her 
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for their hard work to improve and refine this article. She 
would also like to thank her mother and father who have endlessly supported her throughout 
her law school journey. 
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the same group ran into a car parts store and forced an employee at gunpoint 
to unlock the safe.2  When the employee scrambled to open the safe, the 
armed men screamed in the employee’s face, threatening to kill him.3  
“Eventually, when the safe did not open, [the robbers] fled.”4  As he fled 
with his accomplices, Davis shot at a dog that was merely barking at them.5 
The group of robbers, in a two-month span, terrorized the South 
Florida community by committing a series of seven armed robberies.6  
Eventually, surveillance video, DNA, and cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) enabled the police to catch the violent group.7  Notably, 
“[h]istorical [CSLI] showed that Davis and his accomplices had placed and 
received cell phone calls in close proximity to the locations of the crimes 
around the times that the crimes were committed.”8  Obtaining historical 
CSLI, and the use of it as evidence during Davis’s trial, became a 
controversial issue during Davis’s appeal.9  The governmental obtainment of 
historical CSLI with a court order rather than a warrant has created a Fourth 
Amendment debate.10  Should the government be required to demonstrate 
probable cause to secure a warrant to obtain historical CSLI?11  Although 
this modern constitutional debate has been considered in other circuits, 
United States v. Davis12 raises an issue of first impression in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.13 
This Comment analyzes the prevailing controversy surrounding 
technology, government, and privacy.14  It begins by exploring the elements 
of the Fourth Amendment and the predominant cases dealing with privacy 
such as Katz v. United States.15  Part two discusses what constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and presages the discussion of why obtaining 
                                                                                                       
1. Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 
(11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928-EE). 
2. Id. at 6–7. 
3. Id. at 7. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4–9. 
7. See id. at 9–10. 
8. Id. at 10. 
9. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th 
Cir. 2014). 
13. Id. at 1210. 
14. See infra Parts II–V. 
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part II. 
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historical CSLI does not constitute a search that will be discussed in the latter 
part of the Comment.16 
Part three of this Comment discusses historical CSLI and this non-
invasive law enforcement practice.17  This section elaborates on the 
difference between historical and real-time CSLI while explaining why 
historical CSLI is non-invasive and does not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.18 
Part four—the largest and most significant part—focuses on the 
recent Eleventh Circuit decision of Davis.19  This section contains an in-
depth critique of the opinion.20  Additionally, it explains the mistake the 
Eleventh Circuit made in comparing the case at hand to United States v. 
Jones.21  This Part then discusses other weaknesses of the opinion and 
explains how and why the court’s decision was misguided.22 
The purpose of this Comment is to educate the public on the 
misinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment and to explain why one does not 
have an expectation of privacy in public.23  Lastly, this Comment analyzes 
the recent Eleventh Circuit decision and discusses why the court got it wrong 
when it comes to Fourth Amendment implications and historical CSLI.24 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution warrants 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”25  The Fourth 
Amendment is designed to protect the privacy of individuals from unlawful 
intrusion by the government.26  An individual must have a “‘constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in order to obtain protection 
                                            
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en 
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); see infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. No. 10-1259, slip op. 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012); see infra Part IV. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding 
defendant lacked legitimate expectation of privacy when he left garbage bags filled with 
contraband next to the street). 
24. See infra Parts II–IV. 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
26. Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored 
Communications Act:  Why the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location 
Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 712 (2012). 
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under the Fourth Amendment from an unreasonable search or seizure.27  To 
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable the 
Court in Katz developed a two-part test.28  The first part of the test involves 
whether “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search.”29  The second part of the test asks whether 
“society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”30  The 
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, does not extend to what an 
individual consciously reveals to the public.31  Furthermore, the expectation 
of privacy, construed from the Fourth Amendment, is determined by the 
context of each case.32 
A. What Constitutes a Search? 
 To determine whether the government has performed an 
unreasonable search protected under the Fourth Amendment, one must 
determine whether that person exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy which society is ready to accept as reasonable.33  If no expectation of 
privacy exists then a search without a warrant does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.34  If, however, a person does have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the government cannot seize evidence without a warrant supported 
by probable cause.35 
A person does not have a subjective expectation of privacy to what 
he or she exposes to the public.36  When “a person knowingly exposes 
[information] to the public,” he or she can no longer subjectively believe that 
information will be kept private, and therefore will not benefit from Fourth 
Amendment protections.37 
                                            
27. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
29. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
30. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
32. Malone, supra note 26, at 712. 
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
34. See id. 
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
36. See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996). 
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TECHNOLOGY 
There are roughly three hundred million cell phone subscribers in the 
United States alone.38  Notwithstanding the country’s growing affinity with 
technology, a lack of appellant precedent exists regarding what the 
government can and cannot obtain from technological devices, such as cell 
phones.39  It is important to understand how a cell phone works in order to 
evaluate the few cases available regarding CSLI and to help predict future 
decisions.40 
When a person places a cell phone call, a signal is conveyed to the 
nearest cell tower, and eventually to the carrier’s office.41  What experts refer 
to as a cell site is the “geographical location containing the cell tower, radio 
transceiver, and base station controller.”42  Anytime a person receives or 
makes a cell phone call, the carrier stores that information.43  It should be 
noted that even when a cell phone user is not placing a call, his or her 
location can be identified because the phone is continuously interacting with 
the mobile network.44  According to many scholars, due to the sophistication 
of mobile devices, CSLI can be obtained within a few hundred feet.45 
A. Cell Site Location Information (“CSLI”) 
What is typically referred to as CSLI has become a widely used 
method for the government to help fight crime.46  Although it has recently 
been used to combat criminal activity, many fear that obtainment of this 
information infringes on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.47  Courts 
frequently differentiate between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI, also 
                                            
38. See CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, CTIA’S Wireless Industry Survey 
Results, (2013), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf. 
39. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:  A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 681 (2011). 
40. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “Davis’s Fourth Amendment 
argument raises issues of first impression in this circuit, and not definitively decided 
elsewhere in the country”); Malone, supra note 26, at 703 (stating that “many people probably 
do not consider how this technology works or what information they may inadvertently be 
sharing with their cell phone company”). 
41. Malone, supra note 26, at 707–08. 
42. Christopher Fox, Comment, Checking In:  Historic Cell Site Location 
Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 773–74 (2012). 
43. See id. 
44. Malone, supra note 26, at 708. 
45. Id. at 704. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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known as prospective CSLI.48  This distinction between real-time and 
historical CSLI is vital in the evaluation and response to privacy issues.49  
Courts have yet to sufficiently address whether CSLI deserves any 
constitutional protection at all.50  The major issue facing CSLI among legal 
scholars is whether a warrant should be required to obtain historical CSLI.51  
Before one can obtain a warrant, probable cause must be established.52  Even 
before one can delve into this complex constitutional issue, two questions 
must be answered.53  The first question is whether collecting CSLI is 
considered a search; if it is considered a search, then there must be 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.54  Second, if obtaining CSLI is not 
considered a search, then what standard must the government meet in order 
to obtain historical CSLI?55 
1. Historical Versus Real-Time Location Information 
Historical CSLI records are obtained from a past date in time and 
only provide “the date, time, and duration of calls, whether calls are inbound 
or outbound, and show the originating and terminating cell sites for calls 
received or placed on the phone.”56  Cell phone carriers retain this 
information for a given amount of time for business purposes.57  Real-time 
CSLI permits the government in present time to track a cell phone user’s 
whereabouts.58  The majority of courts faced with requests for real-time 
CSLI consistently have held the material is considered “tracking information 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which requires a warrant—and thus a 
showing of probable cause—before an order for disclosure of that CSLI may 
                                            
48. Malone, supra note 26, at 704. 
49. Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure:  Why Probable Cause Is 
Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1875, 
1884 (2011). 
50. Malone, supra note 26, at 704. 
51. Id. at 704–05. 
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
53. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1887. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical 
Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2011, 
at 1, 10. 
57. Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old 
Law:  A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 571, 579–80 (2012). 
58. See id. at 582. 
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be granted.”59  The real debate, however, regarding CSLI concerns historical 
data, as seen in Davis.60  Courts have interpreted historical CSLI to be 
overseen by section 201 of the Stored Communications Act.61 
a. The Stored Communications Act 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 oversees the 
discovery of CSLI.62  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
encompasses the Stored Communications Act in title two and “serve[s] as the 
basic statutory framework within which CSLI jurisprudence has 
developed.”63  Congress passed the Stored Communications Act to combat 
privacy concerns regarding the voluntary obtainment of consumers’ personal 
information.64  Under the Stored Communications Act, the government 
cannot simply compel communication companies, specifically cell phone 
companies, to turn over private customer information such as telephone 
numbers and call logs.65  In addition, the communication companies are 
similarly constricted in their ability to turn over customer information to the 
government.66 
Under the Stored Communications Act, a government agency may 
compel a communication service provider to provide the “contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant.”67  Under section 201 of the Stored Communications 
Act, the government may therefore obtain the actual location of a cell phone 
subscriber in real time only when the government agency obtains a warrant 
                                            
59. Malone, supra note 26, at 710; see also Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 § 108, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012). 
60. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); Malone, supra note 26, at 710–11. 
61. Stored Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
(2012); Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Malone, supra note 26, at 710. 
62. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894.  See generally Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
63. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894; see also Stored Communications Act § 
201. 
64. See Harkins, supra note 49, at 1899. 
65. Harkins, supra note 49 at 1896; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  “The SCA 
regulates government access to stored user account information compiled by third parties in 
the ordinary course of business.”  Harkins, supra note 49, at 1896. 
66. Blank, supra note 56, at 11. 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Malone, supra note 26, at 718. 
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pursuant to probable cause.68  While § 2703(a) only allows the government 
to obtain real-time location information pursuant to a warrant, § 2703(c) 
permits the government to obtain historical location information.69  To obtain 
historical information, 
[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic 
communication service or remote computing service to disclose a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity:  
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; . . . (B) obtains a court order 
for such disclosure; [or] . . . (D) submits a formal written request 
relevant to a law enforcement investigation . . . .70 
Accordingly, the government, pursuant to § 2703(c), may obtain 
records of cell phone subscribers with a court order by following § 2703(d) 
of the codified Stored Communications Act.71 
The Stored Communications Act, section 201, sets forth the 
requirements needed for a government agency to obtain a court order, which 
would compel a carrier to turn over the information of a subscriber.72  This 
subsection of the statute allows the government to obtain the location 
information “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”73 
Although most scholars and courts acknowledge that “a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber”74 refers to historical CSLI, the 
central dispute involves what standard should be employed by courts to 
                                            
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  According to the Act, a 
government agency may obtain the actual location of a subscriber’s communications only 
when the agency obtains a warrant pursuant to probable cause required by the Fourth 
Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
69. U.S. CONST. amend IV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (c). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). 
In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), three 
qualifications must be met:  [F]irst, the CSP must be a provider of an electronic 
communication service; second, the data may not be content information as defined 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” an electronic communications service. 
Fraser, supra note 57, at 583 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)); see also Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012). 
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d); Fraser, supra note 57, at 585. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. § 2703(c)(1). 
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authorize disclosure of historical CSLI.75  “Over the last several years, the 
prevailing view among the courts was that historical CSLI was governed by 
the S[tored] C[ommunications] A[ct] and thus could be obtained without a 
warrant pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order.”76 
Conversely, many argue that a cell phone is really a tracking device 
and thus outside the scope of the Stored Communications Act since a 
tracking device is not within its definition of what is considered an electronic 
communication.77  Therefore, in order for the government to compel a carrier 
to provide historical CSLI of a subscriber, “the information must have been 
stored by [a provider of electronic communications].”78  The Third Circuit, 
however, has specifically addressed this issue and determined that a cell 
phone is not considered a tracking device.79 
b. Third Circuit Opinion 
In its holding, the Third Circuit articulated that by its nature, CSLI is 
not considered a tracking device and therefore should not be held to the 
higher probable cause standard.80  The Third Circuit decision was the first on 
the appellate level that decided “whether a court can deny a [g]overnment 
application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the [g]overnment has satisfied its 
burden of proof under that provision.”81  The government in In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government82 
submitted a request to the magistrate judge for a court order to obtain 
                                            
75. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010). 
76. Malone, supra note 26, at 721; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
77. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(12) (2012); Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
78. Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
79. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 309, 313. 
80. Id. at 313. 
We therefore cannot accept the MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be 
considered information from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires 
probable cause for its production. 
In sum, we hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under § 
2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause 
determination. . . . The MJ erred in allowing her impressions of the general 
expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into anything else.  We 
also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than probable cause, a conclusion 
that . . . is supported by the legislative history. 
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
81. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 305–06. 
82. 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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historical CSLI.83  The magistrate judge denied the government’s request and 
insisted on a government showing of probable cause when obtaining CSLI.84  
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the magistrate’s ruling and held 
“that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a [court] order and that 
such an order does not require the traditional probable cause 
determination.”85 
Notwithstanding the Third Circuit decision, some still believe that a 
cell phone is considered a tracking device when the government is 
attempting to obtain real-time or prospective data.86  Although many scholars 
support this contention, this Comment from here on focuses solely on 
historical CSLI.87 
Even though government agencies frequently use historical CSLI to 
investigate criminal activity throughout the country,88 a few scholars and 
courts believe section 2703(d) should be discarded and replaced with a newer 
and higher standard of probable cause.89  The Third Circuit, however, has 
held that to determine what standard a court should employ when a 
government agency attempts to obtain historical CSLI is not an issue for the 
courts to decide, and that the standard should, instead, be left up to 
Congress.90 
We respectfully suggest that if Congress intended to circumscribe 
the discretion it gave to magistrates under § 2703(d) then 
Congress, as the representative of the people, would have so 
provided.  Congress would, of course, be aware that such a statute 
mandating the issuance of a § 2703(d) order without requiring 
probable cause and based only on the Government’s word may 
evoke protests by cell phone users concerned about their privacy.  
The considerations for and against such a requirement would be 
for Congress to balance.  A court is not the appropriate forum for 
                                            
83. Id. at 305. 
84. Id. at 305, 308. 
85. Id. at 313.  “We also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than 
probable cause, a conclusion that . . . is supported by the legislative history.”  Id. 
86. Malone, supra note 26, at 724–25. 
87. E.g., id., at 724–25; see infra Parts III–V. 
88. See Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
89. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Malone, supra note 26, 704–05. 
90. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 319. 
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such balancing, and we decline to take a step to which Congress is 
silent.91 
This precedent-setting decision offered by the Third Circuit—while 
one of the first federal circuit court decisions regarding historical CSLI—
most likely will determine how future courts will examine the governmental 
obtainment of historical CSLI.92 
IV. UNITED STATES V. DAVIS:  WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT 
WRONG 
The next section of this Comment focuses on the misguided decision 
of the Eleventh Circuit in Davis.93  This section will provide evidence 
showing why the court was misguided.94 
A. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy:  Third Party Doctrine 
Although the Eleventh Circuit claims that a cell phone subscriber has 
a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation of privacy may not be 
one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.95  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly articulated that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to 
the information a person voluntarily reveals to a third party.96  Accordingly, 
if historical CSLI is considered to be information that is voluntarily given to 
a third party, then it is presumed that the government obtainment of historical 
CSLI is not considered a search and no warrant is required.97  To support this 
argument, many opponents of a warrant requirement standard cite to the 
Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller.98 
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy to the voluntary information provided to a bank.99  
Before his trial, the respondent sought to suppress bank records obtained 
                                            
91. Id. 
92. Malone, supra note 26, at 723. 
93. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); infra Part IV.A–E. 
94. See infra Part IV.A–E. 
95. Malone, supra note 26, at 712, 733. 
96. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe:  The Fourth Amendment 
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506 
(2012). 
97. Id. 
98. 425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743–44 (1979). 
99. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45. 
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through a purportedly flawed subpoena.100  The lower court denied his 
motion and respondent was subsequently convicted on conspiracy charges.101  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court later affirmed 
the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.102  Additionally, in its 
decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a person conveys personal 
information to a third party, that person anticipates that the third party will 
inevitably convey that personal information to the government.103 
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.  All of the 
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit 
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks 
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.  
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the 
information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress . . . the 
expressed purpose of which . . . to require records to be maintained 
because they [are useful] “in criminal . . . investigations and 
proceedings.”104 
Banks retain a record of their customers’ accounts to comply with 
the Bank Secrecy Act, which is “merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a 
proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that records 
are available when they are needed.”105  The Court concluded that because 
customers are aware that the information within their account is kept by the 
bank—a third party—there is no Fourth Amendment right violated when that 
information is conveyed to law enforcement.106 
In addition to citing Miller, challengers to the warrant requirement 
standard for historical CSLI also cite the Court’s decision in Smith v. 
Maryland107 to bolster their argument.108  In that case the Court held—three 
years after Miller—that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to the telephone numbers they dialed.109  In Smith, the government 
obtained an installation of a pen register on the petitioner’s phone to collect 
                                            
100. Id. at 436. 
101. Id. at 436–37. 
102. Id. at 437, 440. 
103. Rothstein, supra note 96, at 507 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
104. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1976)). 
105. Id. at 444. 
106. Id. at 444–45. 
107. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
108. See id. at 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 446; In re Application of 
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the 
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010). 
109. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. 
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the phone numbers he dialed.110  The police installed the pen register on the 
petitioner’s phone without obtaining a warrant or court order.111  The 
petitioner was suspected of participating in a robbery and subsequently 
making harassing phone calls to his victim.112  With the help of the pen 
register, the police were able to identify the petitioner as the robbery 
suspect.113  The victim was ultimately able to identify her robber, and 
thereafter, the petitioner was arrested.114  Prior to his trial, the petitioner 
sought to suppress all evidence obtained from the pen register on the 
contention it violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.115  The lower court ultimately denied the petitioner’s 
motion to suppress and the appeal went all the way to the Supreme Court.116  
Eventually, the Supreme Court held that because the information is 
voluntarily conveyed to a third party, a person does not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy to the phone numbers he or she dials.117  In addition, 
most people are aware that the carrier retains a record of the numbers dialed 
because they eventually appear on a monthly telephone bill.118 
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey 
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone 
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of 
legitimate business purposes.  Although subjective expectations 
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that 
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any 
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain 
secret.119 
The petitioner attempted to argue that he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy because the telephone calls originated in his house.120  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court quickly shut down this argument by stating 
“[r]egardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the 
                                            
110. Id. at 737. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
115. Id. at 737–38. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 743–44; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 588.  “Further, in Smith v. 
Maryland, the Supreme Court found that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed 
records of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and therefore assumed the risk 
that those records would be revealed to the police.”  Fraser, supra note 57, at 588. 
118. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
119. Id. at 743. 
120. Id. 
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telephone company in . . . the same way if he wished to complete his call.  
The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some 
other phone could make no conceivable difference . . . .”121  Even if he had 
an expectation of privacy to his dialed telephone numbers, the Supreme 
Court further noted that society is not willing to acknowledge this 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.122 
B. Historical CSLI:  A Voluntary Disclosure to a Third Party 
The underlying policy argument in both Miller and Smith is 
identical:  When a person voluntarily reveals information to a third party 
they surrender any legitimate expectation of privacy over that information.123  
Courts have extended the third party argument to comprise information 
regarding:  “[C]redit card statements, electric utility records, motel 
registration records, and employment records.”124  Proponents of a warrant 
requirement, however, challenge this line of reasoning and contend “cell 
phones automatically register with cell phone towers and send location 
information without any voluntary action by the user.”125  Although this may 
be the case, the automatic registration of a cell phone with a tower is an 
acknowledged consequence of possessing a cell phone.126 
Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their 
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS 
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the 
government uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes 
that law enforcement agencies have reported and solved with the 
help of CSLI.127 
The Third Circuit, however, attempted to argue that a typical cell 
phone user likely does not even realize that a carrier retains their location 
                                            
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 
(1976); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012).  
“Historical CSLI has been analogized with other types of personal records, such as bank 
records, that courts have ruled are [freely given] to a third party.”  Malone, supra note 26, at 
739. 
124. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
125. Malone, supra note 26, at 739. 
126. Id. 
127. Fox, supra note 42, at 789. 
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information.128  However, this argument can easily be invalidated.129  When a 
cell phone user places a call, the user must undoubtedly anticipate that their 
carrier will determine their call location for billing purposes.130  How would 
a carrier determine the proper billing rate for a cell phone call without 
determining the subscriber’s location when making the call?131  Therefore, a 
subscriber must recognize that their cell phone provider retains their location 
information as part of the ordinary course of business.132 
An additional argument for why historical CSLI is considered a 
voluntary conveyance of information is because a cell phone user can easily 
turn off their phone, thereby preventing the registration of their location with 
a cell tower.133  In addition, most cell phone thieves immediately turn off the 
stolen phone because they understand that their location will likely be 
traceable.134  “[T]he prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions and 
subscribers’ increased use of these services directly undermine the position 
that cell phone customers are not voluntarily sharing their location 
information with [cell site providers].”135 
1. Comparison to United States v. Davis 
Similar to the telephone numbers dialed in Smith,136 and the bank 
information provided to the bank in Miller,137 the defendant in Davis 
                                            
128. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); Malone, 
supra note 26, at 739. 
129. See Malone, supra note 26, at 739. 
130. Id. at 739–40. 
131. See id. 
[A]s users become more aware of cell phone technology, there will no longer be a 
widespread lack of knowledge regarding the type of location data cell phone 
companies routinely collect.  If people continue to use their cell phones even after 
they learn and understand how historical CSLI is gathered and maintained, they 
will have a much harder time arguing that the CSLI has not been voluntarily 
conveyed. 
Id. at 740. 
132. Id. at 739–40. 
133. Malone, supra note 26, at 740. 
134. Garth Johnston, Smart Thieves Wise Up to Smart Phones:  Turn ‘Em Off 
to Disable Tracking, GOTHAMIST (March 26, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2012/
03/26/smart_crooks_wise_up_on_smart_phone.php. 
135. Fox, supra note 42, at 788. 
Therefore, a cell phone user has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI 
that the [cell site provider] records when the user makes or receives a call because 
the subscriber has voluntarily shared this information with the [cell site provider] 
and assumes the risk that the [cell site provider] may turn the information over to 
law enforcement agencies. 
Id. at 788–89. 
136. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). 
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voluntarily transmitted his location to cell towers in order to make and 
receive calls.138  The carrier then retained the location information of the 
defendant for its personal business records.139  “[H]istorical [CSLI] are 
records created and kept by third parties that are voluntarily conveyed to 
those third parties by their customers.  As part of the ordinary course of 
business, cell[] phone companies collect information that identifies the cell[] 
towers through which a person’s calls are routed.”140 
C. The Beeper Cases 
Soon after the decisions of United States v. Knotts141 and United 
States v. Karo,142 the Supreme Court decided two cases within a two-term 
period that addressed the issue of governmental use of tracking devices in 
determining the whereabouts of suspected drug manufacturers.143  These two 
cases assist in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to his or her precise location.144  Additionally, “[t]hese cases are 
especially apt when discussing historical CSLI because they dealt with a 
technology that many critics of the current interpretation of the SCA 
compare to cell phones:  [T]racking devices.”145 
Employing the use of beepers allows law enforcement 
agents to track the object the beeper has been attached to by 
following the emitted signals, similar to the way in which one can 
compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the 
movements of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in real-
time.146 
In Knotts, law enforcement agents positioned a tracking beeper in a 
container that was holding chloroform that agents suspected was used by the 
defendants in their production of drugs.147  Law enforcement agents were 
able to track the container to a remote cabin.148  With the assistance of the 
                                                                                                       
137. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1976). 
138. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209–10, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g 
granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
139. Id. at 1209–10. 
140. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012). 
141. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
142. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
143. Fox, supra note 42, at 780. 
144. Malone, supra note 26, at 713. 
145. Id. 
146. Fox, supra note 42, at 780 (footnote omitted). 
147. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
148. Id. 
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beeper and surveillance of the defendant’s cabin, the agents were able to 
obtain a search warrant.149  During the execution of the search warrant, 
agents discovered a drug laboratory and subsequently arrested the 
defendant.150  The defendant sought to suppress the evidence law 
enforcement obtained through the warrantless tracking of the beeper.151  
After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced for producing a controlled substance.152 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction 
and found the use of the beeper to track the defendant was a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.153  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision and found the defendant’s expectation of privacy 
was not violated because the warrantless tracking of the beeper was not a 
search within the Fourth Amendment.154  The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper . . . amounted 
principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and 
highways.”155  Additionally, the Court noted that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when traveling in a car on a public road because that 
person voluntarily conveys that information to the public.156  The Court 
therefore once again concluded that a person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to what is voluntarily conveyed to the public.157 
A similar fact pattern involving a beeper occurred in Karo.158  After 
the defendants purchased cans of ether from a confidential informant that 
were used in the extraction of cocaine from clothes that had been imported 
into the United States, the government secured a warrant that allowed the 
installation and tracking of a beeper in one of the cans.159  Once the 
defendant picked the cans of ether up from the informant, the agents then 
followed the defendant to his home.160  After the cans were moved to a 
                                            
149. Id. at 279. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279. 
153. Id. at 279. 
154. Id. at 285. 
155. Id. at 281. 
156. Id. at 281–82. 
When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone 
who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final 
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
157. Id. at 281–82. 
158. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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number of locations, through the use of the beeper, the government agents 
finally discovered that the cans were at the house rented by the defendants.161  
The agents then obtained a warrant to search the house and subsequently 
discovered the defendants’ cocaine and laboratory paraphernalia.162  The 
defendants were consequently arrested and moved to suppress the evidence 
derived from the initial warrant to install the beeper.163 
After the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to 
grant the defendant’s suppression of evidence, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.164  The Court ultimately decided that although the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the government installed 
the beeper on the ether can, the monitoring of the can when it was inside the 
defendant’s home was considered an unreasonable search.165  Unlike Knotts, 
as the Court noted, the beeper in Karo showed that it was inside the 
defendants’ home. 166  The Court furthermore held that the use of a beeper to 
track a person in his or her private residence that is not open to visual 
surveillance is considered a search within the Fourth Amendment.167 
Where exactly the beepers were broadcasting their precise location is 
the key difference between these two cases.168  The most significant question 
to ask when one is studying electronic surveillance cases is “what kind of 
information can be collected and whether that sort of information would be 
freely available to, say, a passerby?”169  Moreover, these two cases inevitably 
created a public/private distinction to evaluate the use of warrantless tracking 
devices and their potential Fourth Amendment implications.170 
                                            
161. Id. at 708–10. 
162. Id. at 710. 
163. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710.  “The [d]istrict [c]ourt granted respondents’ 
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the . . . residence on the grounds that the 
initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid and that the . . . seizure was the tainted fruit of 
an unauthorized installation and monitoring of that beeper.”  Id. 
164. Id. at 710–11. 
165. Id. at 713, 715. 
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, 
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the 
interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and 
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant. 
Id. at 715. 
166. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710, 715; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 
(1983). 
167. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
168. Malone, supra note 26, at 715. 
169. Id. at 716. 
170. Fox, supra note 42, at 782; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 468 
U.S. at 284. 
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1. CSLI Differs from Beeper Cases 
Supporters of a warrant requirement for CSLI argue that the same 
analysis used in the beeper cases should be employed in CSLI cases.171  
Employing the same public/private analysis, however, would be 
superfluous.172 
[C]urrently CSLI is not consistently accurate enough to implicate 
the home of a suspect, but rather only indicates the general area 
where the call was made from, which may or may not give rise to 
the inference that the defendant was at home.  Knotts and Karo 
make clear that acquiring location information about an object in 
the vicinity of the home or other private space, but not within its 
interior, is not a search.173 
In addition, “historical CSLI does not convey information about the 
interior of a home.”174  Unlike the beeper cases that provide a precise 
location of the tracking device, historical CSLI typically only reveals the 
location of a cell phone within roughly 200 feet.175 
[T]he historical [CSLI] at issue identif[ies] only the closest cell[] 
tower to the Defendants’ phones, and not the precise location of 
the Defendants themselves. . . . Indeed, even with an ever-denser 
cell[] tower grid, such precision is impossible.  Moreover, even if 
cell site records could definitively indicate that an individual is in 
his home, that information only reveals that a person made or 
received a phone call while at home—in other words, non-
incriminatory information that is clearly obtainable via the 
constitutional pen register at issue in Smith v. Maryland.176 
                                            
171. Fox, supra note 42, at 789.  “Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly 
accurate, it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo, as that information will 
allow law enforcement to determine if a suspect is in his or her home.”  Fraser, supra note 57, 
at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
172. See Fraser, supra note 57, at 611–12.  “The tracker beeper cases simply do 
not carry over well to a tracking device that has other uses; there is a need for a different 
distinction in CSLI analysis.”  Id. at 612. 
173. Id. at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
174. Malone, supra note 26, at 737. 
175. Id.  “Unless a person is standing in the middle of a residence and the walls 
are 100 feet away in any direction, his historical CSLI will not be precise enough to prove that 
he is actually inside the walls of the residence and secluded from the public eye.”  Id. 
176. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (D. Md. 2012); see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Malone, supra note 26, at 738.  “CSLI 
cannot indicate with certainty anything about the interior of a private residence.  Thus, the 
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Consequently, unlike the more precise tracking of a beeper, 
historical CSLI does not provide a precise location of a cell phone because 
the cell tower only gives an approximate location.177  Because historical 
CSLI substantially differs from beeper tracking, “CSLI falls outside of the 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections.  Accordingly, when a law 
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI information to 
approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search.”178 
D. United States v. Jones 
The most recent case that dealt with Fourth Amendment implications 
on tracking devices occurred in United States v. Jones.179  In Jones, the 
government secured a search warrant to install a GPS on a vehicle that was 
registered to the respondent’s wife.180  The government suspected the 
respondent of trafficking drugs through his nightclub and accordingly sought 
the warrant to allow the government to install the electronic tracking 
device.181  The warrant authorized the government to install and track the car 
in the District of Columbia for only ten days.182  Disobeying the terms of the 
warrant, the government installed the device in Maryland on the eleventh 
day.183  Signals from the device documented the vehicle’s location within 
roughly one hundred feet.184  With help from the tracking device, the 
government was able to obtain an indictment against the respondent and 
                                                                                                       
Fourth Amendment does not protect historical CSLI, and current law does not require a 
warrant or probable cause to obtain historical CSLI.”  Malone, supra note 26, at 738. 
177. Fox, supra note 42, at 789.  “This information does not provide the actual 
location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower location used to carry a call 
and because location calculations based on cell towers give only an approximation of a 
subscriber’s phone’s location.”  Id. at 789. 
178. Id. at 790. 
If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate location of the cell phone at the 
initiation of the call can be computed.  This approximate location, however, 
provides the general area of the caller, not the exact location.  A tracking beeper, on 
the other hand, can be traced to a precise location. . . . [H]istoric CSLI cannot show 
that a subscriber was at a particular place at a particular time; it can only show that 
the phone was in a general area. 
Id. at 789–90. 
179. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012). 
180. Id. at 1–2. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 2. 
183. Id. 
184. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2. 
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several of his co-conspirators, charging them with conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine.185 
Prior to trial, the respondent sought to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the GPS tracking, arguing that the installation and tracking of 
the GPS on the vehicle was an unreasonable search within the Fourth 
Amendment.186  The court, however, only suppressed the evidence obtained 
through the GPS while the vehicle was parked in the garage of the 
respondent’s house.187  Subsequently, the respondent was convicted at 
trial.188  The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction on the 
grounds that the evidence acquired from the warrantless tracking of the GPS 
violated the Fourth Amendment.189 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority opinion, written by 
Justice Scalia, indicated that the case was primarily about the physical 
intrusion by the government onto private property for the sole purpose of 
obtaining evidence.190  “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”191  The Court, therefore, predominantly 
based its decision on the common law trespass doctrine.192  The physical 
trespass by the government to install the GPS device, outside the 
requirements set forth by the warrant, violated the respondent’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.193 
1. Why Jones Analysis Does Not Apply 
The Eleventh Circuit in Davis erroneously applied the analysis set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Jones to arrive at its holding.194  Several 
reasons exist why the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to 
historical CSLI cases.195 
                                            
185. Id. at 2–3. 
186. Id. at 2. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 3. 
189. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op at 3. 
190. Id. at 4. 
191. Id. at 4. 
192. Id.  “The majority decided only that a search occurs when the government 
trespasses on an individual’s property for the purpose of gathering information.”  Rothstein, 
supra note 96, at 501. 
193. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–3, 12. 
194. See id. at 3–4; United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212, 1214 (11th 
Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
195. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3–4; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620. 
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First, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that GPS tracking and CSLI are 
analogous.196  As previously discussed, the tracking produced by a GPS and 
historical CSLI yield different levels of accuracy when determining an 
individual’s location.197  In Jones, the device was attached to a car, and the 
law enforcement agents tracked its movements in real-time.198  In Davis, 
however, the government did not track the suspects movements in real-time; 
the government simply obtained historical CSLI which does not track an 
individual’s precise real-time movements.199  “Historical cell site location 
data is, as its name implies, historical—the information revealed by such data 
exposes to the government only where a suspect was and not where he is.”200 
In addition, unlike Jones, the agents in Davis obtained records from 
the defendant’s cell phone carrier that only revealed the vicinity in which he 
made or received a cell phone call.201  And, unlike Jones, “this information 
can only reveal the general vicinity in which a cell[] phone is used.”202  The 
court even noted that “[w]e do not doubt that there may be a difference in 
precision, but that is not to say that the difference in precision has 
constitutional significance.”203  This argument is flawed because a person 
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to everything, and a 
person’s precise location is vital in determining whether their Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated.204  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
erred when it compared the tracking device employed in Jones to the 
historical CSLI employed in Davis.205 
Next, the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to the Davis 
case because there was no trespass in Davis.206  Nevertheless, although the 
court addresses this factual distinction, it still used Jones to arrive at its 
decision.207 
[I]n the controversy before us there was no GPS device, no 
placement, and no physical trespass.  Therefore, although Jones 
clearly removes all doubt as to whether electronically transmitted 
                                            
196. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213. 
197. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text. 
198. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2. 
199. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 613–14. 
200. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (D. Md. 2012). 
201. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2; Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; Graham, 
846 F. Supp. 2d at 392. 
202. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 
2. 
203. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216. 
204. See e.g., Fraser, supra note 57, at 609–13. 
205. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213–14, 1216; Fraser, supra note 57, at 613. 
206. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 4. 
207. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
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location information can be protected by the Fourth Amendment it 
is not determinative as to whether the information in this case is so 
protected.  The answer to that question is tied up with the 
emergence of the privacy theory of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  While Jones is not controlling, we reiterate that it is 
instructive.208 
Such an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s analysis set forth in Jones 
further demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit got it wrong.209  Because the 
obtainment of one’s historical CSLI does not involve a physical trespass to 
one’s property, the Eleventh Circuit should not have employed the trespass 
theory to analyze the possible Fourth Amendment implications.210  Instead, 
the Eleventh Circuit should have employed the analysis set forth in Katz—to 
determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society was willing to accept as reasonable—to his CSLI.211 
E. Katz Analysis Applied to Davis 
If the Eleventh Circuit decided to instead employ the Katz analysis it 
would have found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.212  Conversely, even if the court found that the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it would have found that society would 
not be willing to accept that expectation of privacy as reasonable because his 
location was voluntarily conveyed to the public through his cell phone 
provider.213 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that: 
[E]ven on a person’s first visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a 
bookie, or a priest, one may assume that the visit is private if it 
was not conducted in a public way.  One’s cell phone, unlike an 
automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere.  Thus, the 
                                            
208. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
209. See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620. 
 While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of Jones will be, the 
Court’s narrow holding that the installation and use of the GPS device was a search 
provides little guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain historical 
CSLI records.  First, with respect to cell phones, the government does not have to 
install the devise used to generate location information—the user is already 
carrying around his or her cell phone. 
Fraser, supra note 57, at 620; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
210. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012). 
211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Graham, 846 F. 
Supp. 2d at 396. 
212. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 396–401. 
213. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99; Malone, supra note 26, at 733. 
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exposure of the [CSLI] can convert what would otherwise be a 
private event into a public one. . . . [CSLI] is private in nature 
rather than being public.214 
However, as previously indicated, “historical CSLI are the 
provider’s business records, and are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”215  Because the defendant’s historical CSLI was retained by 
his cell phone provider within its ordinary course of business, the defendant 
had no expectation of privacy to those records and consequently his Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated.216  Therefore, because the Eleventh 
Circuit disregarded the third party doctrine in arriving at its decision, it got it 
wrong when it comes to historical CSLI and the Fourth Amendment.217 
V. CONCLUSION 
Requiring a warrant each time law enforcement wishes to obtain 
historical CSLI would hinder the efforts of law enforcement and slow down 
their ability to investigate crimes.218  While society’s dependence on cell 
phones continues to grow and the government’s need to solve crimes 
continuously persists, a uniform standard to obtain historical CSLI needs to 
be addressed by Congress.219  However, as the Third Circuit articulated, it is 
not for the courts to decide what standard should be employed to obtain these 
records, but it is for Congress to decide.220  The Eleventh Circuit failed to 
follow its sister circuit in this regard.221 
As discussed at length, historical CSLI is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.222  The Stored Communications Act223 helps protect citizens 
and enables law enforcement to efficiently do their job.224  Because a cell 
phone user does not have a legitimate expectation to privacy to the records 
voluntarily conveyed to their cell phone provider, the Fourth Amendment is 
                                            
214. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en 
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
215. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
216. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
217. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–400. 
218. Malone, supra note 26, at 744. 
219. Fox, supra note 42, at 792. 
220. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010). 
221. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17. 
222. See Fox, supra note 42, at 792. 
223. See generally Stored Communications Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710 (2012). 
224. Malone, supra note 26, at 745; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
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not implicated.225  The Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze Davis properly and 
consequently its decision was misguided.226 
After the submission of this Comment, the government filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc.227  With a majority of judges agreeing in favor 
of rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately vacated the Davis decision.228 
 
                                            
225. Malone, supra note 26, at 745. 
226. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210; see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 
2d 384, 403 (D. Md. 2012); Fraser, supra note 57, at 613; Malone, supra note 26, at 745. 
227. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1223. 
228. Id. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In public and private schools, disabled children are being restrained 
and secluded against their will.1  One Florida disabled student was restrained 
in a hot dog roll, which is when teachers roll the student up in blankets.2  
After the school admitted the teachers had rolled the child up for fun, the 
parents then realized their child had odd reactions to blankets and towels at 
home.3  Another autistic student, who weighs only fifty-two pounds and is in 
second grade, was restrained and pinned down to the floor repeatedly.4  His 
mother said the teachers “bust[ed] his lip, bruis[ed] his torso and arm, and 
sprain[ed] his neck on different occasions.”5  When the mother found the 
bruises, she filed a no-restraint letter with the school, but despite this, the 
abuse continued.6  Additionally, another disabled student—who was 
crying—was restrained in a chair at a public school by a teacher using 
packing tape.7  The twenty-one year old teacher taped the five-year-old 
disabled student to a chair so tightly that he could not move, and then turned 
the chair upside down.8  The teacher said he did this as a form of discipline, 
and would not release the student until he stopped crying.9  On another 
                                                     
1. See infra Part II. 
2. Parent Story: Who Will Care About Our Children Once EducRAT$ 
Cleanse, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PREVENTION OF TEACHER ABUSE, http://endteacherabuse.org/
Musumeci.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
3. Id. 
4. Technique Leaves Second-Grader with Bruises, Sprain, Busted Lip Isaiah 
Moore, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at A8. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Man Charged with Abuse After Taping Student into Chair Police Say Boy, 
5, Unhurt, Suffered ‘Mental Anguish’, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2011, at B2. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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occasion, another student put the same child into a trashcan, and the teacher 
pushed him down so he could not get out of the trashcan.10  This teacher was 
arrested for aggravated child abuse.11  Another abuse incident transpired 
when an aide broke a disabled student’s arm at an elementary school.12  The 
school fired the special education aide, who was also a behavioral specialist, 
for using inappropriate discipline but was not arrested on criminal charges.13  
This is what occurs daily in our Florida public schools.14  Florida and federal 
statutes do not prohibit the restraining and secluding of disabled students.15  
Florida and federal statutes ought to limit restraining and secluding disabled 
students to emergency purposes only.16 
This Comment analyzes the problems with the current Florida laws 
on restraining and secluding disabled children in school.17  Part II explains 
the historical aspects of federal statutes regarding disabled children from 
1973 until the present.18  Part III examines the history of all past and current 
federal statutes that have been proposed in both the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Senate from 2009 through 2015.19  None of 
these bills have been enacted yet.20  Part IV surveys Florida statutes and 
regulations concerning disabled students, when school personnel are allowed 
to restrain or seclude them and how the school personnel are supposed to 
document and record the incidents.21  Part V scrutinizes how schools violate 
disabled students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by inflicting corporal 
punishment on them.22  Part V also analyzes disabled students’ procedural 
due process rights and their substantive due process rights.23  Part VI 
provides recommendations on how to prevent school personnel from 
restraining and secluding disabled students in school improperly and to only 
restrain or seclude students if they are an imminent threat to themselves or 
others around them.24 
                                                     
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. NAT’L ASS’N FOR PREVENTION OF TEACHER ABUSE, supra note 2. 
13. Id. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Parts III–IV. 
16. See infra Part VI. 
17. See infra Parts III–IV. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. See infra Part V. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. See infra Part VI. 
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II. FEDERAL STATUTES REGARDING DISABLED CHILDREN 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was passed in 1990 to 
protect the civil rights of individuals with disabilities.25  Title II of the ADA 
specifically prohibits discrimination of individuals with disabilities.26  The 
school district falls under Title II Chapter 2.8000 of the ADA as a public 
service.27  Congress had to clarify what it intended when it passed the ADA 
in 2008.28  In September of 2008, President Barack Obama signed into law 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADA 
AA”).29  This law came into effect on January 1, 2009.30  Congress passed 
the ADA AA because the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions 
interpreted the ADA’s definition of a disability too narrowly.31  Congress 
explained that the ADA AA rejects the high burden from the Supreme Court 
and reiterates Congress’ intent for the scope of the ADA to be broad and 
inclusive, not narrow.32  Congress specified that “[i]t is the intent of the 
legislation to establish a degree of functional limitation required for an 
impairment to constitute a disability that is consistent with what Congress 
                                                     
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012); 
NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SCHOOL IS NOT SUPPOSED TO HURT:  THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION MUST DO MORE TO PROTECT SCHOOL CHILDREN FROM RESTRAINT 
AND SECLUSION 41 (2012), available at www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/School_is_Not_Supposed_to_Hurt_3_v7.pdf. 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 for Students with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIV. RTS., (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-504faq-201109.html (last modified Jan. 19, 
2012). 
27. Dep’t of Justice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical 
Assistance Manual Covering State and Local Government Programs and Services, 
http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html (last visited Sep. 2, 2015); Protecting Students with 
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children 
with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIV. RTS. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html (last modified Dec. 19, 2013). 
28. Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students 
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26. 
29. Id.; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 1, 
122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12201 (2012)). 
30. § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. 
31. Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students 
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also 
§ 2, 122 Stat. at 3553. 
32. Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students 
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also 
§ 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. 
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originally intended.”33  In this amendment, it also broadens the scope of 
major life activities, and provides a non-exhaustive list of both general 
activities and bodily functions.34 
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)—now 
29 U.S.C. § 794—prohibits any program that receives federal financial 
assistance to deny a qualified handicapped person benefits, exclude 
participation, or be subjected to discrimination solely due to the person’s 
handicap.35  The ADA AA affects the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by 
changing what it means to have a disability.36  This amendment now 
broadens the scope of a disability, and students who were denied before 
based on the narrow definition of disability, might now be able to qualify 
under the broader definition.37  Section 504 requires that a free appropriate 
public education (“FAPE”) be provided to all students that qualify with a 
disability.38 
C. Title II of the ADA of 1990 
Title II of the ADA of 1990 prohibits discrimination due to a 
person’s disability.39  Title II cannot be construed to any lesser standard other 
than the standards under Section 504 and its implementing regulations.40  
Title II prohibits discrimination by all state and local government services, 
                                                     
33. Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students 
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26. 
34. § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555; see also 34 C.F.R. 104.3(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2013); 
Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/rights/guid/
ocr/disability.html (last modified Sept. 21, 2012). 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 104.1, .4; Protecting Students with 
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children 
with Disabilities, supra note 27. 
36. Disability Discrimination, supra note 34; Protecting Students with 
Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions about Section 504 and the Education of Children 
with Disabilities, supra note 27; see also § 3, 122 Stat. 3555. 
37. See § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555; Disability Discrimination, supra note 34. 
38. Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, supra note 27; see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794. 
39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Letter from 
Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleague 2 (May 14, 2014), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405-charter.pdf. 
40. Questions and Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students 
with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also 
29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
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programs, and activities—which include public schools—regardless of 
whether the state or local government service receives any federal financial 
assistance.41 
 
D. History of the Protection and Advocacy System and the National 
Disability Rights Network 
The federally mandated Protection and Advocacy System (“P&A”) 
program is located in every state in the country.42  The P&A program 
provides support for people with mental, emotional, intellectual, and physical 
disabilities.43  The National Disability Rights Network (“NDRN”) is a 
nonprofit organization for P&A, which allows NDRN to try and make a 
society that gives disabled individuals equal opportunities, where they can 
exert their meaningful choices and their autonomy.44  Through legal 
assistance, legislative advocacy, and training assistance, NDRN hopes to 
create a better society for disabled individuals.45  However, while these 
programs are all in place to help disabled individuals, the Office of Special 
Education Programs (“OSEP”) is directly accountable for administering the 
implementation of special education laws.46 
NDRN published its first report in 2009 on restraint and seclusion in 
schools and found that, notwithstanding twenty years of allegations of abuse, 
nineteen states had no laws on restraint and seclusion to protect children in 
school.47  Florida was one of the states that did not have any laws on restraint 
                                                     
41. Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, supra note 27; Questions and 
Answers on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 for Students with Disabilities Attending Public 
Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 26; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
42. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 42. 
43. Id. at 42–43. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND 
RESTRAINTS:  SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND 
TREATMENT CENTERS 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]; Darcie 
Ahern Mulay, Keeping All Students Safe:  The Need for Federal Standards to Protect 
Children from Abusive Restraint and Seclusion in Schools, 42 STETSON L. REV. 325, 327 n.12 
(2012) (finding that the other remaining states that do have laws on restraining and secluding 
children are very limited and ineffective for its purpose).  But see JESSICA BUTLER, THE 
AUTISM NAT’L COMM., HOW SAFE IS THE SCHOOLHOUSE?: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SECLUSION 
AND RESTRAINT LAWS AND POLICIES 57–58 (2015), available at 
http://www.autcom.org/pdf/HowSafeSchoolhouse.pdf (documenting that of the laws that go 
into effect on March 18, 2015, seventeen states—including Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, 
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
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and seclusion in schools in 2009.48  The Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) then reported that restraint and seclusion laws vary from state-to-
state and are very broad in their interpretation.49  The Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires that students aged three to 
twenty-one receive education in the least restrictive environment.50 
E. History of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
On November 29, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act (“EHA”)—also known as Public Law 94-
142—into law.51  The EHA was passed to help disabled children attend 
school and to not be discriminated against while in school.52  Before the 
EHA passed in 1970, schools in the United States only educated one in five 
children who had disabilities.53  During this time, most states had laws 
excluding students who were deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, or mentally 
retarded.54  The EHA was amended in 1990, and is now called IDEA.55  
IDEA was passed to specifically protect children with disabilities.56 
There are landmark cases furthering educational support for disabled 
students.57  Cases like Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania58 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of 
Columbia59 recognized that states and local neighborhoods have the 
                                                                                                                             
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming—do not have a 
specific statute, regulation, or guideline on secluding and restraining children in schools). 
48. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 4 n.4. 
49. Id. at 4. 
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3. 
51. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–
142, 89 Stat. 773 (amended 1990); The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services Celebrates 35 Years of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., http:/
/www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/index.html (last modified June 6, 2012). 
52. History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities through IDEA, OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., http://
www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last modified July 19, 2007). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1400. 
56. History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities through IDEA, supra note 52. 
57. Id. 
58. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam). 
59. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D.C 1972). 
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responsibility to educate children with disabilities.60  In Mills, the court held 
that children with disabilities have the right to be educated because the right 
to an education is protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.61 
The United States has made progress to better accommodate disabled 
children’s basic needs.62  Nevertheless, even though disabled students were 
being accommodated, they were accommodated not so they could go to 
school, but so they could go to state institutions.63  At these state-run 
institutions, they were provided with minimal food, shelter, and clothes, 
which is not in itself very accommodating.64  The United States finally 
started making programs for the disabled students and their families.65  
Through IDEA, children with disabilities now receive FAPE in every state in 
the United States, which is provided by OSERS.66  IDEA and FAPE were a 
response to the millions of disabled students who were either excluded from 
being educated, or had limited access to education.67 
Now disabled children are able to attend schools, become educated, 
and become productive members of society, instead of being in state 
institutions.68  With the implementation of IDEA and FAPE, disabled 
students are now attending high school graduation, going to college, and 
finding employment.69  These implementations are moving this country in 
the right direction; however, there is still more work to be done.70  What 
these federal laws have tried to implement is a safeguard for disabled 
                                                     
60. Id. at 878; Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1259–60; 
History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through 
IDEA, supra note 52. 
61. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868, 875; see also History: Twenty-Five Years of 
Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52. 
62. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878; History: Twenty-five Years of Progress in 
Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52. 
63. See History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services Celebrates 35 
Years of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 51. 
67. History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52; see also Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(b)(9), (c), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (amended 1990). 
68. History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 51; see also Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, § 3(b)(9), (c), 89 Stat. at 775. 
69. See History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52. 
70. See id. 
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children to attend school and be accommodated.71  With these laws also 
came federal training assistance for special education teachers and related 
specialists.72  However, all of this training for special education teachers and 
related specialists fell short because there are hundreds of cases of disabled 
students being restrained and secluded in Florida schools.73  When these 
disabled children are restrained and secluded against their will, although they 
sometimes may not be hurt physically, they are hurt mentally and 
emotionally.74  Some cases have been reported of disabled children who were 
restrained or secluded, and as a consequence, were physically injured, and in 
rare cases some children have even died.75 
IDEA authorizes the federal government to give funds to states for 
educating disabled children as long as the state complies with the provisions 
of IDEA.76  All disabled students are located and evaluated to establish if the 
child is eligible for special education and related services that the state 
offers.77  If a child is accepted for special education, the child’s parents and 
school personnel develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”).78  
An IEP is a document that explains the goals of the student and what services 
are to be provided to the student.79  The IEP was created to give the student 
goals, cater to the student’s unique needs, and provide services throughout 
the student’s education in order to improve their learning capabilities while 
                                                     
71. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 3(c), 89 Stat. 
at 775; History:  Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities 
Through IDEA, supra note 52. 
72. History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with 
Disabilities Through IDEA, supra note 52.  Acts were enacted to expand training of teachers 
in all disability areas.  Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282; 
Captioned Films Act of 1961; Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-276, 75 stat. 
575 (which trained teachers for deaf students); The Training of Professional Personnel Act of 
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-158, 73 stat. 339 (trained teachers on how to teach mentally retarded 
students); Captioned Films Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-905, 72 Stat. 1742 (trained teachers 
for students who had mental retardation). 
73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7–8. 
74. Id. at 8. 
75. Id. 
76. NANCY LEE JONES & CAROL J. TOLAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40521, 
THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA):  SELECTED JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE 2004 REAUTHORIZATION 1 (2009). 
77. Id. 
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3. 
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 47, at 3. 
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in school.80  With the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA, Congress required the 
U.S. Department of Education to create model forms for IEP, prior written 
notice, and procedural safeguards.81 
F. Guidelines from U. S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
On July 31, 2009, U. S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan sent a 
letter to all Chief State School Officers and advised each state to review its 
current policies on restraint and seclusion.82  In Mr. Duncan’s letter, he 
advised the Chief State School Officers of a technique that is available called 
positive behavior interventions and support (“PBIS”).83  He urged schools to 
apply the PBIS technique to all students, staff, and all places in school so that 
eventually restraining and secluding any child would be unnecessary.84  He 
also urged schools to start reporting incidents where students were restrained 
or secluded.85  Mr. Duncan wanted these reports to be published so other 
students, administrators, teachers, and parents of children can consent to the 
procedures and techniques used at a particular school.86  Furthermore, in 
2009, the U.S. Department of Education “asked its regional Comprehensive 
Centers to collect [every] [s]tate’s statutes, regulations, policies, and 
guidelines [relating to] the use of restraint and seclusion” in school.87  This 
information was then posted on the U.S. Department of Education’s 
website.88  Additionally, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (“SAMHSA”)—which is affiliated with the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services—asked the OSEP to look at a paper written 
by SAMHSA concerning abusive restraints and seclusions in school.89  The 
OSEP concluded, after reading the report, that it would benefit everyone at 
school, but especially students “if information and technical assistance were 
provided to [s]tate departments of education, local school districts, and 
preschool, elementary, and secondary schools” to help reduce restraint and 
                                                     
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3; DISABILITY 
RIGHTS SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS 15 (2009), 
available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.pdf. 
81. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON 
REQUIRED CONTENT OF FORMS UNDER PART B OF THE IDEA 1 (2009). 
82. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION:  RESOURCE DOCUMENT 
4–5 (2012). 
83. Id. at iii, 5, 25. 
84. Id. at iii. 
85. See id. at 5. 
86. Id. 
87. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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seclusion.90  The information and technical assistance provided to the 
schools, instruct schools to use restraint or seclusion only when a student is 
an immediate, serious, physical danger to himself or others.91 
In the GAO report documenting instances of abuse from 1990–2009, 
most of the instances where children were restrained or secluded were due to 
“problems with untrained or poorly trained staff.”92  The GAO report 
presented four encompassing themes:  (1) disabled children were restrained 
and secluded when there was no physically aggressive trigger and when their 
parents did not give consent for those techniques to be used; (2) a disabled 
child restrained face-down or a restraint that blocks the airway so no air can 
get to the lungs can make the child die; (3) school personnel were not trained 
on how to properly restrain and seclude disabled children; and (4) school 
personnel that were not properly trained on how to restrain and seclude 
children and have seriously injured or killed them, are still employed as 
teachers.93 
On May 19, 2009, “[t]he GAO report was presented to the U.S. 
House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor [during] a 
hearing [regarding] restraint and seclusion.”94  During this hearing and other 
hearings on the same issue, other testimony was also presented, such as 
disabled students who were abused by being restrained or secluded in 
school.95  This led to the drafting of the first federal legislation to protect 
students from being restrained or secluded in school.96 
The U.S. Department of Education recognizes that all districts and 
all states can surpass the fifteen principles framework, but all states are going 
to be urged strongly to follow these fifteen principles.97  It gives guidelines 
as to when to use restraint and seclusion, how teachers should be trained, 
school policies on restraint and seclusion, and documenting restraint and 
seclusion incidents.98  The fifteen principles exemplify how to reduce or 
eliminate restraint and seclusion school wide.99  These fifteen principles offer 
schools appropriate behavior guideline, not only to develop policies on 
                                                     
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 7. 
93. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7. 
94. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 7. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. at 7–8. 
97. Id. at 11–12. 
98. See id. at 12–13. 
99. Press Release, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of 
Education Issues Resource Document that Discourages Restraint and Seclusion (May 15, 
2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-issues-resource-
document-discourages-restraint-and-seclusion. 
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restraining and secluding children, but to also ensure the students’ safety as 
well as the safety of the adults.100  Mr. Duncan said it best when he correctly 
stated: 
 
[T]he standard for educators should be the same standard that 
parents use for their own children. . . .  There is a difference 
between a brief time out in the corner of a classroom to help a 
child calm down and locking a child in an isolated room for hours.  
This really comes down to common sense.101 
III. THERE IS NO FEDERAL STATUTE THAT ADDRESSES RESTRAINT OR 
SECLUSION OF DISABLED CHILDREN IN SCHOOLS 
There is no federal statute prohibiting restraint or seclusion in 
schools.102  Only states have guidelines, statutes, and regulations to prohibit 
types of restraint and seclusion in schools.103  Congressman George Miller—
who was chair of the Education and Labor Committee—introduced a bill 
called Preventing Harmful Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act on 
December 9, 2009.104  This title was shortened to Keeping All Students Safe 
Act.105  It passed in the House on March 3, 2010, but it died in the Senate.106  
The next bill was introduced at the same time as the previous bill on 
December 9, 2009, but in the Senate by former Senator Christopher Dodd, 
who was chair of the Subcommittee of Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee; however, it did not pass the Senate.107  Congressman 
George Miller introduced the next bill—the Keeping All Students Safe 
Act—on April 6, 2011, which died in the House.108  The most recent bill in 
the Senate on prohibiting restraint and seclusion in schools was introduced 
by Senator Tom Harkin—current chair of the Health, Education, Labor, and 
                                                     
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 6–7. 
103. Id. 
104. H.R. 4247-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://
www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4247?q=%7B”search”%3A%58” (last 
visited Sep. 4, 2015). 
105. Id. 
106. See id. 
107. See S. 2860-Preventing Harmful Restraint and Seclusion in Schools Act, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/2860?q=%7B
"search"%3A%5B" (last visited Sep. 4, 2015). 
108. See H.R. 1381-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1381?q=%7B"search"%3A%5B" (last 
visited Sep. 4, 2015). 
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Pensions Committee—on February 24, 2014.109  This bill is also called 
Keeping All Students Safe Act, and it has been referred to the committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.110  The most recent bill introduced 
in the House was by Congressmen Bobby Scott and Don Beyer on February 
12, 2015—also called Keeping All Students Safe Act—has been referred to 
the committee on House Education and the Workforce.111  Curt Decker—
NDRN Executive Director—asked, “‘[h]ow many more students dying and 
being emotionally traumatized are needed for Congress to pass this 
legislation?’”112  The Cindy Smith, Policy Counsel at NDRN urges this bill 
to swiftly pass in the Senate because 
federal action is needed to ensure that all students and families 
have adequate protection.  ‘The states have had the opportunity to 
pass legislation, yet the patchwork of state laws is . . . inadequate.  
A parent should know if they move from one state to another that 
they will be notified if their child is restrained or secluded, yet less 
than half the states require parents of all students to be notified.’113 
Restraining and secluding children in mental health facilities are 
prohibited because they realize the danger.114  Researchers have concluded 
that restraining and secluding disabled students in school has no therapeutic 
effect, and conversely it increases the student’s agitation and disruptive 
behavior.115 
IV. FLORIDA RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION LAWS 
In Florida, a teacher’s assistant at Coral Gables Elementary School 
taped five first graders’ arms to their laps, bound their ankles together, taped 
                                                     
109. S. 2036-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2036?q=%7B"search"%3A%5B" (last 
visited Sep. 4, 2015). 
110. Id. 
111. H.R. 927-Keeping All Students Safe Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr927 (last visited Sep. 4, 2015). 
112. Press Release, Nat’l Disability Rights Network, Senate Introduces 
Keeping All Students Safe Act:  NDRN Urges Swift Senate Passage (Feb. 12, 2014), 
available at http://www.ndrn.org/component/content/article/5/510-press-release-ndrn-urges-
swift-senate-passage-.html. 
113. Id. 
114. See Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3207, 114 Stat. 
1195, 1195 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 190ii (2012)). 
115. See Sandy K. Magee & Janet Ellis, The Detrimental Effects of Physical 
Restraint as a Consequence for Inappropriate Classroom Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV. 
ANALYSIS 501, 502–03 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1284345/pdf/11800190.pdf. 
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their heads to the blackboard, and taped the chairs they sat in to the 
blackboard.116  These children were only six years old.117  The teacher’s 
assistant was arrested eight times for various felonies, and the school stated it 
did not allow corporal punishment.118  Many children have died, have 
become severely injured, physically or mentally, and have experienced 
trauma from techniques like restraint and seclusion.119  Another boy in 
kindergarten was restrained three times in less than one month in his U.S. 
Cerebral Palsy School in Orange County.120  One of those times, he was 
restrained and held face down for forty-five minutes, and the school did not 
have the parents’ consent to restrain their child.121  A parent said there could 
be harmful consequences every time a disabled child is restrained.122  From 
this incident the boy developed “post-traumatic stress disorder, epilepsy and 
autism-spectrum behaviors.”123  Now seven, the boy is still hurt from his 
experience of being restrained for non-aggressive behavior, and cries for no 
reason.124  His father said “[i]t damage[d] [his son’s] core belief that [he is] 
safe” in school.125  Another case involved a Florida teen that had post-
traumatic stress disorder from being dangerously restrained and repeatedly 
secluded, and as a result the boy had to be admitted to a psychiatric 
facility.126  The court did not find the school’s acts to be excessive, egregious 
or a shock to the conscience, even when the school did not have parental 
consent to physically restrain or seclude the child.127 
                                                     
116. Mulay, supra note 47, at 325–26; Jean-Paul Renaud, Teacher, Aide 
Arrested on Child-Abuse ChargesFirst-Grade Students Say They Were Tied up for 
Misbehaving, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1B. 
117. Renaud, supra note 116. 
118. Id. 
119. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 9. 
120. Lauren Roth, Orange County Schools Still Restrain the Most Students, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2012, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-08-26/news/os-
orange-florida-restraint-seclusion-20120825_1_restraint-and-seclusion-orange-schools-
superintendent-barbara-jenkins. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Roth, supra note 120. 
126. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., REP. ON DANGEROUS USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINTS IN SCHOOLS REMAINS 
WIDESPREAD AND DIFFICULT TO REMEDY:  A REVIEW OF TEN CASES 4 (Comm. Print 2014) 
[hereinafter STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH CONG.]. 
127. Id. at 19. 
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A. Child with a Disability Definition 
[A] child with a disability—[in general]—means a child— 
(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments—including 
deafness—speech or language impairments, visual impairments—
including blindness—serious emotional disturbance, referred to in 
this chapter as emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, 
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or 
specific learning disabilities; and  
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related 
services. 
 . . . . 
The term child with a disability for a child aged [three] through 
[nine]—or any subset of that age range, including ages [three] 
through [five]—may, at the discretion of the State and the local 
educational agency, include a child— 
(i) experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and 
as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, 
in [one] or more of the following areas:  physical development; 
cognitive development; communication development; social or 
emotional development; or adaptive development; and 
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related 
services.128 
B. Florida Restraint Regulations 
The Department’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) started 
researching and collecting data on how many times restraint and seclusion 
occurred in schools in 2009.129  The OCR did this research as part of the 
Department’s 2009 to 2010 Civil Rights Data Collection (“CRDC”).130  For 
this study, the OCR and the CRDC had to come up with definitions for 
restraint and seclusion because they had not yet been defined by federal 
statute.131  Today, the Florida statutes and the Florida Administrative Code 
                                                     
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)–(B) (2012). 
129. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 9. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. at 7, 10.  But see FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32)–(33) (2014). 
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provide definitions and regulations on reactive strategies such as restraint 
and seclusion.132  The most common type of restraint used in school on 
disabled students is physical or mechanical restraint.133 
Florida Statute section 393.063(32) defines restraint as “a physical 
device, method, or drug used to control dangerous behavior.”134  Section 
393.063 of the Florida Statutes defines physical or manual restraint as “any 
manual method or physical or mechanical device, material, or equipment 
attached or adjacent to an individual’s body so that he or she cannot easily 
remove the restraint and which restricts freedom of movement or normal 
access to one’s body.”135  The Florida Administrative Code adds to this 
statute by including specific time periods and defining what physical 
restraint does not include.136  The Florida Administrative Code provides that 
manual restraint is when a person uses his hands or body to physically 
immobilize a person’s freedom of movement or normal access to 
his or her body for more than fifteen continuous seconds.  It does 
not include physically guiding a client during transport or skill 
training for up to two minutes.  Repeated applications and releases 
of manual restraint in order to circumvent the fifteen-second and 
two-minute criteria are prohibited.137 
The term mechanical restraint is defined as “a physical device used 
to restrict an individual’s movement or restrict the normal function of the 
individual’s body.”138  “This term does not include devices [that are] 
implemented by trained school personnel or [used] by a student” that has a 
medical or service need that has been prescribed by a doctor or related 
services professional, and the student is using it for its appropriate 
purpose.139  Some of these approved mechanical restraint devices are devices 
that support a student’s spine so the student can sit up straight, have more 
                                                     
132. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32)–(33); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-
8.001 (2014).  “Reactive strategies means . . . procedures or physical crisis management 
techniques of seclusion or manual, mechanical, or chemical restraint utilized for control of 
behaviors that create an emergency or crisis situation.”  FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-
8.001(15). 
133. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 9–10; Heather 
Vogell, Violent and Legal:  The Shocking Ways School Kids Are Being Pinned Down, Isolated 
Against Their Will, PROPUBLICA (June 19, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/schools-restraints-seclusions. 
134. FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32). 
135. Id. § 393.063(32)(a). 
136. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(12), (17). 
137. Id. r. 65G-8.001(12). 
138. Id. r. 65G-8.001(13). 
139. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10; see also FLA. STAT. § 
393.063(32)(b)–(c); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(13). 
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mobility, and improve their balance.140  These devices are approved because 
the student would not be able to do any of these things without the support 
from mechanical restraints.141  Most often, mechanical restraints are “straps, 
handcuffs or bungee cords.”142  Other mechanical restraints that are allowed 
are mechanical safety restraints used for transportation purposes, mechanical 
restraints used for medical immobilization, and orthopedically prescribed 
restraint devices that allow a student to participate in activities without 
causing harm to himself.143  A student who is being mechanically restrained 
must be allowed to move for a minimum of ten minutes for every hour that 
the student is restrained.144 
Chemical restraint is using medication to control and alter a disabled 
student’s behavior immediately.145  Chemical restraint is only allowed when 
there is written authorization from “an authorized physician who has 
[established] that the chemical [medication] is the least restrictive, most 
appropriate alternative available.”146  The authorizing physician must be 
present or must be on the telephone when a trained and authorized staff 
person examines the disabled child.147  If a disabled child is restrained, an 
authorized, certified, and trained staff member must observe the student 
during the restraint to monitor heart rate and determine when the release 
criteria have been reached.148  Every effort must be made before using any 
type of restraint on a student.149  Restraint used for a period of more than one 
hour on a disabled student “require[s] approval by an authoriz[ed] agent”; if 
it exceeds two hours, then the teacher needs to visually examine the student 
and receive re-approval from the authorized agent.150 
                                                     
140. See FLA. STAT. § 393.063(32)(c); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-
8.001(13)(c); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10. 
141. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 10. 
142. Vogell, supra note 133. 
143. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(13); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra 
note 82, at 10. 
144. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.007(10). 
145. Id. r. 65G-8.001(5), .008(1). 
146. Id. r. 65G-8.008(2). 
147. Id. r. 65G-8.008(3). 
148. Id. r. 65G-8.005(3), .007(3); .008(3).  A staff member or school personal 
authorized to use 
mechanical restraint must be a Certified Behavior Analyst certified by the Behavior 
Analyst Certification Board [R], Inc.; a behavior analyst certified by the Agency 
pursuant to [s]ection 393.17 [of the Florida Statutes], and by Rule 65G-4.003 [of 
the Florida Administrative Code]; a physician licensed under [c]hapter 458 or 459 
[of the Florida Statutes]; a psychologist licensed under [c]hapter 490 [of the Florida 
Statutes]; or a clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, or mental health 
counselor licensed under [c]hapter 491 [of the Florida Statutes]. 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3)(c). 
149. Id. r. 65G-8.007(1). 
150. Id. r. 65G-8.007(4)–(5). 
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The following restraints are prohibited from use: 
1. Reactive strategies involving noxious or painful stimuli, as 
prohibited by [s]ection 393.13(4)(g), [of the Florida Statutes]; 
2. Untested or experimental procedures; 
3. Any physical crisis management technique that might restrict or 
obstruct an individual’s airway or impair breathing, including 
techniques whereby staff persons use their hands or body to place 
pressure on the client’s head, neck, back, chest, abdomen, or 
joints; 
4. Restraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical 
device, behind his or her back; 
5. Physical holds relying on the inducement of pain for behavioral 
control; 
6. Movement, hyperextension, or twisting of body parts; 
7. Any maneuver that causes a loss of balance without physical 
support—such as tripping or pushing—for the purpose of 
containment; 
8. Any reactive strategy in which a pillow, blanket, or other item is 
used to cover the individual’s face as part of the restraint process; 
9. Any reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or 
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life; 
10. Use of any containment technique medically contraindicated 
for an individual; 
11. Containment without continuous monitoring and documentation of vital 
signs and status with respect to release criteria . . . .151 
C. Florida Seclusion Regulations 
Most people equate secluding a disabled child with putting the child 
in a time out period.152  However, the Florida Administrative Code explicitly 
                                                     
151. Id. r. 65G-8.009(1)–(11). 
152. See Seclusion in Developmental Disability Facilities, DISABILITY RTS. 
FLA., http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/resources/disability_topic_info/seclusion_in_
developmental_disability_facilities (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
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provides seclusion is not a time out.153  If a teacher puts a disabled student in 
time out and it exceeds the duration of twenty consecutive minutes, the time 
out has now been converted into a reactive strategy of seclusion.154  
Seclusion is defined as “involuntary isolation of a person in a room or area 
from which the person is prevented from leaving.”155  There must be an 
authorized and trained staff member present to approve the school 
personnel’s action to seclude the student.156  Any room where the disabled 
student is going to be secluded must have adequate lighting and ventilation 
to allow the student to breathe at a normal pace.157  The room must also have 
enough space for the student to lie down comfortably.158  The door to the 
room must be unlocked when the student is secluded without being 
monitored by a staff member.159  “[T]he door can be held shut by a staff 
person using a spring bolt, magnetic hold, or other mechanism” that enables 
the student to leave the room if the teacher leaves the locale.160  Before a 
teacher uses seclusion, all other options must have been used, and there must 
be a threat of imminent danger to the student or to others.161  Use of a 
reactive strategy must be continuously monitored, be the least possible 
restriction for its use, and end when the emergency ends.162  If the seclusion 
lasts for more than one hour, it needs to be approved by an authorized agent; 
if it lasts more than two hours, then the teacher must observe the student 
before seeking re-approval.163 
                                                     
153. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.001(16).  Time out is very short and can 
only last from one minute to twenty consecutive minutes.  Id. r. 65G-8.001(17)(a). 
154. Id. r. 65G-8.001(17); see also supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
155. FLA. STAT. § 393.063(33) (2014); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
65G-8.001(16). 
156. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3)(d)–(e).  The authorized staff 
member must have at a minimum:   
[A] bachelor’s degree, two years of experience serving individuals with 
developmental disabilities, and be certified in reactive strategies through an 
Agency-approved emergency procedure curriculum; and [t]he authorizing agent or 
staff person with approval authority for manual restraint must be certified in 
reactive strategies through an Agency-approved emergency procedure curriculum. 
Id. 
157. Id. r. 65G-8.007(8). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. r. 65G-8.007(9). 
160. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.007(9). 
161. See id. r. 65G-8.001(15), .006(1)–(2). 
162. Id. r. 65G-8.006(4)–(6). 
163. Id. r. 65G-8.007(4)–(5). 
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D. Florida Statutes and Regulations That Are Supposed to Protect 
Students from Restraint and Seclusion 
Florida labels children with disability as exceptional students 
because they are eligible for special programs and services approved by the 
Board of Education.164  Special education services are defined as designed 
instruction and services, which are necessary for exceptional students to 
benefit from their education.165  Some special services that may be included 
for exceptional students are:  transportation, physical therapy, aide for the 
blind, braillists, counseling, speech therapy, assistive technology devices, 
and mental health services.166  Reactive strategies, such as types of restraint 
and seclusion, must neither be implemented robotically—as soon as a teacher 
sees or punishes undesirable behavior—nor for the convenience of school 
personnel.167  The restraint and seclusion must stop when the emergency 
ends.168  For a teacher to become a special education teacher, the teacher 
must:  (1) have received certification of a special education teacher or passed 
a Florida special education teacher license exam; (2) have not had a special 
education certification or license be waived for any basis; and (3) have at 
least a bachelor’s degree.169 
To provide meaningful protection against restraint or seclusion for 
disabled students, a state can either:  (1) “provide[] multiple protections 
against restraint or seclusion for students”; or (2) “ha[ve] few protections but 
strictly limit[] the technique to emergency threats of physical harm.  This 
designation does not necessarily mean that a state’s laws provide sufficient 
protection . . . .”170  The State of Florida has statutes that prohibit restraint or 
seclusion when the student’s breathing is compromised, but it does not limit 
it to emergency situations only.171 
                                                     
164. FLA. STAT. § 1003.01(3)(a) (2014). 
165. Id. § 1003.01(3)(b). 
166. Id.  Special services can include:   
[T]ransportation; diagnostic and evaluation services; social services; physical and 
occupational therapy; speech and language pathology services; job placement; 
orientation and mobility training; braillists, typists, and readers for the blind; 
interpreters and auditory amplification; services provided by a certified listening 
and spoken language specialist; rehabilitation counseling; transition services; 
mental health services; guidance and career counseling; specified materials, 
assistive technology devices, and other specialized equipment; and other such 
services as approved by rules of the state board. 
Id. 
167. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.006(2). 
168. FLA. STAT. § 393.13(4)(h). 
169. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(10)(B) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(b) (2013). 
170. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 12 n.33. 
171. Id. at 14 n.35; see also FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(4). 
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Florida Statute, section 393.13, provides that a disabled person has a 
right to be free from harm.172  This includes any “unnecessary physical, 
chemical, or mechanical restraint, isolation . . . abuse, [and] neglect.”173  This 
statute also provides that discriminating against disabled children and 
excluding disabled children from any program or activity that is publicly 
funded is prohibited.174 
Florida Statute, section 1003.57, defines five options disabled 
students have for a classroom environment in school.175  The first option is 
learning in a regular classroom where the disabled student spends eighty 
percent or more of his time learning with non-disabled students during the 
week.176  The second option is in a resource room where the disabled student 
spends “[forty] to [eighty] percent of the school week with non-disabled” 
students.177  The third option is in a separate class where the disabled student 
“spends less than [forty] percent of the school week with non-disabled” 
students.178  The fourth option is a separate environment which is where the 
disabled student is sent to a “separate private school, residential facility, or 
hospital or homebound program.”179  The last option is an “[e]xceptional 
student education center or special day school,” where the disabled student 
attends “a separate public school to which non-disabled peers do not have 
access.”180  When making the IEP, after the student is found eligible to 
receive an exceptional student education (“ESE”), all of these options should 
be discussed with the parents and student.181  The statute also requires the 
school district to communicate to the parents what services are available and 
appropriate for the student.182  At the IEP meeting, the school district must 
disclose how much money it receives from the state for ESE support levels 
for a full time student.183  The school district must also approve the student’s 
IEP if it can be implemented at the student’s current school, or deny the IEP 
when it cannot be implemented at the student’s current school.184 
Florida almost made it to the weak category of states on laws 
protecting children, but it is now in the bottom of the states that provide 
                                                     
172. FLA. STAT. § 393.13(3)(g). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. § 393.13(3)(i). 
175. Id. § 1003.57(1)(a). 
176. Id. § 1003.57(1)(a)(1)(c). 
177. FLA. STAT. § 1003.57(1)(a)(1)(d). 
178. Id. § 1003.57(1)(a)(1)(e). 
179. Id. § 1003.57(1)(a)(1)(b). 
180. Id. § 1003.57(1)(a)(1)(a). 
181. See id. § 1003.57. 
182. FLA. STAT. § 1003.57(1)(g). 
183. Id. § 1003.57(1)(j). 
184. Id. § 1003.57(3)(c). 
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meaningful protection.185  Florida did not make it in the weak category of 
state laws on protecting children because of its strong data collection on 
abuse instances.186  Florida monitors all of its schools by district to make sure 
the schools are complying with state laws, and then publishes the findings on 
the Department of Education’s website.187 
1. Florida’s Monitoring and Reporting Systems 
Florida’s strong monitoring system is due to the 2010 Florida 
Legislature passing House Bill 1073 which created section 1003.573 of the 
Florida Statutes.188  The statute, titled Restraint and Seclusion on Students 
with Disabilities, directly focuses on the problem of restraining and 
secluding disabled children, even though there are schools where 
nondisabled children are secluded and restrained.189  Nevertheless, two years 
after this statute was implemented, Florida still had problems with 
monitoring and reporting.190  From 2011 to 2012, one set of data from the 
Florida Department of Education stated there were four times as many 
students who were secluded in rooms “than a second set of data [called] the 
School Environmental Safety Incident Report (“SESIR”).”191  Some districts 
only view SESIR as a place to report disciplinary incidents and not restraint 
and seclusion incidents.192  Cheryl Elters, a representative for the Florida 
Department of Education, stated that school district personnel do not realize 
they need to record restraint and seclusion data in two places.193  The 
disconnect comes from how restraint and seclusion are used in schools 
because most of these techniques are used on disabled children.194  Teachers 
use restraint and seclusion on disabled children and view it not as a 
disciplinary action for a behavior, but they view it as a safety precaution.195  
                                                     
185. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 12–13. 
186. Id. at 12–13, 92. 
187. Id. at 13, 91; see also, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2013-14 EXCEPTIONAL 
STUDENT EDUCATION MONITORING AND ASSISTANCE ON-SITE VISIT REPORT FOR SEMINOLE 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 (2014), http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7673/urlt/
1314OSSeminole.pdf. 
188. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573 (2014); H.R. 1073, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Fla. 2010). 
189. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573; see also BUTLER, supra note 47, at 10. 
190. See Sarah Gonzalez & John O’Connor, Florida Keeps Two Sets of 
Seclusion Data—And Why Neither May Tell the Full Story, STATE IMPACT, (Aug. 14, 2012, 
12:19 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2012/08/14/florida-keeps-two-sets-of-seclusion-
data-and-why-neither-may-tell-the-full-story/. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Gonzalez & O’Connor, supra note 190. 
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Teachers use restraint and seclusion when disabled students exhibit 
dangerous behaviors that can cause a danger to themselves or others.196  
Teachers also use restraint or seclusion as a disciplinary action to break up a 
school fight.197  This is why there is a discrepancy in both sets of data.198  
Even with these two sets of data, we still do not know the amount of disabled 
children restrained and secluded—one reason is because school personnel do 
not report to both data collections, and the other reason is because it occurs 
in the classroom where it is most likely not going to be reported.199  
Monitoring restraint and seclusion on disabled students should occur at the 
“classroom, building, district, and state levels.”200 
The research collected from all Florida school districts is available 
on the Disability Rights Florida website,201 and when you find a report, it 
links to the Florida Department of Education website for the charts.202  In 
2012, there were only nine Florida counties that were authorized to use 
mechanical restraint.203  From August 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012, there 
were a total of 9712 incidents of restraint, and there were 4347 disabled 
students.204  Forty-six percent of all disabled students restrained were in pre-
kindergarten through third grade.205  The students were restrained on average 
for eleven minutes; forty-five percent of students restrained were white and 
eighty-four percent were male.206  From August 1, 2011 through June 30, 
2012, there were a total of 4193 incidents of seclusion, and there were 1435 
disabled students.207  Forty-two percent of these children that were secluded 
were in pre-kindergarten through third grade, and forty-three percent that 
                                                     
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. 
199. Id. 
200. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(2)(a) (2014). 
201. Restraint and Seclusion—County by County, DISABILITY RIGHTS FLA., 
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/resources/disability_topic_info/
restraint_and_seclusion_county_by_county (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
202. E.g., BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 1, 2013 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014, available 
at http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/Aug_
2013_to_June_2014_Detail.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
203. Restraint and Seclusion—County by County, supra note 201.  The nine 
counties that were authorized to use mechanical restraint in 2012 were:  Alachua, 
Hillsborough, Levy, Madison, Manatee, Marion, Pinellas, Orange, and Santa Rosa.  Id. 
204. BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 2011 THROUGH JUNE 2012, available at http://
www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/
August_to_June_various_2012.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
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were secluded were in fourth grade through eighth grade.208  The students 
were secluded on average for twenty minutes; forty-five percent of the 
students secluded were black and eighty-three percent were male.209 
From August 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, there were a total of 
9218 incidents of restraint, and there were 4000 students with disabilities.210  
Forty-nine percent of the restrained students were in pre-kindergarten 
through third grade.211  From August 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013, there 
were a total of 2913 incidents of seclusion, and there were 1145 students 
with disabilities.212  Forty-seven percent of these students were in fourth 
grade through eighth grade.213 
From August 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, there were a total of 
8895 incidents of restraint, and there were 3461 students with disabilities.214  
Forty-eight percent of disabled students restrained were in pre-kindergarten 
through third grade.215  From August 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, there 
were a total of 2264 incidents of seclusion, and there were 882 students with 
disabilities.216  Forty-four percent of seclusion incidents occurred with 
students from fourth to eighth grade.217 
One example of how school districts are changing due to the 
reporting of restraint and seclusion of disabled children is Orange County.218  
Orange County eliminated seclusion of disabled students in 2012.219  Orange 
County schools still restrain the most students.220  “Restraint and seclusion 
are totally out of control,” says one parent of a disabled child.221  She says, 
“children . . . us[e] behaviors to communicate,” and school teachers “need to 
understand that.”222  The guideline from the U. S. Secretary of Education, 
Mr. Arne Duncan, says restraint and seclusion should never be used as 
                                                     
208. Id. 
209. BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., supra note 204. 
210. BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
RESTRAINT INCIDENTS BY DISTRICT: AUGUST 1, 2012 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2013, available at 
http://disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/August_2012_-_June_
2013_by_county,_disability,_type_and_strategy_.pdf (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. & STUDENT SERVS., supra note 202. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. See Roth, supra note 120. 
219. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 21; Roth, supra note 120. 
220. Roth, supra note 120. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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punishment or discipline.223  This guideline is also in compliance with 
Florida Administrative Code chapter 65G-8.006, section 2.224  The guidelines 
state wrap mats should never be used as a mechanical restraint.225  In Orange 
County, Florida, schools still use wrap mats to strap disabled students lying 
flat against a board.226  Anna Diaz, head of a special education service in 
Orange County, Florida, said restraining a disabled student should only be 
used when the student is in imminent danger of hurting himself or others.227  
This statement is in accord with the guidelines, but saying it and doing it by 
implementing and overseeing that those guidelines are being followed, are 
two different things.228 
Every school in Florida must have a policy that discusses restraint 
and seclusion of students.229  These policies must follow chapter 65G-8.003 
of the Florida Administrative Code.230  These policies must also include the 
district’s plan to reduce or eliminate restraint and seclusion, which may 
include additional training in positive behavioral support and crisis 
management, parental involvement, and more student evaluation.231  With 
the passage of this law, Florida school districts and school personnel are 
banned from using any mechanical or physical “restraint that restricts a 
student’s breathing.”232  Florida schools and school personnel are also 
prohibited from “clos[ing], lock[ing], or physically block[ing] a student in a 
room that is unlit and does not meet the rules of the State Fire Marshal for 
seclusion time-out rooms.”233 
2. Documentation Requirement 
Florida Statutes, section 1003.573 makes it a requirement that every 
incident of restraint or seclusion be documented and reported within twenty-
four hours.234  This report must contain the following items: 
                                                     
223. Id. 
224. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.006(2) (2014). 
225. Roth, supra note 120. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See id. 
229. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a) (2014); Seclusion in Developmental 
Disability Facilities, supra note 152. 
230. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.003(1) (2014). 
231. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6)(a)–(b), (e); see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
65G-8.003(1). 
232. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(4); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.009(3). 
233. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(5); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 69A-
58.0084(1)–(5) (2014). 
234. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(1)(a). 
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1. The name of the student restrained or secluded. 
2. The age, grade, ethnicity, and disability of the student 
restrained or secluded. 
3. The date and time of the event and the duration of the restraint 
or seclusion. 
4. The location at which the restraint or seclusion occurred. 
5. A description of the type of restraint used in terms established 
by the Department of Education. 
6. The name of the person using or assisting in the restraint or 
seclusion of the student. 
7. The name of any nonstudent who was present to witness the 
restraint or seclusion. 
8. A description of the incident, including: 
a. The context in which the restraint or seclusion occurred. 
b. The student’s behavior leading up to and precipitating the 
decision to use manual or physical restraint or seclusion, including 
an indication as to why there was an imminent risk of serious 
injury or death to the student or others. 
c. The specific positive behavioral strategies used to prevent and 
deescalate the behavior. 
d. What occurred with the student immediately after the 
termination of the restraint or seclusion. 
e. Any injuries, visible marks, or possible medical emergencies 
that may have occurred during the restraint or seclusion, 
documented according to district policies. 
f. Evidence of steps taken to notify the student’s parent or guardian.235 
 
This statute provides that a restraint or seclusion incident report 
should include:  Everything about the child, the child’s disability, the reason 
the teacher used restraint or seclusion, and what the teacher did to prevent 
the situation from escalating to having to use restraint or seclusion.236  
                                                     
235. Id. § 1003.573(1)(b). 
236. Id. 
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Implied by this statute is that physical restraint or seclusion must be used 
only if there is “an imminent risk of serious injury or death to the student or 
others.”237  Nevertheless, this requirement is implicit in an incident report, 
and it is not specifically provided as a requirement before a teacher can 
restrain or seclude a disabled student.238  It can be interpreted that restraint 
and seclusion can be used for any reason, and there does not need to be any 
threat of serious bodily injury or harm before restraint or seclusion can be 
used on the student.239 
Documentation of the abuse should be given to the “school principal, 
the district director of [ESE], and the bureau chief of the Bureau of 
Exceptional Education and Student Services electronically each month that 
the school is in session.”240  This data should be reported to the Florida 
Department of Education so it can analyze the data and figure out what 
methods were most used and by what county.241  Parents or students can also 
fill out a complaint form online about an incident that occurred at school, and 
OCR will investigate it.242 
Nevertheless, even with all these laws on documenting these abusive 
incidents, a Florida disabled teen was continuously restrained using the 
dangerous technique of prone restraint, and most of the documents were 
either incomplete or missing.243  Prone restraint is when the student is forced 
to put his face down for a period of time.244  Florida once banned school 
personnel from using prone restraint techniques; however, that restriction 
was later removed by legislators.245  This student was restrained at least 
eighty-nine times over a fourteen-month period, which included twenty-
seven prone restraints.246  This student could not tell his parents because his 
disability interfered with his ability to communicate.247  His parents 
discovered the abuse that had occurred in school when the student’s 
                                                     
237. See id. § 1003.573(1)(b)(8)(b). 
238. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 25–26 n.53. 
239. See id.; JESSICA BUTLER, THE AUTISM NAT’L COMM., MY STATE’S 
SECLUSION & RESTRAINT LAWS:  BRIEF SUMMARIES OF STATE SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 
LAWS AND POLICIES 15 (2013), available at http://www.autcom.org/pdf/MyStateRestraint
SeclusionLaws.pdf. 
240. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(2)(b). 
241. See id. § 1003.573(2)(c). 
242. OCR Complaint Consent Form, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
ASSESSMENT SYS., https://ocrcas.ed.gov/cas.cfm (last visited Sep. 5, 2015). 
243. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 19. 
244. Mulay, supra note 47, at 330. 
245. Id. at 331, 332 & n.40. 
246. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 17. 
247. Id. at 19. 
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“outbursts became so debilitating that he had to be removed from the 
school.”248  When his parents requested the logs the school used to document 
restraint and seclusion, the “logs were incomplete or missing.”249  The 
parent’s attorney believed that without all of the documentation completely 
filled out—and the logs that were missing—“it was impossible to 
substantiate the parents’ claims that the school had been indifferent to their 
child’s suffering.”250  In this case, the disabled student had to be put into a 
psychiatric facility as a direct result from the harm he suffered when teachers 
put him in repeated restraint and seclusion.251  The court did not find the 
school’s actions to be excessive, egregious, or a shock to the conscious 
because the court “do[es] not take . . . psychological trauma [evidence] as 
seriously as . . . physical injury” evidence.252 
 
V. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS VIOLATES DISABLED 
STUDENTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE FREE FROM EXCESSIVE 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND DISCRIMINATED AGAINST SOLELY DUE TO 
THEIR DISABILITIES 
A. Procedural Due Process 
A child with a disability should never be restrained or secluded in 
school unless it is for the safety of others or for the child’s safety.253  
Corporal punishment on disabled students will not give rise to the procedural 
due process rights in the U.S. Constitution, unless the corporal punishment is 
for disciplinary reasons, and it does not violate the common law privilege of 
teachers being able to use reasonable force—but not excessive force—to 
educate and discipline a child.254  Public and private schools use restraint and 
seclusion methods to try to control disabled students.255 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or 
                                                     
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 26. 
252. Id. 
253. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 1, 10. 
254. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661, 676 (1977). 
255. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 25, at 7. 
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enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.256 
This means that public schools and its representatives—like teachers, 
aides, and specialists—cannot deprive any disabled child of his life or liberty 
without the due process of the law.257  The Fourteenth Amendment further 
implies that disabled children must have equal protection of the laws of the 
United States, and no person can deprive them of the rights that they are 
entitled to by being citizens of the United States.258  No state can “deprive [a] 
person of life, liberty, or property [interest] without [the] due process of 
law.”259  The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the argument 
that any grave loss upon a person from the state is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.260  For there to be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court looks toward the nature of the interest at issue.261 
The test to determine if the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable is:  
(1) whether the individual’s interest is an interest within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s life, liberty, or property interests; and (2) if the Fourteenth 
Amendment life, liberty, or property interests are implemented, what process 
of law is due.262 
The liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment “encompass[es] 
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”263  The State cannot 
physically punish a person unless the punishment is in agreement with due 
process of law.264 
In Ingraham v. Wright,265 the Supreme Court held that corporal 
punishment in public schools is associated with the constitutionally protected 
liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment.266  This is because when a 
school official, acting under color of state law, punishes a child for behavior 
by restraining the child and physically hurting the child, the liberty interest of 
                                                     
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
257. See id. 
258. See id. 
259. Id. 
260. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 673–74. 
264. Id. at 674. 
265. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
266. Id. at 674. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated.267  But it “h[e]ld that the traditional 
common law remedies [were] adequate to afford due process” of law.268 
The Supreme Court has held that corporal punishment restraining the 
child’s freedom of movement violates the Fourteenth Amendment.269  The 
first step of the test is satisfied when Florida special education teachers, 
acting under color of state law, inflict corporal punishment on disabled 
students in public school by forcibly restraining them against their will.270 
 The next step is to determine what process of law is due.271  To 
determine what process is due, the Supreme Court applies the Mathews v. 
Eldridge272 three-part test:   
(1) [what is] the private interest that will be affected . . . ; (2) the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest . . . and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and . . . (3) the [state] interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.273 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when a state actor 
inflicts corporal punishment on a child in school by restraining the child that 
involves serious physical pain, it implicates the liberty interest of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.274  The importance of the liberty interest is freedom 
of movement, and it can be argued that it is not only the liberty interest at 
stake, but the life interest is also implicated if the student restrained is 
restrained too long or improperly.275  This is because when a school actor 
restrains a child and inflicts excessive corporal punishment the child could 
die, and there have been cases reported where children have died from 
excessive corporal punishment.276 
In Goss v. Lopez,277 the Court held that “a student must be given 
[notice and] an . . . opportunity to be heard [at an informal hearing] before 
                                                     
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 672. 
269. Id. at 674. 
270. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 (holding that any corporal punishment inflicted 
on a student in public school by a state actor implicates the Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest). 
271. Id. 
272. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
273. Id. at 335. 
274. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 676; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
275. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673–74. 
276. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8–11. 
277. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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[the student] is . . . suspended from public school.”278  At the very least, the 
minimum due process requirements that are due when a state actor arbitrarily 
deprives a person of a liberty interest are notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.279  The suggestion from Goss and Ingraham for procedural due 
process purposes is that, for a student to be suspended ten days or more, the 
school must give the student notice and an opportunity to be heard.280  
Nevertheless, for a school official to inflict serious pain and corporal 
punishment on a student there is no requirement for notice or an opportunity 
to be heard.281 
The Ingraham Court distinguished Goss by stating: 
Unlike Goss . . . , this case does not involve the state-
created property interest in public education.  The purpose of 
corporal punishment is to correct a child’s behavior without 
interrupting his education.  That corporal punishment may, in a 
rare case, have the unintended effect of temporarily removing a 
child from school affords no basis for concluding that the practice 
itself deprives students of property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Nor does this case involve any state-created interest in 
liberty going beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
freedom from bodily restraint and corporal punishment.282 
The Ingraham Court held that the United States allows reasonable 
corporal punishment as long as it is not excessive.283  This demonstrates that 
a balance must be struck between the state’s interest of furthering 
education—which sometimes requires reasonable corporal punishment—and 
the student’s interest of personal security and freedom of movement.284  The 
Court stated the prevalent rule, which is that teachers and administrators can 
exert a reasonable amount of force for what they “‘reasonably believe[] to be 
[required] for [the student’s] proper control, training, or education.’”285 
The next part of the test is:  What procedural safeguards are due?286  
Florida has procedural safeguards in place if a student is punished by a 
                                                     
278. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 692 (White, J., dissenting); Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. 
279. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
280. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682; Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
281. See Ingraham, 430 U.S at 659 n.12; Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. 
282. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 n.43 (citation omitted) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. 
at 565). 
283. Id. at 676. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 661. 
286. Id. at 674. 
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school teacher, and later it was found that the school teacher’s use of 
corporal punishment was not reasonable but excessive.287  In such a case, tort 
and penal law provides a procedural safeguard and an adequate remedy.288  
For more severe types of abuse cases than paddling a student, there are 
procedural safeguards in civil and criminal law when taken into 
consideration with the openness of the school environment.289 
In Ingraham, the uncontradicted evidence showed that a student was 
paddled by a teacher and that such corporal punishment—and the pain 
associated with it—in Dade County public schools was rare with the 
exception of a few cases.290  Furthermore, paddling is normally inflicted in 
response to direct conduct of the student, and there are usually other teachers 
present.291  Thus, the risk that a teacher will paddle a student “without cause 
is typically insignificant.”292  The Court held that a teacher can paddle a 
student for disciplinary reasons, and this does not threaten “any substantive 
rights nor condemns the child ‘to suffer grievous loss of any kind.’”293  The 
Court would not hold that corporal punishment should be eliminated in 
schools because it has a deep-rooted history in the United States that serves 
an important educational interest; the elimination of corporal punishment 
must occur by its own social policy, and not by a court’s ruling of a right to 
due process.294  The Court held that it is not in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s liberty interest to not give notice and an opportunity to be 
heard when there are traditional common law remedies.295 
Before 2009, the schools were not monitoring or reporting restraint 
and seclusion incidents on disabled children, and there were no procedural 
safeguards in place.296  Now, every Florida school district needs to create a 
plan of action on how to reduce restraint and seclusion, and have parental 
consent to restrain or seclude a child.297  Even though all of these laws are in 
place, school personnel and districts do not follow them and still restrain and 
                                                     
287. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 677. 
288. See id. at 677–78. 
289. Id. at 678. 
290. Id. at 677. 
291. Id. at 677–78. 
292. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678. 
293. Id. at 678 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
294. Id. at 681. 
295. Id. at 682.  It is important to note that the Ingraham Court refused to 
review Petitioner’s third argument for certiorari, which was that “the infliction of severe 
corporal punishment upon public school students [is] arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to 
achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 659 n.12. 
296. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3–5. 
297. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6) (2014). 
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seclude children without consent; some do not even fill out the necessary 
forms after the incident.298  School personnel are not giving notice to the 
student’s parents or an opportunity to be heard at a hearing because schools 
are trying to cover up how much they are abusing these students.299  Most of 
the time when students are restrained or secluded, teachers will say it was 
due to their aggressive behavior, when in reality, students had non-
aggressive behavior and just had not followed a command.300  Most students 
cannot control their actions because of their disability, and when they do not 
follow their teacher’s instructions, they are trying to communicate something 
other than I am not following directions.301  Not following a teacher’s 
instructions and exhibiting non-aggressive behavior are not reasons to 
restrain and seclude students, that is merely punishing them for their 
disabilities.302 
Parents of the disabled child must write a complaint containing “any 
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
the child, or the provision of a FAPE to such child,” and the complaint must 
present “an alleged violation that occurred not more than [two] years before 
the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the 
alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint.”303  Also, parents must 
meet with the IEP board to discuss the problem in mediation.304  If mediation 
does not work, an administrative due process hearing is given, then the 
parents can appeal, and then they can file a civil action.305  Throughout the 
entire process, the burden of proof is on the parents and disabled child to 
show that the school district violated the student’s rights.306  It is still a 
violation of procedural due process when a disabled student’s liberty is taken 
away first and then the school provides them with an administrative hearing 
                                                     
298. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 19. 
299. See id. 
300. See RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION INCIDENTS, DISABILITY RIGHTS FLA. 
(2012), http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/documents/RS_County_by_County/IDEA_
State_Advisory_ppt_July_2012.pdf. 
301. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 19; Roth, supra note 120; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8. 
302. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 8; Roth, supra 
note 120. 
303. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)–(B) (2012). 
304. See id. § 1415(e)(1)–(2). 
305. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.511, .514, .516 (2013); OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. 
PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 24, 29, 31. 
306. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005); Mulay, supra 
note 47, at 341. 
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afterwards, only if requested by the parents or the child.307  This makes it 
seem that disabled students and parents are given their procedural due 
process rights.308  Yet, it takes time for the parents and students to go through 
this process before being able to file in court, while their child is still in 
school being abused by the teacher.309  However, this makes the rights of 
disabled children insurmountable when arguing a constitutional violation 
because the burden in court is too high to reach.310  Despite all these laws to 
aid disabled students, in practicing these laws, disabled students have an 
uphill battle.311  In Schaffer ex rel. Shaffer v. Weast,312 Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg argued that “policy considerations, convenience, and fairness” 
justify the high burden that should be placed upon the defendant, the school 
district, because they are in a far better position to show they had complied 
with the statutory requirements.313  The procedural due process rights that are 
due are to notify the parents that the school uses restraint or seclusion 
techniques, the school should have the parents sign a consent form, and the 
parents should have a due process hearing before an incident.314  Then, after 
the incident occurs, the school should notify the parents within twenty-four 
hours to let them know why it occurred.315  If the parents want to have a due 
process hearing after, to see if it was truly necessary, they should be afforded 
that right as well.316 
B. Substantive Due Process Rights 
Excessive use of corporal punishment, “‘at least where not 
administered in conformity with a valid school policy authorizing corporal 
punishment . . . may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is 
tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking behavior.’”317  
“Many corporal punishment cases involve . . . traditional applications of 
physical force, [like when] school officials, subject to an official policy, or in 
                                                     
307. See Mulay, supra note 47, at 341. 
308. See id. 
309. See id. at 341, 348. 
310. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 113TH 
CONG., supra note 126, at 24; Mulay, supra note 47, at 348. 
311. See Mulay, supra note 47, at 341, 348. 
 312. 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
313. Id. at 63–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
314. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5; see also FLA. STAT. § 
1003.573(3)(a)(6) (2014). 
315. FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(1)(a). 
316. See id. § 1003.573(3)(a)(6); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 5. 
317. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 
598 (11th Cir. 2010) (alternation in original) (quoting Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
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a . . . disciplinary setting,” spank or paddle a disorderly student.318  However, 
the Eleventh Circuit in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board of 
Education319 stated that it does not want to open the door to a floodgate of 
litigation.320 
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand substantive due 
process rights because of the lack of preconstitutional history, and the need 
for judicial restraint.321  The Fourteenth Amendment “‘protects individual 
liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.’”322  However, cases dealing with 
abusive executive action have repeatedly emphasized that “‘only the most 
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional 
sense.’”323 
In the context of disciplinary corporal punishment in the 
public schools, we emphasize once more that the substantive due 
process claim is quite different than a claim of assault and battery 
under state tort law.  In resolving a state tort claim, [the] decision 
may well turn on whether “ten licks rather than five” were 
excessive, so that line-drawing this refined may be required.  But 
substantive due process is concerned with violations of personal 
rights of privacy and bodily security of so different an order of 
magnitude that inquiry in a particular case simply need not start at 
the level of concern these distinctions imply.  As in the cognate 
police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in school 
corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied 
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need 
presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a 
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a 
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to 
the conscience.  Not every violation of state tort and criminal 
assault laws will be a violation of this constitutional right, but 
some of course may.324 
                                                     
318. Neal, 229 F.3d at 1072. 
319. 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). 
320. Id. at 1076. 
321. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (citing 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543–44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)). 
322. Neal, 229 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (per curiam)). 
323. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 
598 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). 
324. Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (citations 
omitted). 
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Under Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney,325 to have a viable substantive 
due process claim one must claim severe injury, the force to cause the injury 
must be disproportionate to the need, and the action must be inspired by 
malice.326  It must be brutal and inhumane abuse that shocks the 
conscience.327  The Hall ex rel. Hall standard of shock the conscience is 
followed in the Eleventh Circuit.328  The Due Process Clause is not triggered 
“‘whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm,’” and it is not 
meant to conform state causes of action into federal causes of action.329 
In determining if a student’s allegations of corporal punishment rise 
to the level of arbitrariness, and shock the conscience in violation of the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the student, 
plaintiff, must allege:  “(1) [a] school official intentionally used . . . excessive 
[force] under the circumstances, and (2) the force used presented a 
reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury.”330 
T.W. ex. rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, Florida331 
is a recent Eleventh Circuit case involving corporal punishment inflicted on a 
disabled student in school.332  In this case, T.W. was a disabled fourteen-
year-old student who had “separation anxiety disorder, major depressive 
disorder, dysthymic disorder, receptive expressive language disorder, and 
[was] eventually [diagnosed] with pervasive developmental disorder.”333  
T.W. was able to communicate verbally, but his receptive communicative 
abilities were impaired.334  His teacher, Kathleen Garrett, “completed two 
courses on physical restraint techniques and was certified in crisis prevention 
intervention.”335  Garrett abused T.W. over several months.336  The first 
incident occurred when Garrett—who weighs over three-hundred pounds—
got annoyed at T.W.’s comments for not going into the cool down room, put 
T.W. on the floor face first, sat on his buttocks, and put his hands behind his 
back.337  The second incident was when he did not follow Garrett’s command 
                                                     
 325. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). 
326. Id. at 613. 
327. Id. 
328. Id.; see also T.W., 610 F.3d at 602. 
329. T.W., 610 F.3d at 603 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 848 (1998)). 
330. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th 
Cir. 2000). 
331. 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
332. Id. at 592. 
333. Id. at 593. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. at 595. 
336. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 595–96. 
337. Id. at 595. 
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and started to walk away from her.338  Garrett tried to restrain T.W. while he 
was standing, so T.W. began swinging his hands at her, which then led 
Garrett to force him face down on the floor, and pull his right leg behind his 
left leg for two to three minutes.339  Sabrina Mort, a witness and an aide to 
Garrett who also observed this restraint, said “‘the strength that [Garrett] 
took [T.W.] down with . . . was hard,’ and ‘[t]hey both probably got hurt that 
day.’”340  “Mort testified that it was inappropriate for Garrett to pull T.W.’s 
leg up in that manner.”341  “Mort [also] testified that, at least once a week, 
Garrett would ‘pick and nag at [T.W.] until he would just get to the point 
where he just [could not] take it anymore.’  Garrett often restrained her 
students after doing something to upset or anger them.”342 
The third incident occurred when T.W. did not listen to Garrett’s 
instruction to stop scratching the insect bite on his arm, which was when 
Garrett pushed T.W.’s arms down to prevent him from scratching.343  When 
T.W. began screaming and cursing at Garrett, she pulled T.W. from the 
table—without pushing the chair out first—causing his legs to hit the 
table.344  She put his arms behind his back, forced him against the table, and 
leaned on his back with all of her weight to keep him in this position.345  
When Garrett held T.W. in this position, he told her it hurt him, but Garrett 
would only release him once he said he would do his work.346  He then said 
he would do his work, she released him, and he went back to scratching the 
bite on his arm.347  “Garrett told T.W. to go to the cool down room, but he 
refused.”348  She then forced him into the cool down room and shut the 
door.349  “Mort heard T.W. scream[ing] ‘leave me alone,’ ‘stop it,’ and 
‘[you are] hurting me,’” while furniture was being moved inside the cool 
down room.350  Garrett came out, and minutes later, T.W. came out 
screaming at Garrett that he would tell his mother what she did to him.351  
“The next day, T.W.’s mother [wrote] a note to [the] school asking why 
                                                     
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. (alterations in original). 
341. T.W., 610 F.3d at 595. 
342. Id. at 594 (alterations in original). 
343. Id. at 595. 
344. Id. 
345. Id. 
346. T.W., 610 F.3d at 595. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. T.W., 610 F.3d at 595–96. 
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Garrett had twisted T.W.’s arm and shoved him against the wall in the cool 
down room.”352 
In the fourth incident, another aide, Jennifer Rodriguez, observed 
T.W. standing when Garrett pulled his hands behind his back and escorted 
him to the cool down room.353  Rodriguez testified that it is not appropriate 
to put a student’s arms behind his or her back because it can cause 
asphyxiation.354 
The fifth time, which Mort testified to in court, was when Garrett put 
T.W. in the cool down room, shut off the lights, and then blocked the exit by 
sitting in front of it for more than five minutes.355  When T.W. was allowed 
out of the cool down room, he started mumbling, and Garrett put her foot out 
to purposefully trip him.356 
On two separate occasions, T.W.’s mother observed bruises on his 
arms and he told her that Garrett had hurt him.357  Dr. Upchurch, a 
psychologist, “explained that ‘[t]he systemized application of harsh words 
and actions towards the students in the class and towards [T.W.] himself 
created an environment of danger and fear . . . , which resulted in his 
exhibiting symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.’”358  Dr. Upchurch 
also explained that, “[b]ecause T.W. was ‘one of the higher functioning 
students in the class, . . . . [h]is inability to protect the [other students] 
created a sense of guilt and powerlessness.’”359  Dr. Upchurch concluded that 
T.W.’s aggravated stress and his feeling of not being safe at school caused 
him to drop out.360  Dr. Danziger, another psychiatrist retained by T.W., said 
Garrett probably “‘suffered from both sexual masochism and sexual sadism’ 
[because] Garrett’s verbal and physical abuse of her students was ‘consistent 
with someone whose private sadistic sexual practices spilled over into the 
classroom setting.’”361 
It is important to note that the police arrested Garrett for child abuse 
based on the four students’ allegations and the jury found her guilty on one 
count, but the court withheld adjudication.362 
T.W. claims that Garrett verbally and physically abused the disabled 
students “and engaged in sadistic sexual behavior [that] supports an 
                                                     
352. Id. at 596. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. T.W., 610 F.3d at 596. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. (alterations in original). 
359. Id. (alterations in original). 
360. Id. 
361. T.W., 610 F.3d at 597. 
362. Id. 
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inference that Garrett restrained T.W. out of malice and sadism, not for the 
purpose of discipline.”363  The court stated that the key inquiry is not the 
manner of the use of force, but if the use of force is directly related to the 
student’s misconduct and whether it is used for disciplinary purposes.364  The 
court found that, out of the five incidents that were testified to, only one 
incident was not for the use of disciplinary purposes.365  The first incident 
was related to discipline because Garrett said she would release him when he 
followed her instructions, and she did.366  The second incident was related to 
discipline because she told him that she would release him once he calmed 
down, and she did.367  The third incident was related to discipline because 
she said she would release him when he agreed to do his work, and she 
did.368  The fourth incident was related to discipline because Garrett only 
restrained T.W. on the way to the cool down room.369  The fifth incident, 
however—when Garrett tripped T.W. on his way out of the cool down 
room—was not related to disciplinary purposes.370  The court held that it 
does not have to determine if Garrett’s use of force was elevated to a shock 
the conscience level in the fifth incident because tripping a student, which 
causes the student to stumble—without anything more—does not violate the 
Constitution.371 
The court then looked towards the other four incidents to see if 
T.W.’s rights were violated because he was not free from excessive corporal 
punishment.372  The first step is to have the plaintiff prove that the school’s 
use of corporal punishment was excessive.373  To establish if the amount of 
force was excessive, the court looks at the totality of the circumstances, 
which encompasses three steps:  (1) the need for using corporal punishment; 
(2) the relationship between the need of corporal punishment and the amount 
of punishment used; and (3) the degree of the inflicted injury.374  The court 
held that the first four incidents resulted from attempts to “restore order, 
maintain discipline, or protect T.W. from self-injurious behavior.”375  These 
incidents of restraint were due to T.W. not following Garrett’s instructions, 
                                                     
363. Id. at 598. 
364. Id. at 598–99. 
365. Id. at 599. 
366. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
371. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. at 600. 
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refusing to go to the cool down room, refusing to stop scratching an insect 
bite, and what led to the fourth incident is unclear, but it occurred on the way 
to the cool down room.376  T.W.’s argument was that the need for Garrett’s 
use of force was non-existent because Garrett was the one who provoked him 
to act out.377  The court noted that there was evidence that Garrett teased 
T.W. until he became angry, but there was no evidence to assert Garrett 
provoked him.378 
T.W. also claimed that Garrett’s actions were purposely inflicted at 
him and other students, and that Garrett engaged in sadistic sexual 
behavior.379  The court stated that “‘[i]f the use of force was objectively 
reasonable—that is, if it “was not excessive as a matter of law and was a 
reasonable response to the student’s misconduct”—then the subjective intent 
of the school official is unimportant.’”380  The court reasoned that by viewing 
the four incidents objectively, even if force was used too soon, Garrett’s use 
of force was not wholly unjustified.381 
The next step is to consider if the need of force was proportionate to 
the force exerted.382  The court found that Garrett’s use of force was not 
necessary and was inappropriate, but also that Garrett’s “‘amount of force . . 
. was [not] unrelated’ to the need to . . . use force.”383  This was because 
Garrett only restrained or secluded him for a few minutes at a time, and even 
though the force might have been inappropriate, it was directly related to 
furthering the government’s goal of furthering education.384  All of Garrett’s 
restraining and seclusions were so T.W. could calm down, stop being 
disruptive, and do his work.385 
The third factor looks at the extent and nature of T.W.’s injuries.386  
The court found that T.W. only suffered minor injuries—a few bruises that 
his mother saw.387  The court found Garrett’s conduct did exacerbate T.W.’s 
developmental disability, behavioral problems, and caused him to have post-
traumatic stress disorder.388  The court has never considered if substantive 
                                                     
376. T.W., 610 F.3d at 600. 
377. Id. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. (quoting Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1337 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam)). 
381. T.W., 610 F.3d at 600. 
382. Id. at 601. 
383. Id. (alteration in original). 
384. See id. 
385. Id. 
386. T.W., 610 F.3d at 601. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. 
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due process can be violated by psychological injuries.389  The court looked at 
the totality of the circumstances, including T.W.’s psychological problems, 
and found that Garrett’s behavior was not arbitrary, egregious, or a shock to 
the conscience.390  The court said it did “not condone the use of [excessive] 
force [on] a vulnerable student . . . but no reasonable jury could [have] 
conclude[d] that Garrett’s use of force was obviously excessive in the 
constitutional sense.”391 
The Supreme Court does not have a case on point of a student’s 
substantive due process rights being violated due to excessive force of 
corporal punishment.392  The lower courts have had to develop a test to 
approach corporal punishment, and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits use the 
Fourth Amendment approach, while the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use the substantive due process tests.393  
When parents and disabled students finally get to the court system, they have 
to satisfy the factors of the Hall ex rel. Hall test, they have to have evidence 
because they have a high burden of proof; additionally, the disabled children 
can have communication problems, and these behavioral problems, can limit 
the student’s credibility.394  Looking at all of the factors, the court is not set 
up for justice, and even if by some chance the parents and disabled student 
win in court, the disabled student was still abused and that is something the 
court cannot undo.395  The test that the Eleventh Circuit applies—the shock 
the conscience standard—is too high of a burden for parents and disabled 
students to meet.396  In T.W.’s case, the same techniques that Garrett used on 
him killed another student, and that still did not violate substantive due 
process rights.397  After what Garrett did to T.W., the Florida Administrative 
Code rules—which have been in effect since August 7, 2008—prohibited 
                                                     
389. Id. 
390. Id. at 602. 
391. T.W., 610 F.3d at 602. 
392. Lewis M. Wasserman, Corporal Punishment in K-12 Public School 
Settings:  Reconsideration of Its Constitutional Dimensions Thirty Years After Ingraham v. 
Wright, 26 TOURO L. REV. 1029, 1098 & n.486 (2011); see also Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 
F.2d 607, 610–11 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing substantive due process elements).  Compare 
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing a Fourth 
Amendment violation instead of a due process violation), with Johnson ex rel. T.J. v. 
Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2001). 
393. Wasserman, supra note 392, at 1098–99. 
394. Mulay, supra note 47, at 347–48; see also Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
395. Mulay, supra note 47, at 348. 
396. See id. 
397. See T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla. 610 F.3d 588, 
595 (11th Cir. 2010); M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 
1325 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Mulay, supra note 47, at 350 n.141. 
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“[r]estraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical device, 
behind his or her back,” “[m]ovement, hyperextension, or twisting of body 
parts,” and “[a]ny reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or 
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life.”398  If T.W.’s case went 
to the Eleventh Circuit today with these new procedures now in effect, the 
Eleventh Circuit might hold that Garrett did violate T.W.’s substantive due 
process rights by using excessive corporal punishment, and restricting his 
freedom of movement by restraining him.399 
In another case, M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole County School 
Board400—involving the same teacher as in T.W.—the Middle District of 
Florida generated a different outcome.401  M.S. ex rel. Soltys concerns a 
disabled student who is mentally retarded, severely autistic, nonverbal, and 
only say about ten to twenty words.402  M.S. is alleging that “Garrett 
subjected M.S. to . . . physical, emotional, and verbal abuse” and that M.S. 
observed other acts similar to what he experienced to fellow classmates.403  
The way Garrett treated M.S. was what led to Garrett’s arrest in 2004 when 
Mort and Rodriguez told the assistant principal about the way Garrett treated 
some of the disabled students.404  The incident occurred when Garrett was 
unhappy that M.S. was looking at a magazine instead of doing his work.405  
M.S. refused to do his work, and pinched Garrett, which was normal when he 
did not get his way.406  When this occurred, Garrett  
“jerked him out of his desk so fast and flipped [his] body down on 
the desk, had the one arm behind him, took the other arm and put it 
behind him, started to lean down and with her left hand she held 
his head down.”  Garrett then pushed M.S.’s head down across the 
desk while holding his hands behind his back until “his eyes were 
bulging” and “his lips started turning . . . a purply light blue.”407 
                                                     
398. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.009(4), (6), (9) (2014); see also T.W., 
610 F.3d at 595. 
399. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602 (inferring that from these now effective rules— 
Florida Administrative Code rules 65G-8.009(4), (6), and (9)—the Eleventh Circuit might 
have held differently because Garrett’s use of force was not in line with her duties as a 
teacher, and it went beyond her duties to restrain him the way she did multiple times as well 
with the other students). 
400. 636 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
401. Compare id. at 1326, with T.W., 610 F.3d at 602. 
402. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. 
403. Id. 
404. Id. at 1320. 
405. Id. at 1319. 
406. Id. 
407. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1319–20 (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted). 
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Mort, a school aide, told Garrett to release M.S. because he had 
enough and Garrett finally released him.408  Upon releasing him, Garrett 
physically assaulted Mort by pushing him against the door and telling him 
“‘[t]his is my fucking class and [I will] run it the way I see fit.’”409 
Other acts that Mort and Rodriguez testified to involved Garrett’s 
behavior toward M.S.410  In Mort’s deposition, she recounted several 
incidents of Garrett abusing M.S.411  “One incident [was] when Mort took 
M.S. to [use] the restroom to change his clothes because he . . . wet his pants 
[which was] common . . . due to his developmental disabilities and his lack 
of toilet training.”412 Garrett followed M.S. and Mort, and when they reached 
the restroom door she shut it and told M.S. “‘[y]ou will not piss [your pants] 
in my class,’” and after every word she continuously struck M.S. “in the 
back of the head with the [bottom] of her palm.”413  Mort said Garrett hit 
M.S. hard, and the last strike was “‘so hard that his chin hit his knee.’”414  In 
another instance like the one just mentioned, M.S. had to change his pants in 
the restroom again, and Garrett “‘smacked him on the butt’” which was firm 
enough to leave three fingerprint marks, which Mort saw when she changed 
his clothes.415  Another incident that Mort relayed was that Garrett frequently 
hit M.S. with her fist and elbow for a wide variety of reasons like making 
him be quiet, to make him continue his school work, to stop M.S. from trying 
to kiss her, and to stop him from laying down to go to sleep.416  At times, 
these blows from Garrett were firm enough to make M.S.’s whole head 
jerk.417  Rodriguez gave the same accounts as Mort did and some other 
instances where Garrett abused M.S.418  M.S.’s parents said that before 
enrolling him in this school, he was not an aggressive child; he played with 
the neighbors and his parents, and even traveled to Europe with his 
parents.419  But after being at this school with Garrett abusing M.S., he is 
now more aggressive towards his siblings and even strangers.420  His parents 
remember one incident when they drove him to school and M.S. had a panic 
                                                     
408. Id. at 1320. 
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410. Id. 
411. Id. 
412. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1320. 
413. Id. (alteration in original). 
414. Id. 
415. Id. 
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417. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 (alterations in original). 
418. Id. 
419. Id. at 1321. 
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attack; he started to cry and scream ‘“no school”’ repeatedly while trying to 
get back into his parents car.421 
M.S. and his parents allege that his Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process rights were violated due to being mentally and 
physically abused by his teacher Garrett.422  “Embodied in the [Fourteenth 
Amendment] right is the right to be free from excessive force at the hands of 
a government official.”423  To establish if a governmental actor is liable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983424 the court must look to the following four factors:  
(1) the need for using corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the 
need for corporal punishment and the amount of punishment used, and (3) 
the degree of the inflicted injury, and (4) “whether force was applied in a 
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”425  The shock the 
conscience threshold is quickly reached when the victim is more vulnerable 
to abuse and is defenseless.426 
First, the court considered the need to use corporal punishment by 
looking to M.S.’s normal conduct, which is pinching to get attention and an 
inability to control bodily functions, versus Garret smashing M.S.’s head into 
the desk and leaning on him, all three hundred pounds worth of Garrett, 
“until his eyes bulged out [of his head] and his face turned blue.”427  The 
court found that a jury could determine that there was no need for Garrett to 
use corporal punishment for M.S.’s normal actions and for actions he could 
not control like wetting his pants.428  The court then considered the 
relationship between the need of corporal punishment and the amount of 
                                                     
421. Id. 
422. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
423. Id. 
424. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States 
Code states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
Id. 
425. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
426. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
427. Id. at 1324; see also T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 
Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir. 2010). 
428. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. 
206
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/5
2015] THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION 309 
punishment used, finding that a jury could determine that Garrett’s use of 
corporal punishment and physical force was disproportionate to the 
disciplinary actions needed.429 
Next in the court’s analysis, was the extent of M.S.’s injury.430  
Garrett’s sole argument was that M.S.’s injury did not meet the shock the 
conscience threshold, and that there were no physical injuries.431  The court 
rejected Garrett’s argument because a reasonable jury could have found—if 
it accepted the plaintiff’s evidence—that M.S.’s injuries were physical, 
mental, and emotional.432  “[E]ven though [M.S.’s] alleged injuries [were] 
more difficult to quantify than . . . the average [corporal punishment] case, 
that [did] not mean they [were] nonexistent.”433  M.S.’s mother noticed he 
had bruising on multiple occasions but that it was due to his own self-
infliction.434  M.S.’s parents said they noticed behavioral changes in M.S. 
after he was put in the school where Garrett was his teacher.435  M.S. was 
also in the classroom with ten other students who were all autistic, and 
observed Garrett abuse other disabled students verbally and physically.436  
The court noted that this could have created an aggressive and abusive 
environment.437  A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is determined on 
a case-by-case basis.438  The degree of injury must be weighed with the need 
to exert excessive physical force and the plaintiff’s vulnerability.439  There 
are circumstances that call for extreme, immediate measures to ensure the 
                                                     
429. Id. at 1323–24. 
430. Id. at 1324. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. 
433. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. at 1324 n.6.  The court noted that Garrett wanted it to disregard other 
allegations of child abuse besides M.S.  Id.  The court concluded that it could not do that 
because M.S. could have been affected by watching his classmates be abused by Garrett.  
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 n.6. 
In a classroom of fewer than ten students, all of whom were autistic, the regular use 
of unnecessary violence and the consistent barrage of verbal assaults could have 
created a harmful and perhaps emotionally abusive environment.  When that 
environment is coupled with evidence of direct physical assault such as alleged 
here, the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred is one for a jury.  
Garrett’s direct abuse of one child was a different kind of abuse for another.  An 
absurd result might follow, particularly in this setting, if Garrett’s actions were 
considered in a vacuum and Garrett benefitted from the fact that she mistreated all 
of the children rather than confining her abuse to a single child. 
Id. 
437. Id. at 1324 n.6. 
438. See id. at 1325. 
439. Id. 
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safety of other students and those around them.440  Nonetheless, “school . . . 
restraints used as aversive techniques to control behavior or impose negative 
consequences should never be used on children.”441  Garrett physically 
abused M.S. by slapping him on his buttocks so hard she left fingerprint 
marks, slapping his head so that his head shook and hit his chin, and 
slamming him into the desk so that he could not breathe—his face turning 
blue and his eyes bulging out.442  Here, a jury could have determined that 
Garrett maliciously used unnecessary and excessive physical force against a 
helpless autistic child.443 
Finally, the court considered “whether the force was [used] in good 
faith” to maintain order and restore discipline to the room, or was inspired by 
malice.444  The court found that Garrett could have needed to use some type 
of physical restraint to maintain order in the room and restore discipline 
when M.S. pinched her; however, the court found that the excessive force 
Garrett used by slamming M.S. into the desk, leaning on him so he could not 
breathe, and causing his eyes to bulge out of his head, was not needed to 
restore order to the room.445  M.S. suffered severe physical and emotional 
damages due to multiple abusive incidents.446  If Garrett only had this one 
abusive incident with M.S. she might have escaped constitutional liability 
under Hall ex rel. Hall.447  Nevertheless, this was evidence that there was not 
only one incident of abuse, but multiple incidents, making a pattern of 
abuse.448  If these incidents came out at trial, a jury could have found that 
Garrett’s actions were not made in good faith to restore order to the 
classroom, and that she had malicious intent.449 
If at trial M.S. was found to have suffered a violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Garrett would not be subject to qualified 
immunity because she used excessive punishment on an autistic, helpless 
child who could not communicate, which is prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.450  M.S. has “the right to be free from excessive and arbitrary 
                                                     
440. Craig Goodmark, A Tragic Void:  Georgia’s Failure to Regulate Restraint 
& Seclusion in Schools, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 249, 256 (2010). 
441. Id. 
442. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
443. Id. at 1324. 
444. Id. at 1325. 
445. Id. 
446. Id. 
447. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325; see also Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 
F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
448. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
449. Id. 
450. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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corporal punishment,” especially in a school milieu.451  This was 
established under the precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Ingraham and from the Eleventh Circuit in Neal ex rel. Neal.452  The court 
denied Garrett’s motion for summary judgment because a jury could have 
concluded that Garrett’s use of corporal punishment was excessive, and it 
violated M.S.’s Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of movement and to 
be free from corporal punishment.453 
C. The Rowley Court Set the Legal Test to Determine if a Child Has a 
FAPE in School 
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that a 
FAPE is comprised of: 
[E]ducational instruction specially designed to meet the unique 
needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are 
necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.  
Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition 
also requires that such instruction and services be provided at 
public expense and under public supervision, meet the [s]tate’s 
educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the 
[s]tate’s regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP.  
Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient 
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the 
instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are 
satisfied, the child is receiving a free, appropriate public education 
as defined by the Act.454 
Its holding gave special education providers a loophole to not 
educate to the fullest extent possible because under the law, if they abide by 
the student’s IEP, give them any special education instruction, and an aide—
plus anything else that the statute requires—the child is receiving a FAPE.455  
Although it is a FAPE, nevertheless, it is not the best free public 
education.456  The disabled child’s parents’ argument is that the goal of the 
                                                     
451. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
452. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 
2000); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678 (1977). 
453. M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325–26; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. 
454. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 188–89 (1982). 
455. See id. at 203. 
456. See id. at 189. 
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EHA—what is now amended as IDEA457—is to provide FAPE to disabled 
children who qualify, but it fails to provide an equal opportunity for 
education.458  Mills and Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children both held 
that handicapped children are required to receive access to “adequate, 
publicly supported education,” not that handicapped children require “any 
particular substantive level of education.”459  The Supreme Court of the 
United States noted in a footnote that every need of disabled children cannot 
be met, which is why the special education teachers and the parents make an 
IEP, to see what services the student will receive.460  “‘If sufficient funds are 
not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed . . . 
then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no 
child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent 
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom.’”461  The Supreme Court of 
the United States stated that insufficient funding or even administrative 
inefficiency of a school could not burden the exceptional disabled student 
more than a normal child.462  This case purports that there is no equality in 
education for disabled—or exceptional students, as called by IDEA—and 
normal children.463  IDEA provisions provide that disabled children should 
be in the least restrictive environment, which is being in a regular class with 
other nondisabled students, along with an aide, if possible.464  This means 
that a disabled child would be learning at the same rate of a nondisabled 
child in school.465 
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Center School 
District v. Rowley466, the school would not provide a deaf child with a 
qualified sign language interpreter in her classes.467  The parents and the 
                                                     
457. DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, supra note 80, at 15; see also 20 U.S.C. § 
1400 (2012). 
458. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198; see also Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No 94-142, § 1401, 89 Stat. 773 (amended 1990). 
459. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 193 (citing Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam) and Mills v. Bd. of Educ. 
of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D. D.C. 1972)).  The Supreme Court of the United States 
agreed with both cases on how much education disabled children receive versus how much 
education the disabled children need.  See id. at 193 n.15. 
460. Id. at 193 n. 15, 194 n.16. 
461. Id. at 199 (quoting Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876). 
462. See id. at 193 n.15; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876. 
463. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. 
464. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 47, at 3. 
465. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 47, at 3. 
466. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
467. Id. at 184–85. 
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student sued the School District of New York under EHA of 1975—amended 
now as 20 U.S.C. § 1401—because the school district denied her a FAPE.468  
The school district denied the student’s request because she was excelling in 
all her classes and understanding the material without the help of a sign 
language interpreter.469  The court applied a two-part test to determine if a 
disabled child had a FAPE:  (1) whether the state has complied with the 
procedures required by EHA or IDEA; and (2) was the IEP reasonably 
calculated to have the disabled student obtain educational value?470 
The Rowley standard has been prominent in EHA cases—the 
predecessor to IDEA cases—for over twenty-five years, and Congress has 
still not expressed disagreement with it.471  If Congress did explicitly 
disagree with the Rowley standard, it could change the FAPE definition.472  
Yet Congress still has not amended the statutory FAPE definition, which 
“weighs strongly against finding a congressional intent to alter the Rowley 
standard,” of FAPE.473 
Cases are brought under the Rowley standard by the parents and 
disabled children arguing that being restrained and secluded is a denial of 
their FAPE.474  Their argument is supported by a report which states that the 
restraining or secluding of a disabled child takes away from their goals in the 
IEP.475  It also distracts them from their education since they will not be 
educated during the time they are restrained or secluded.476  It can also make 
them anxious, and even develop more behavioral issues in the future.477 
                                                     
468. 20 U.S.C. § 1401; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. 
469. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. 
470. Id. at 206–07. 
471. Alyssa Kaplan, Note, Harm Without Recourse:  The Need for a Private 
Right of Action in Federal Restraint and Seclusion Legislation, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 
590–91 n.60 (2010); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07. 
472. Kaplan, supra note 471, at 590 n.60; see also Rowley, 548 U.S. at 206–07. 
473. Kaplan, supra note 471, at 590 n.60 (quoting Mr. C. ex rel. K.C. v. Me. 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D. Me. 2008)); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. 
at 206–07. 
474. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Kaplan, supra note 471, at 589–90. 
475. See NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SCHOOL IS NOT SUPPOSED TO 
HURT: UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN 2009 TO PREVENT AND REDUCE RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION IN 
SCHOOLS 27 (2010), available at http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/
Publications/Reports/School-is-Not-Supposed-to-Hurt-NDRN.pdf. 
476. See id. 
477. See JESSICA BUTLER, COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS & ADVOCATES, 
UNSAFE IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE:  ABUSE OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 1, 20, 25–26, 44 
(2009), available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/collection/662B1866-
952D-41FA-B7F3-D3CF68639918/UnsafeCOPAAMay_27_2009.pdf. 
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D. Disabled Children and Their Parents Suing Schools Under the 
Federal Statute IDEA Does Not Provide the Protection Most Disabled 
Students Sought for in the Federal Court System 
IDEA is what most litigants sue under when trying to protect the 
rights of their disabled children.478  In the IDEA provisions, a school is 
supposed to provide FAPE to disabled students.479  This is because IDEA is a 
federal program that gives money to state and local agencies that comply 
with the conditions in IDEA to aid disabled students in receiving a better 
education.480  FAPE is supposed to tailor education services and provide 
aides to disabled students, which help them learn better in a least restrictive 
environment.481  With all of these provisions in IDEA to help disabled 
children receive a better and free education, it would seem logical that this 
statute would aid disabled students in vindicating their rights that have been 
infringed.482  However, most parents of disabled children who were 
restrained or secluded in school cannot immediately sue the school or anyone 
involved.483  This is because through IDEA, one of the provisions is that all 
administrative remedies have to be exhausted before a parent can file a suit 
in court on their child’s behalf.484 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There should be a federal and state mandate from the Supreme Court 
of the United States, U.S. Congress, and the Florida Legislature, that 
expressly prohibits all restraint and seclusion techniques, except in 
emergency circumstances where the disabled student is a threat to himself or 
to others around him.485  The federal and state statutes should ban all: 
1.  Reactive strategies involving noxious or painful stimuli, as 
prohibited by section 393.13(4)(g) [of the Florida Statutes]; 
2.  Untested or experimental procedures; 
                                                     
478. Mulay, supra note 47, at 340; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). 
479. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 
694–95 (11th Cir. 1991). 
480. Greer, 950 F.2d at 694; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400. 
481. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(i), (a)(5)(A); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 47, at 3. 
482. See Mulay, supra note 47, at 340. 
483. Id. at 341. 
484. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)–(8), (g)(1); Mulay, supra note 47, at 341. 
485. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-8.006(6)–(7) (2014); U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 2. 
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3.  Any physical crisis management technique that might restrict or 
obstruct an individual’s airway or impair breathing, including 
techniques whereby staff persons use their hands or body to place 
pressure on the client’s head, neck, back, chest, abdomen, or 
joints; 
4.  Restraint of an individual’s hands, with or without a mechanical 
device, behind his or her back; 
5.  Physical holds relying on the inducement of pain for behavioral 
control; 
6.  Movement, hyperextension, or twisting of body parts; 
7.  Any maneuver that causes a loss of balance without physical 
support—such as tripping or pushing—for the purpose of 
containment; 
8.  Any reactive strategy in which a pillow, blanket, or other item 
is used to cover the individual’s face as part of the restraint 
process; 
9.  Any reactive strategy that may exacerbate a known medical or 
physical condition, or endanger the individual’s life; 
10.  Use of any containment technique medically contraindicated 
for an individual; 
11. Containment without continuous monitoring and 
documentation of vital signs and status with respect to release 
criteria.486 
Furthermore, all disabled students and special education teachers 
should start using a positive reinforcement system instead of a negative 
reinforcement system—like secluding or restraining children.487  All special 
education teachers should be required to get certified and recertified every 
five years, and do continuing education to learn more about working with 
disabled children properly and effectively.488  The statutes should also restate 
that all disabled students should be entitled to due process of law, and have a 
                                                     
486. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.009(1)–(11). 
487. See, e.g., JIM WRIGHT, INTERVENTION CENT., HOW TO:  IMPROVE 
CLASSROOM BEHAVIORS USING SELF-MONITORING CHECKLISTS 1–2 (2014), available at http://
www.interventioncentral.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
pdfs_blog/self_management_self_monitoring_behavior_checklist.pdf. 
488. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 65G-8.005(3). 
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right to be free from bodily restraint and corporal punishment from a 
governmental actor.489 
The solution should be modeled after the U.S. Department of 
Education’s solution, which states that no student should be restrained or 
secluded unless the student is in imminent danger to cause physical harm to 
himself or others.490  The U.S. Department of Education also proposes that 
when a student has a history of dangerous and escalating behavior, and 
teachers have previously restrained or secluded the child to restore order, “a 
school [ought to make] a plan for (1) teaching and supporting more 
appropriate behavior; and (2) determining positive methods to prevent 
behavioral escalations that have previously resulted in the use of restraint or 
seclusion.”491 
To aid with this new positive behavior technique, the federal statute 
and the Florida statute should also include a monitoring checklist, so students 
can monitor their own progress.492  There are two checklists that students can 
fill out with their teachers.493  The school can obtain sample checklists 
online.494  It has been proven that students who have their own checklists that 
target positive behavioral conduct and replacement behaviors—which 
replace problem behaviors known to trigger restraint and seclusion—show 
improvement in their general classroom conduct.495  The teacher can 
customize each checklist for each disabled student with what each student 
needs to work on throughout the day.496  The teacher can then conduct a 
monitoring session for certain students, and as the school day progresses, the 
student can check off what he thought he did correctly and what 
improvements are needed.497  Then, this can be compared to the teacher’s 
self-assessment through the student’s conduct, and the student can better 
equate what is expected of him throughout the day.498 
Researchers have also found that “[s]tudents are more likely to 
achieve [success] when they are (1) directly taught school and classroom 
routines and social expectations that are predictable and contextually 
relevant; (2) acknowledged clearly and consistently for their displays of 
positive academic and social behavior; and (3) treated by others with 
                                                     
489. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. STAT. § 393.13(g) (2014). 
490. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 16–17. 
491. Id. at 17. 
492. See Wright, supra note 487, at 1. 
493. Id. at 3–5. 
494. E.g., id. at 2. 
495. See id. at 1–2. 
496. Id. at 1. 
497. Wright, supra note 487, at 1, 3–5. 
498. See id. at 1. 
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respect.”499  To do this the entire school needs to be invested in having a 
positive behavioral support system, not just the students with behavioral 
problems.500  The school should:  Focus on preventing the problem behavior 
by finding the underlying root to the behavioral problem and “review[] 
behavioral data regularly” that they are required to report, so they can adopt 
“procedures to the needs of all students and provid[e] additional academic 
and social behavioral supports for students who are not making expected  
progress.”501  There is no evidence that shows that school officials, teachers, 
or aides who use restraining and secluding methods actually positively 
benefit the child.502  There is also no evidence that shows that using 
restraining and secluding methods reduce the occurrence of behavioral 
outbursts.503  These behavioral outbursts are normally what cause others to 
use these abusive methods on the disabled students in the first place.504  A 
ban should be in place for all types of restraint and seclusion, and be replaced 
with positive behavioral reinforcement techniques.505 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Students with disabilities should not be abused when they go to 
school by being restrained and secluded.506  Disabled students being 
restrained and secluded in school violates their Fourteenth Amendment 
procedural and substantive due process rights.507  When this occurs, school 
personnel violate the students’ procedural due process rights because the 
disabled students’ interests fall within the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s life, liberty, or property interests; due process is the addition 
of procedural safeguards which cost the school little to nothing.508  These 
procedural safeguards should be:  (1) notifying the parents of restraining or 
secluding students before it occurs so they can sign a consent form; (2) 
allowing the parents and student to have a due process hearing before an 
incident occurs; and (3) after the incident occurs, letting the parents know 
why it happened.509  Then, the parents and student can be afforded a due 
                                                     
499. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 2–3. 
500. Id. at 3. 
501. Id. 
502. Id. at 2. 
503. Id. 
504. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 82, at 15–16, 18–19. 
505. Id. at 8, 12, 15, 18; see also Wright, supra note 487, at 1. 
506. FLA. STAT. § 393.13(3)(g) (2014). 
507. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
508. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); see also Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
509. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 1. 
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process hearing to make sure the restraint or seclusion was necessary after 
the incident.510  These procedural safeguards are required by the 
reauthorization of IDEA in 2004, which requires the U. S. Department of 
Education to create model forms for an IEP, prior written notice, and 
procedural safeguards for restraint and seclusion of disabled students.511 
Furthermore, disabled students’ substantive due process rights are 
violated when:  (1) there is a severe injury; (2) the force to cause the injury 
was disproportionate to the need; and (3) the action was inspired by 
malice.512  For a court to establish if a student’s allegations of corporal 
punishment rise to a level of arbitrariness and the shock the conscience 
standard—which would violate the student’s substantive due process 
rights—the student or parents must allege:  “(1) a school official 
intentionally used . . . excessive [force] under the circumstances, and (2) the 
force used presented a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily 
injury.”513  It also would aid them if they were able to prove that the teacher 
has a pattern of abuse instead of one isolated incident.514  This would prove it 
was done with malicious intent.515  If a student proves the above test, then the 
court would rule that the student’s substantive due process rights were 
violated because the teacher’s actions were not made in good faith to restore 
order to the classroom, but were done with malicious intent.516  In most 
cases, the teachers that abuse disabled students by restraining and secluding 
them are not isolated incidents.517  Disabled students have suffered severe 
injury from these techniques used in schools.518  Courts have held that 
excessive corporal punishment used maliciously on disabled students 
violates their substantive due process rights to be free from bodily restraint 
and punishment.519 
                                                     
510. See FLA. STAT. § 1003.573 (1), (3), (5) (2014); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
65G-8.012 (2014). 
511. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, supra note 81, at 1. 
512. See Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
513. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th 
Cir. 2000); see also T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. Of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 
598 (11th Cir. 2010). 
514. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 
636 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
515. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
516. See T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
517. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 7. 
518. Id. at 7, 10. 
519. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977); T.W., 610 F.3d at 602; 
M.S., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. 
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